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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
Introduction
This thesis is organised in three main papers that investigate different aspects of banking. In
this introduction, we start by giving a brief overview of the banking industry with particular focus
on the functions fulfilled by banks and on the evolution of this industry in the last few decades.
In a second step, we discuss the three main studies that constitute this thesis and highlight our
main contributions to the banking literature.
As noted by Shiller (2012) in his book Finance and the Good Society, banks have survived
centuries of financial evolution, and thus have found an important niche in the economy. Banks
are present in the daily lives (e.g. transaction services, money supply) of most individuals. While
the form taken by banks has steadily evolved, their main (traditional) function, consisting in taking
deposits to finance investments, has remained much the same. This function is often labelled as
intermediation function consisting in channelling funds from individuals with no immediate use
of their savings to individuals and firms with productive investment opportunities (Mishkin &
Eakins, 2012).
In order to fulfil this main intermediation function and guarantee the attractiveness of their
liquid, little risk-bearing deposits that pay a fixed interest rate, banks further contribute to three
subordinated economic functions. First, banks achieve liquidity for their depositors by pooling
the investments of many depositors. By keeping a sufficient amount of liquidity in reserve to
cover the normal volume of withdrawals, they allow deposits backed up by illiquid investments to
remain highly liquid.1 Second, banks address a moral hazard problem that individuals seeking a
return on their investments face if they try to invest directly. Individual investors may be robbed
since some companies may not care about losses imposed to small investors. Banks, on the other
hand, and even if they do make the occasional bad call, have numerous other investments in their
portfolios, a strategy that generally helps them maintain their integrity and reputations. For this
reason, depositors often perceive banks as safer and more appropriate. And third, banks address a
selection bias problem. Most individuals have no way of evaluating the trustworthiness of potential
investments. In contrast, banks deal on a personal basis with the businesses to which they lend
money and they collect detailed information about these businesses (Shiller, 2012).
1This system usually works as intended, though it is vulnerable to sudden panic or bank runs. To prevent these
situations from happening, governments have designed schemes such as deposit insurance, suspension of liquidity,
and regulation asking banks to hold additional liquidity reserves.
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Additionally to these functions, banks provide a payments system that allows financial and
real resources to flow to their highest-return uses. Moreover, they are also involved in open market
operations through interventions that alter their balance sheets and ultimately contribute to the
monetary control mechanism. Finally, banks are an important source of funds for small borrowers
who often have limited access to other sources of external finance (Berger, Kashyap, Scalise,
Gertler, & M. Friedman, 1995).
As summarised by Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, and Song (2013), various economic studies have
shown that banks, as financial intermediaries, matter for human welfare through their impact
on economic growth, property, entrepreneurship, labour market conditions, and economic oppor-
tunities. For example, King and Levine (1993) found strong links between various measures of
financial development and economic indicators such as real GDP per capita growth, rate of physi-
cal capital accumulation and improvements in the efficiency with which economies employ physical
capital. Similarly, Levine (2005) underlined the important role played by financial intermediaries
and financial markets in promoting economic growth. For instance, better developed financial
systems ease financing constraints on firms. Finally, results from the study of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Levine (2009) suggest that improvements regarding the functioning of financial contracts, financial
markets, and financial intermediaries expand economic opportunities available to individuals and
reduce inequality.
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 has dramatically illustrated the impact that the banking
system has on the real economy. This recession has massively affected most economic sectors, and
this in almost all parts of the world. While the effects of this economic crisis have been widespread,
the origin of the crisis was narrower. The economic crisis was triggered by the financial crisis
that started in 2007 in the U.S.. Problems in the banking industry have spilled over into the real
economy through the credit crunch that followed the start of the financial crisis. While particularly
spectacular, the story in itself was, however, not new (Cetorelli, Mandel, & Mollineaux, 2012). As
documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), many severe economic crises have originated from
financial crises throughout the centuries.
Compared to previous recessions, the economic recession that originated from the 2007-2008
3
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financial crisis has been particularly dramatic in terms of economic output and unemployment. It
reached a level of severity not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s which was triggered by
the stock market crash of 1929. Thus, the Great Depression, similar the the Great Recession, had
its roots in the demise of the banking industry and in the disruption of financial intermediation.
In order to prevent a repetition of the Great Depression, governments implemented tighter
banking regulations. These regulations controlled very strictly the rates at which banks could
lend and borrow money, made it difficult for banks to compete with each other, and drastically
restricted the scope of activities that banks could practice. These tighter regulations resulted in
the banking sector being rather boring and unattractive, or at least in giving the impression that
the banking industry was rather boring and unattractive (DeYoung & Rice, 2004). To illustrate
this unappealing character, the banking industry was ironically labelled as following a “3-6-3
rule”. According to this “rule” that reflected the public opinion regarding the attractiveness of the
banking industry during most of the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, bankers had a stable and
comfortable existence. They paid a three (“3”) percent rate of interest on deposits, charged a six
(“6”) percent rate of interest on loans, and then headed to the golf course at three (“3”) o’clock.
While highly simplified, the 3-6-3 rule nevertheless reflects the fact that the banking industry was
seen as highly noncompetitive and simplistic.
Starting in the 1980s, this rather unappealing image of the banking industry has dramatically
changed. A global trend of deregulation opened up many new businesses to the banks. The most
notorious example is probably the reapealing of the Glass-Steagall Act and its replacement by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted after the Great Depression
and drastically limited the scope of commercial banks’ activities. Another example is the Second
Banking Coordination Directive of 1989 in Europe (Stiroh, 2006). In addition to deregulation,
technological developments like internet banking and ATMs contributed to giving a completely
new visage to the banking industry (DeYoung & Rice, 2004).
Following this wave of deregulation, banks entered new businesses (e.g. investment banking,
insurance, securities brokerage). These new businesses resulted in substantial amounts of noninter-
est income from nontraditional activities. While interest income from lending activities had long
4
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been the main source of operating income, the share of noninterest income substantially increased
from the 1980s on, going in pair with the progressive deregulation that has taken place in this
period (DeYoung & Rice, 2004). As illustration, we show this evolution for U.S. commercial banks
on Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Share of non-interest income out of total income, U.S. commercial
banks 1980-2013
Source of the data: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Historical Statistics on Banking
The fundamental changes of the last few decades have affected both the asset and the liability
side of banks’ balance sheets (Berger et al., 1995). Analysing fundamental changes in the U.S.
banking industry between 1970 and 2003, DeYoung and Rice (2004) underlined three major de-
velopments that have decisively affected financial statements. The first major development relates
to the asset side. Since the mid-1980s, the ratios of low-yielding cash balances to total assets and
investments in loans to total assets have substantially declined. From 1986 to 2003, a 10 percentage
point reduction in loan to total assets has been more than offset by a 12 percentage point increase
in other assets such as derivatives or asset-backed securities to total assets.
The second fundamental change described by DeYoung and Rice (2004) relates to the liability
side and consists in a shift from deposits funding to other funding sources. As illustration, we
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show this evolution for U.S. commercial banks on Figure 1.2. For the authors, these changes in
the composition of banks’ liabilities reflect (1) increased competition from nonbanks for household
and business deposits, (2) expanded ability of large banks to raise debt in financial markets (e.g.
commercial paper, subordinated debt), and (3) regulations that require banks to hold higher levels
of equity.
Figure 1.2: Share of non-deposit funding out of total liabilities and equity capital,
U.S. commercial banks 1980-2013
Source of the data: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Historical Statistics on Banking
The third major change reported by DeYoung and Rice (2004) relates more fundamentally to
the way of analysing banks. Traditionally, the focus of financial analysts has been on balance
sheets. Because of the traditional intermediation function of banks, consisting in deposit-taking
and loan-making, the main information regarding a bank’s activity mix could be found by looking
either at the asset or at the liability side of the balance sheet. Due to recent developments,
DeYoung and Rice (2004) argued that the income statement has become at least as important
as the balance sheet. This is especially true when it comes to assessing the respective share of
commercial and investment activities.
Banks’ balance sheets have become increasingly complex, opaque, and incomplete. As a result,
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they do not reflect all information regarding the main activities performed by banks (Bank for
International Settlements, 2012; Cetorelli et al., 2012; DeYoung & Rice, 2004). An important
reason is the increasing presence of off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities. Though OBS activities
are not recorded on the balance sheet, they nevertheless belong to a bank’s daily business and
generate earnings as well as expenses. For example, Kane and Unal (1990) and Cooper, Jackson,
and Patterson (2003) documented a rapid expansion in OBS activities, notably related to fee-
based service activities. Similarly, Bolt and Humphrey (2010) showed that, while overall revenues
of European banks increased between 1987-2006, their sources shifted from the loan-deposit rate
spread to non-interest income activities. Finally, deregulation and technological changes, as well
as the potential costs and benefits associated with combining bank activities of various kinds, have
resulted in a wider variation of bank activities across the world.
Banks are different from firms in other industries in several ways. The biggest distinction that
sets the banking sector apart from other industries is perhaps its higher degree of regulation and
supervision (Mishkin & Eakins, 2012). Banking regulation affects firm-level characteristics that,
in turns, affect financial ratios such as profitability, equity, or non-performing loans (Shen & Chih,
2005). Leverage is another important distinction. While high leverage is typically interpreted as
financial distress in other industries, it is intrinsic in banking since the intermediation function
consists in deposit-taking and results in a high level of debt (Barber & Lyon, 1997; Fama &
French, 1992; Viale, Kolari, & Fraser, 2009). Financial statements in the banking industry also
differ substantially from financial statements in other industries. Several positions of the balance
sheet or of the income statement are proper to this industry. First, most positions on the asset
and liability side are financial assets. Second, banks are characterised by specific positions such
as provisions for loan losses or realisation of gains or losses on securities that do not prevail in
other industries (Cohen, Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2014). Furthermore, compared to other
industries, the estimation of discretionary accruals can be problematic in the banking industry
(DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998). Finally, banks are highly sensitive to overall financial risk in
the economy (Gandhi & Lustig, 2013).
All these differences are likely to be reflected through fundamental differences in accounting
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variables that reduce the comparability between banks and firms in other industries and often
result in the exclusion of banks from a vast area of empirical studies in accounting and finance.
Yet, these special characteristics do not make banks less worthy of rigorous empirical analyses.
This situation has fostered the development of a banking-specific literature.
This thesis is organised in three main papers that relate more or less closely to several aspects
of banking briefly discussed in this introduction. These papers form a unit in that they relate to
topics of importance for the banking industry. The overall methodology used throughout the thesis
is largely based on empirical methods. Paper 1 (corresponding to Chapter 2) investigates whether
changes regarding banks’ activity mix affects market valuation, therefore exploring a topic specific
to the banking industry. The two remaining papers focus on research topics for which banks are
typically excluded from empirical studies. Similar to Paper 1, Paper 2 (Chapter 3), also takes
a market perspective and investigates whether bank stock returns can be predicted by banking
industry-specific accounting ratios, profitability measures, and market anomalies that prevail in
the nonfinancial industry. Paper 3 (Chapter 4) investigates earnings management, a practice that
compromises the faithful representation of underlying economic conditions and riskiness. The three
chapters are organised in such a way that they can be read independently. In the following, we
discuss in more detail each of these three papers.
In Paper 1, we investigate the impact of bank diversification on market valuation.2 As un-
derlined earlier, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 strictly limited activity diversification in banking.
However, a wave of worldwide deregulation starting in the 1980s has resulted in a progressive shift
from commercial activities towards investment activities. Three studies in the recent literature have
investigated valuation effects of bank diversification and reported strongly different results. Laeven
and Levine (2007) found a significant diversification discount for a sample of international banks
between 1998-2002. Baele, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007) reported a significant diversi-
fication premium among European banks between 1989-2004. Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzha¨user
(2010) found no direct effect of diversification for a sample of banks in nine industrialised coun-
tries between 1996-2008, but an indirect effect from a positive association of diversification with
2The first study is a joint work with Prof. Dr. Martin Wallmeier while the second and third studies are solely
my work.
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profitability.
Of course, the difference in results between these studies could be explained by the geographical
composition of the samples or by the different time periods analysed. For instance, Baele et
al. (2007) advanced that institutional and regulatory differences between Europe and the U.S.
were responsible for the different results found in their study compared to the study of Laeven
and Levine (2007). However, a more careful analysis of the three studies reveals fundamental
methodological differences. First, bank diversification is intimately related to another structural
characteristic, which is bank type and is also typically proxied by interest-income share. As both
“type” and “diversification” are measured on the basis of the share of interest income, they are
closely related and have to be considered jointly (see Laeven and Levine (2007), p. 337). Yet,
only Laeven and Levine (2007) correctly included these two variables in regression. Second, Elsas
et al. (2010) used an estimation approach with bank fixed effect, thus focusing on the variation
of individual bank value over time, while Laeven and Levine (2007) and Baele et al. (2007) used
country fixed effects and were primarily interested in cross-sectional valuation differences. And
third, the control variables used are not identical. For instance, Elsas et al. (2010) argued that
including a profitability proxy resulted in the non-significance of diversification in their study.
These fundamental methodological discrepancies substantially reduce the comparability of the
results, and it is therefore difficult to assess whether the different results come from the composition
of the samples analysed or from these methodological differences.
Motivated by these strongly different results, we revisit the relationship between market valu-
ation and diversification for a sample of international banks between 1998 and 2013 that includes
19,677 bank-year observations. In order to clearly identify which factors are responsible for the
different results (e.g. time period, sample composition, fundamental differences in the regression
framework), we form three samples similar to those investigated in the three relevant studies and
use a unified framework. Our first intended contribution is therefore to highlight the importance
of using a similar methodology to guarantee a direct comparability of the results between studies
looking at the same topic. Second, we aim to contribute to the discussion about institutional and
geographical determinants of diversification effects by analysing the results for samples covering
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different geographical areas. As a third contribution, we extend the analysis of prior studies to the
recent financial crisis and the following years until 2013.
Our main findings are as follows. We show that using a unified framework for the same time
period leads to very similar results in the various samples investigated. Therefore, different regula-
tory and institutional frameworks do not appear to be responsible for differences in diversification
effects. This finding underlines the importance of using an adequate regression framework in order
to compare the valuation effect of diversification across geographical areas. Our results show that
the differences reported in past studies are likely to reflect methodological differences. Similar
to Laeven and Levine (2007), we report a diversification discount for the period 1998-2002 that
is robust to the inclusion of profitability. However, this discount substantially declines over time
and practically vanishes in the last period considered (2010-2013). We also report a significant
premium for investment banks. Similarly to diversification, this effect diminishes over time. In
addition, we show that the diversification discount is partly caused by a small number of highly
valued investment banks, and therefore do not prevail uniformly in the whole sample.
In Paper 2, we investigate the predicting power of profitability, industry-specific variables,
and traditional market anomalies on the cross-section of bank stock returns. We analyse 190,592
monthly returns for U.S. banks between 1980-2014. The financial literature has reported the
existence of patterns predicting stock market returns (e.g. market-to-book, size or momentum)
labelled as stock market anomalies because they are not explained by the CAPM. Since most asset
pricing studies exclude financial institutions, and since only few industry-specific studies exist (e.g.
Barber and Lyon (1997)), little is known about patterns affecting banks’ cross-sectional returns.
In particular, the profitability premium, which has attracted particular attention in recent years
(e.g. Fama and French (2006), Fama and French (2008), Novy-Marx (2013)), remains unexplored
within the banking industry.
Our first intended contribution is to explore the existence of a profitability premium within this
industry. As a second contribution, we look at the predicting power of several industry-specific
variables. Because of the different nature of banks compared to firms in other industries, there
may exist important links between industry-specific variables and the cross-section of stock returns
10
Introduction
(Cooper et al., 2003). As our last contribution, we investigate the predicting power of several well-
known market anomalies such as size, market-to-book, and past performance at different horizons.
To our knowledge, the momentum anomaly has never been explored within the banking industry.
Our main findings are as follows. Contrasting with clear-cut evidence presented by Novy-Marx
(2013) for the nonfinancial industry, we find only limited evidence regarding the predicting power
of profitability in banking. While we find convincing evidence suggesting a positive relationship
between profitability and expected returns in Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression,
further investigation shows that this result is largely driven by characteristics of small market
capitalisations. Among traditional market anomalies, we find strong evidence suggesting that
book-to-market and past performance at a horizon of one month (short-term return reversal) can
predict the cross-section of expected returns. Among industry-specific variables, our results show
that loan loss provisions, loan share, and activity diversification can also predict the cross-section
of stock market returns. Therefore, we argue that these variables can be considered as serious
candidates for the development of a banking industry-specific asset pricing model. The predicting
power of past performance at a horizon of one month stands out from the other variables considered
both in terms of statistical and economic significance.
Paper 3 deals with earnings management in banking. We adopt a distributional approach
and investigate 27,585 bank-year observations for a sample of international banks between 1999
and 2013. Similar to asset pricing studies, banks are often excluded from earnings management
studies. For the banking industry, only Shen and Chih (2005) explore earnings management using
a distributional approach. They found evidence of a kink around zero earnings in the distribution
of reported earnings. Similar to others (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge, Patel,
and Zeckhauser (1999)), they interpreted this kink as evidence of earnings management without
further investigation. Our study goes one step further in the sense that it does not only explore the
existence of a kink, but also investigates what earnings streams are responsible for the formation
of the king, and whether earnings management is behind the kink.
Our approach to answer these questions is inspired by the study conducted by Dechow et al.
(2003) for nonfinancial firms. First, we investigate the presence of a smooth pre-managed earnings
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distribution similar to the one reported by Dechow et al. (2003). We further analyse the presence
of a kink around zero earnings in the distribution of reported earnings. Finally, we investigate
earnings streams that occur between pre-managed earnings and reported earnings in order to
investigate which specific earnings streams are responsible for the formation of the kink. While
most empirical studies attribute the presence of a kink to earnings management without further
analysis, our approach allows us to assess whether this kink can actually be attributed to earnings
management.
The main results of this study are as follows. We show the existence of a smooth pre-managed
earnings distribution (Pre-impairment operating profit). We further document the progressive for-
mation of a kink around zero earnings taking place in the distribution of earnings measures further
down the income statement and culminating in the distribution of Net income. The analysis of
earnings streams occurring in-between shows that banks with relatively high pre-managed earn-
ings are decisively shifted to the left while banks with small positive earnings are only moderately
shifted, thus causing the kink. This partial shift reflects higher earnings streams among banks
with high pre-managed earnings relative to banks with small pre-managed earnings. The decom-
position of total earnings stream shows that banks with higher pre-managed earnings have higher
impairment charges on loans, securities, and other credits as well as higher tax expenses. While
the difference regarding impairment charges is likely to reflect at least some degree of earnings
management, the kinking effect of taxation is more difficult to reconcile with an earnings manage-
ment explanation since banks with higher earnings can rationally be expected to have larger tax
expenses. Thus, we conclude that earnings management is only a partial explanation for the kink,
and that the magnitude of the kink can only be partially attributed to earnings management.
12
Chapter 2
The Valuation of Diversified Banks:
New Evidence
13
The Valuation of Diversified Banks: New Evidence
Nicolas Guerry∗ Martin Wallmeier †
January 25, 2016
Abstract
We reconsider the effect of diversification on bank valuation. Prior studies in the recent literature
have come to strongly different results, including a significant diversification discount, a significant
diversification premium, and no direct effect at all. The differences are in part attributed to specifics
of the legal and regulatory environment in Europe and the U.S.. In contrast, we argue that the
differences arise from confounding the effects of diversification (specialised banks vs. diversified
banks) and bank type (investment banks vs. commercial banks) in some of the studies. In a
unified framework in which the effects of diversification and bank type can clearly be identified,
results are similar for U.S. and European banks and across regulatory regimes. At the beginning of
our sample period from 1998 to 2013, we find a significant diversification discount, which declines
during the years before the financial crisis and practically vanishes afterwards.
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2.1. Introduction
The association between the diversification of a bank and its valuation is of great interest for the
governance of banks and for bank regulation. As discussed by Laeven and Levine (2007) and
Elsas et al. (2010), different theoretical hypotheses on the impact of diversification on valuation
exist. On the one hand, diversification may allow economies of scope and synergies between the
different business units, for example by providing financial consulting services to firms that are
also loan clients. On the other hand, diversification can give rise to conflicts of interest and agency
costs, and it may result in a more complex organisational structure and a less focused customer
orientation. It is not clear from theory which of these factors prevail, so that empirical studies are
important to estimate the net effect of diversification.
Bank diversification measures are often based on the share of interest income in total operating
income. A bank is considered as fully specialised if the interest-income share is zero or one. In
contrast, a bank is more or less diversified if it earns interest income from lending as well as non-
interest income from commissions or trading. We may consider a bank with equal weights of interest
income and non-interest income as fully diversified, so that the highest degree of diversification is
reached when the interest-income share is 50%.
Bank diversification is intimately related to another structural characteristic, which is bank
type. The “type” characteristic is also typically proxied by interest-income share. A fully spe-
cialised investment bank will be assigned a value of zero because it does not operate in interest-
earning business, while a fully specialised commercial bank only earns interest income and thus
obtains a value of one. Banks combining investment business and commercial banking are assigned
a value in-between. As both “type” and “diversification” are measured on the basis of the share of
interest income, they are closely related and have to be considered jointly (see Laeven and Levine
(2007, p. 337)). The estimation of the diversification effect will likely be distorted if the type effect
is not simultaneously taken into account, and vice versa.
The same conclusion holds if interest-income share is replaced by the share of loan assets in
total assets, which is an alternative proxy proposed in the literature (Laeven & Levine, 2007).
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Again, the type scale goes from zero for pure investment banks to one for pure commercial banks,
and the diversification scale goes from zero for both pure investment banks and pure commercial
banks to one for banks with equal weights of the two businesses (loan share of 50%). As before, the
diversification effect cannot be isolated from the type effect if only one of the variables is included
as an explanatory variable.
In the recent literature, three studies have investigated valuation effects of bank diversification
(Laeven and Levine (2007); Baele et al. (2007); Elsas et al. (2010)). They come to strongly
different results: Laeven and Levine (2007) find a significant diversification discount; Baele et al.
(2007) report a significant diversification premium; and Elsas et al. (2010) find no direct effect of
diversification, but an indirect effect from a positive association of diversification with profitability.
There are several differences between the studies which could explain these results, e.g. the sample
composition and the sample period. However, a more fundamental difference is that only Laeven
and Levine (2007) consider bank type and diversification jointly, while the other studies do not
take the close relation of these variables into account. We show that this problem can explain the
different results. Therefore, our first and main intended contribution is to highlight the importance
of this methodological issue and to reconcile the different results from previous literature by using
a comprehensive framework including type and diversification.
Controlling for bank type also allows us to shed new light on institutional and geographical
determinants of diversification effects, which is the second contribution of this paper. Baele et
al. (2007) argue that the relation between diversification and bank value is different in Europe
relative to the U.S., because the European banking sector had been deregulated by the Second
Banking Coordination Directive already in 1989, when in the US, the Glass-Steagall Act was
still in force. Thus, European banks were allowed to diversify earlier and more broadly. As a
consequence, potential advantages of diversification might have been exploited more thoroughly in
Europe relative to the U.S.. Consistent with this hypothesis, Baele et al. (2007) find evidence of
an income-based diversification premium, contrary to the results of Laeven and Levine (2007) for a
broad international sample. However, as argued above, it is not clear which factors are responsible
for the different results. Similar arguments apply to the study of Elsas et al. (2010) which is
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based on a sample of nine developed countries including European countries and the U.S.. In this
study, we provide comparable results for the samples of these three previous papers by unifying
the time periods, the estimation approach, the type and diversification proxies and the control
variables. Our hypothesis is that previous results might be driven by differences in the estimation
method rather than geographical or regulatory factors. After all, at the end of the 1990s, the
Glass-Steagall Act had already been substantially weakened, and internationally operating banks
had become quite similar.
Our third contribution is to extend the analysis to the recent financial crisis and the following
years until 2013. For prior periods, there is strong evidence of a valuation premium for banks
relying predominantly on investment activities (Baele et al., 2007; Laeven & Levine, 2007). How-
ever, during times of financial distress, commercial activities have been shown to be more stable
and recession-proof than investment activities (DeYoung & Roland, 2001), which suggests that
the premium associated with investment banking may have diminished or even reversed in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis. As highlighted by Elsas et al. (2010), it is also plausible
to assume that the crisis has led to a re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of diversification: on
the one hand, diversified banks could be better able to absorb shocks, on the other hand, they
might suffer disproportionately from a negative outlook on the investment banking branch. More-
over, the financial crisis revealed weaknesses of individual banks (e.g. Lehman Brothers, Freddie
Mac) going beyond their classification as commercial or investment banks. Thus, it is possible
that a shift in valuation from activity-related criteria towards more individual criteria has taken
place. Among the three main studies cited above, only Elsas et al. (2010) study the sub-prime
crisis. While the main part of their study investigates the period from 1996 to 2006, an additional
analysis extends to the years from 2006 to 2008. However, the authors focus on the variation of
individual bank value over time, whereas our study − in line with Laeven and Levine (2007) and
Baele et al. (2007) − is primarily interested in cross-sectional valuation differences. This difference
is reflected in an estimation approach with bank fixed effects in Elsas et al. (2010) and country
fixed effects in Laeven and Levine (2007), Baele et al. (2007) and this study.
Finally, we propose a robustness check based on robust regressions which is motivated by the
17
The Valuation of Diversified Banks: New Evidence
fact that the number of investment banks is small compared to the number of commercial banks,
and there is concern that extreme observations for some investment banks might strongly affect
the estimation results.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. When controlling for bank type, the diversifica-
tion effect does not seem to be influenced by geographical or regulatory factors. In each subperiod
and both for income- and asset-based measures, the effects of bank type and diversification are
similar for the three subsamples of the main prior studies. In particular, we do not confirm that
European banks tend to achieve diversification benefits. In the first subperiod (1998-2002), we find
a significant premium for investment banks and a significant diversification discount. However,
this result is partly driven by a small number of rather extreme observations for investment banks,
so that the effects are considerably smaller in a robust regression. The diversification discount
declines during the years before the financial crisis and practically vanishes in the last subperiod
(2010-2013).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the definitions of
bank type and diversification and discusses how the corresponding effects were estimated in prior
studies. In Section 2.3, we describe the data and the variables used in the empirical analysis. In
Section 2.4, we present the main results, followed by robustness tests in Section 2.5. Section 2.6
concludes.
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2.2. Bank type and diversification in prior literature
The three most relevant prior studies on the association of bank valuation and bank diversification
(Laeven and Levine (2007); Elsas et al. (2010); Baele et al. (2007)) are based on data for listed
banks from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. Laeven and Levine (2007) use data from
43 countries for the period 1998-2002. After excluding small banks with less than US$100 million
in total assets, their final dataset includes 3415 bank-year observations. Baele et al. (2007) use data
from 17 European countries (EU15, Norway and Switzerland) over the period 1989-2004. Their
selection rules result in a final dataset of 143 banks and 1200 bank-year observations. Elsas et al.
(2010) include large banks from nine developed countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, UK, USA, Spain and Switzerland) from 1996 to 2008. Only banks with total assets exceeding
US$1 billion in at least one year of the sample period are included. The final sample contains 380
banks covering 3348 bank-year observations.
The three studies use the following “type” and “diversification” measures, with x defined as
the ratio of net interest income to total operating income (interest-income share):
Type1 = x (2.1)
Type2 = x/(1− x) (2.2)
Diversification1 = 1− |2x− 1| (2.3)
Diversification2 = 1−
(
x2 + (1− x)2) , (2.4)
Figure 2.1 shows Type1 and Type2 in the left panel and Diversification1 and Diversification2
in the right panel. While the type proxies increase monotonically with interest-income share, the
diversification proxies reach a maximum at an interest-income share of 50%. The two diversification
measures are similar to each other, while the type measures are clearly different. Type2 has a
peculiar form going to infinity when interest-income share approaches one, which implies that tiny
changes of interest-income share yield large changes in Type2. For instance, the Type2-impact of a
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change in interest-income share from 0% to 50% is the same as the impact of a change from 90%
to 91%. This pattern does not capture the common understanding of bank type so that we do not
regard Type2 as a meaningful alternative to the type proxy Type1.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
The main estimated regression equation of Laeven and Levine (2007, p. 347, Table 4, Col. 5)
is:1
Q(LL) = Constant− 0.220 · Type1 − 0.080 ·Diversification1 + Controls (2.5)
where Q(LL) is Tobin’s Q measure. The incremental effect of type and diversification on Tobin’s
Q is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2.2. The effect of type can be seen from the negative
overall slope implying a higher value Q(LL) of pure investment banks (interest-income share of
0) relative to pure commercial banks (interest-income share of 1). The diversification discount
reported by Laeven and Levine (2007) is apparent from the kink in the profile at level 0.5 indicating
that diversified banks are valued below a linear combination of pure commercial banks and pure
investment banks.
[Figure 2.2 about here]
The relevant regressions of Baele et al. (2007, p. 2012, Table 3, Cols. 1, 2, 5) are:2
Q(BJV ) = Constant+ 0.0949 · (1− Type1) + Controls (2.6)
Q(BJV ) = Constant+ 0.0593 · (1− Type1) + 0.0645 · (1− Type1)2 + Controls (2.7)
Q(BJV ) = Constant+ 0.0449 ·Diversification1 + Controls (2.8)
1We refer to Col. 5 as the main regression for the following reasons: Cols. 1-4 use another dependent variable
(“Excess value” instead of Tobin’s Q) which reduces the comparability of results with the other studies. In Cols.
6-8, the set of control variables is slightly different, but with minimal impact on the relevant coefficients.
2We refer to Cols. 1, 2, 5 as the relevant regressions because they are based on income-based measures, while
Cols. 3, 4, 6 of the same table use assets-based measures of Type and Diversification.
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where Q(BJV ) is a modified version of Tobin’s Q.3 The estimated linear regression (2.6), which
is illustrated as a solid straight line in the middle panel of Figure 2.2, shows a significantly higher
valuation of investment banks compared to commercial banks, which is in line with the finding of
Laeven and Levine (2007). In addition, the estimated quadratic regression (2.7) is convex, which
is consistent with a diversification discount, again in line with Laeven and Levine (2007) (dotted
line, middle panel of Figure 2.2). It is not clear, however, if the discount is significant.4 The third
regression (2.8) shows a significantly positive coefficient for Diversification1. This is regarded
as evidence of a diversification benefit : “The result is [..] in contrast to the conclusion of Laeven
and Levine [..] who obtain a diversification discount in financial conglomerates (for a worldwide
sample). Since we use a similar measure of revenue diversification, the most probable explanation
for the difference is the scope of the sample. The fact that diversified European banks have a
longer track record and have committed sufficient operating and managerial resources to all these
activities may explain the conviction that they will generate adequate profits” Baele et al. (2007,
p. 2013).
However, the illustration of the third regression in the middle panel of Figure 2.2 (dashed
triangular line) suggests a different interpretation. Because the type variable is not included
in regression (2.8), the triangular structure (V-shape or inverted V-shape) of the diversification
variable is imposed on the data. This is in conflict with the fact that investment banks are more
highly valued than commercial banks, as is apparent from regressions (2.6) and (2.7). In this
situation, regression (2.8) can match the observations either for investment banks (low interest-
income share) or commercial banks (high interest-income share), but not both. Since the number of
banks with a pronounced commercial banking profile is by far larger than the number of investment
banks, commercial banks are more important for the estimation. As a result, the estimated
regression function fits these observations (with high interest-income share) well, while the higher
valuation of investment banks (with low interest-income share) must be ignored. To avoid this
misspecification, Type1 needs to be added to regression (2.8) (see also Laeven and Levine (2007,
3The authors mention that results based on the traditional Tobin’s Q measure are similar (Baele et al. (2007),
p. 2020).
4The linear and quadratic term are individually insignificant due to multicollinearity, but jointly significant
(Baele et al. (2007), p. 2012). The likelihood ratio test for the fit of the quadratic model compared to the linear
model is not reported.
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p. 337)). In this case, we would expect to obtain a negative sign of the diversification variable and
an inverted L-shape for the combined effect, in line with the convex regression function (2.7). We
conclude that the diversification benefit reported in Baele et al. (2007) most probably comes from
not jointly considering type and diversification. The data are more in line with a diversification
discount.
The relevant regression in Elsas et al. (2010, p. 1279, Table 3, Col. 3) is:5
MTB = 1.38 ·Diversification2 − 0.50 · (Diversification2)2 − 0.01 · Type2 + Controls, (2.9)
where MTB is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. The incre-
mental effect of interest-income share on MTB is shown in the right panel of Figure 2.2. The
graph indicates a considerable diversification premium. Individually, the regression coefficients
of Diversification2 and Diversification
2
2 are not significant, but this might well be due to the
almost perfect collinearity of the two variables.6 However, regression (2.9) suffers from the same
problem as regression (2.8) of Baele et al. (2007) because bank type is not adequately controlled for.
As mentioned earlier, the nonlinear Type2 variable cannot account for the valuation difference be-
tween investment banks and commercial banks. Thus, the structure of the diversification variable
with a minimum or maximum at 50% interest-income share is again imposed on the data, which
means that the regression is misspecified. This methodological problem is important enough to
explain the conflicting results of the three studies. The following empirical study aims to examine
diversification effects while controlling for bank type.
5This regression is relevant for our comparison, because the diversification proxy is only based on interest-
income share. In other specifications, a further decomposition of non-interest income into fee-based, trading, and
commission income is used.
6The joint significance of both terms is not reported.
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2.3. Data and variables
2.3.1. Sample of banks
We obtain bank-level data for listed banks from Bankscope of Bureau van Dijk. Data on market
capitalisation come from Thomson Reuters Datastream. We use macroeconomic control variables
from the World Bank, regulatory data from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013), and a financial
freedom index from the Heritage Foundation. Our sample covers the 16-year period from 1998
to 2013. This period includes different business cycles and stock market conditions (e.g. Dot-
com bubble, economic expansion of the early 2000s, sub-prime crisis, sovereign debt crisis). Our
sample is free from survivorship bias since we also consider banks that have been delisted during
the sample period. Following Laeven and Levine (2007), we exclude small banks with less than
US$ 100 million in total assets to enhance comparability across countries. We exclude banks that
are engaged in neither investment banking nor deposit-taking and loan-making. We also eliminate
banks classified as Islamic banks because their accounting information does not match with the
rest of the sample. Finally, we exclude banks with missing data on accounting variables.
We build three subsets of banks corresponding to the samples used in the three prior studies of
interest. The first sample, following Laeven and Levine (2007), includes banks from all countries
worldwide (“Whole sample”). The second subset, following Baele et al. (2007), includes banks
from 17 European countries (“European sample”; EU 15 + Norway and Switzerland). Finally,
the third subset, following Elsas et al. (2010), consists of banks from nine industrialised countries
(“Industrialised countries sample”; Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, USA, Spain,
and Switzerland).
We divide the total period into four subperiods to detect a possible evolution over time and
to allow comparison with existing studies. The first subperiod (1998-2002) corresponds roughly
to the Dot-com bubble and matches the period considered by Laeven and Levine (2007). The
second subperiod (2003-2006) corresponds to the economic expansion of the early 2000s, the third
subperiod (2007-2009) to the financial crisis, and the fourth subperiod (2010-2013) to the post-
financial crisis period.
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2.3.2. Baseline specification
In order to examine how diversification affects bank valuation while controlling for other potential
determinants, we estimate the following panel regression as our baseline empirical specification:
Qi,t = α0 + α1Typei,t + α2Diversificationi,t +α3X
Bank
i,t +α4X
Macro
i,t +α5X
Reg
i,t
+θj(i) + γt + i,t,
(2.10)
where Qi,t is Tobin’s Q of bank i at time t, Type and Diversification are the main variables of
interest as explained above, and XBank, XMacro, XReg are vectors of bank-level, macroeconomic
and regulatory control variables. We denote by j(i) the country of origin of bank i. The regressions
include country (θ) and year (γ) fixed effects.
2.3.3. Variables
In the following, we describe the included variables in more detail. Table 2.1 gives an overview
and specifies the data sources. Summary statistics are shown in Table 2.2 and country-specific
summary statistics in Table 2.3.
[Table 2.1 about here]
[Table 2.2 about here]
Tobin’s Q
We define Tobin’s Q as
Q =
Market value of equity +Book value of debt
Book value of equity +Book value of debt
(2.11)
We use the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year end to account for the typical
delay in the release of accounting information. Following Bolt, de Haan, Hoeberichts, van Oordt,
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and Swank (2012), we winsorise Tobin’s Q at 1% and 99% to mitigate the impact of outliers on
regression estimates.
Bank type and diversification
We use the same income-based and asset-based measures of bank type and diversification as Laeven
and Levine (2007). The income-based measures are identical to Type1 and Diversification1 as
defined in Eq. (2.1) and (2.3). The asset-based bank type measure equals loans to total earning
assets, where total earning assets include loans, securities, and investments. Large values mean
that banks specialise in commercial activities, lower values indicate a higher degree of investment
activities. The asset-based diversification measure is defined in a similar way as Diversification1:
Asset-based Diversification = 1−
∣∣∣∣Net Loans−Other Earning AssetsTotal Earning Assets
∣∣∣∣. (2.12)
It is an open question whether the income-based measures or the asset-based measures are
more appropriate. Laeven and Levine (2007) favour the asset-based definition due to potential
measurement problems faced by income-based measures. A particular concern is that loans granted
by commercial banks can yield fee income which is attributed to investment activities. However,
the asset-based measure may also be problematic because of the increased presence of off-balance
sheet activities in past decades (Cooper et al., 2003; Kane & Unal, 1990). Since these items are
not formally booked, an asset-based measure may underestimate diversification. As there is no
clear preference, we show all results for asset-based as well as income-based measures of bank type
and diversification.
Table 2.4 shows the correlations between bank type and diversification for the whole sample.
Asset-based measures and income-based measures are significantly but not strongly correlated
(0.39 for bank type, 0.14 for diversification), suggesting that they measure different aspects of
bank activities.
[Table 2.4 about here]
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Figure 2.3 shows boxplots per year to illustrate the evolution of the type and diversification
measures over time (upper graphs: type; lower graphs: diversification). The median of type is
mostly near 0.75, and the 25%-quantile is still clearly above 0.5. This indicates that the vast
majority of banks is more oriented towards commercial banking than investment banking. Banks
with an interest-income share or net loans share below 0.25 are rare and typically identified as
outliers in the boxplot diagrams. The upper graphs show a noticeable spike in the share of interest
income in the crisis year of 2008. This echoes findings from DeYoung and Roland (2001) for
prior episodes of financial distress and confirms that commercial activities seem more stable and
recession-proof than investment activities. Further evidence is found in the lower graphs of Figure
2.3 which show a decrease of the overall level of diversification in 2008. The median of net loans
share tends to increase in the five years before the financial crisis and to slightly decrease again
since 2009. However, the distribution of the type and diversification measures does not seem to
be strongly or systematically different in the years before and after 2008.
[Figure 2.3 about here]
Bank-level control variables
We investigate more closely whether different funding structures have an impact on bank valuation.
The International Monetary Fund (2013) documents an increase in the share of wholesale funding
and a simultaneous decrease in the share of customer deposits in the years leading to the financial
crisis. A higher share of wholesale funding is associated with a higher level of bank distress. In
fact, one of the triggers of this crisis is seen in the incapacity of US and European banks that
heavily relied on short-term wholesale funding to renew their expiring funding sources (Claessens
et al., 2012; International Monetary Fund, 2013; Laeven, 2011). These results underline the stable
character of deposit funding compared to market funding, presumably because deposits are usually
covered by government guarantees (see, e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) or Beltratti and Stulz
(2012)). However, a higher share of wholesale funding may also indicate higher creditworthiness
through the ability to raise funds in wholesale capital markets (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010).
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For the empirical analysis, we construct two measures of banks’ funding structures. The first,
deposit share, is defined as the share of customer deposits in total liabilities. The second variable,
wholesale share, is defined as the share of wholesale funding (total short-term funding minus
customer deposits) in total liabilities.
An important theoretical determinant of Tobin’s Q is a bank’s earnings potential because
the market value of equity includes expected earnings that are not yet realised and therefore not
captured in the book value of assets. In robustness checks, Elsas et al. (2010, Table 7, p. 1283) find
that controlling for profitability is crucial because the significant effect of diversification disappears
when a profitability measure is included. The following five control variables are included as proxies
for different aspects of the earnings potential:
(1) The ratio of operating profit to total assets.7 (2) The cost-to-income ratio as a standard
bank-efficiency measure (Elsas et al., 2010). (3) The ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans.
Under fair value accounting, loan loss provisions negatively affect earnings and capital. Thus, a
high ratio indicates a poor quality of the loan portfolio. However, loan loss provisions are commonly
used for income smoothing purposes (Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas, 1999; Beatty, Ke, & Petroni,
2002; Fonseca & Gonzalez, 2008) and could therefore be a weak signal of asset quality. (4) The
Z-score as a measure of bank-level risk and the distance to default.8 (5) Finally, we include the
change in total assets as a proxy for growth opportunities (Laeven & Levine, 2007).
We further include the natural log of total assets as a measure of bank size. While bigger banks
may benefit from economies of scale or from their too-big-to-fail status, they may also grow beyond
their optimal size and suffer from diseconomies of scale or exacerbated agency costs (Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt & Huizinga, 2013). Our last bank-level control variable is the ratio of common equity to total
assets. Because equity represents a buffer against losses but is commonly regarded as expensive, a
higher equity ratio is expected to be associated with higher valuation in times of financial distress,
but with lower valuation during good times.
7We use operating profit rather than net income because it is commonly argued that gross or operating profit,
reflecting a firm’s core activity, is a better proxy for profitability (see Novy-Marx (2013); Yao and Liang (2005);
and Trueman, Wong, and Zhang (2000)).
8We update the Z-score following the recommendation of Lepetit and Strobel (2013).
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Macroeconomic and regulatory control variables
Our macroeconomic control variables are inflation, the GDP growth rate and GDP per capita. To
capture the regulatory environment in different countries, we include indexes provided by Barth,
Caprio, and Levine (2013). These indexes reflect country-specific capital stringency, diversification
guidelines, restrictions on bank activities, restrictiveness with respect to financial conglomerates,
financial statement transparency, deposit insurance scheme, and supervisory power. Finally, we use
the financial freedom index of the Heritage Foundation, which is a measure of banking independence
from government control.
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2.4. Empirical Results
Our analysis consists of 24 regressions, corresponding to all combinations of three subsets (Whole,
Europe, Industrialised), four subperiods (1998-2002, 2003-2006, 2007-2009, 2010-2013), and two
definitions of type and diversification (asset-based, income-based). We summarise the estimation
results in tabular and graphical form. Tables 2.5 to 2.7 show results for the three subsets, in
columns 1-4 for asset-based measures of type and diversification, and in columns 5-8 for income-
based measures. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank
level (Laeven & Levine, 2007). The macroeconomic and regulatory control variables are included
in the estimations, but for the sake of brevity, the coefficients are not displayed. Figures 2.4 and
2.5 illustrate the combined effect of type and diversification for the income-based and asset-based
definitions. As emphasised earlier, type and diversification are strongly related because they are
both defined as a function of the same base variable (interest-income share or net loans share).
To capture the combined effect, we plot the predicted partial response of Tobin’s Q to type and
diversification in a graph with interest-income share or net loans share on the horizontal axis.9 An
effect of type can be seen from the difference of Tobin’s Q at the left and right edges, and an effect
of diversification is reflected in a kink of the profile in the middle. Figure 2.4 illustrates the results
for the income-based measures, Figure 2.5 for the asset-based measures. Each figure contains 12
graphs, for combinations of three subsets (rows) and four subperiods (columns).
[Table 2.5 about here]
[Table 2.6 about here]
9All other explanatory variables are fixed on their mean level. One possible issue with the line of best fit to
model a partial relationship is the presence of high correlations with other independent variables. We check for the
presence of high correlations between the variables of interest (type and diversification) and the other independent
variables using a correlation matrix, but found no pairwise correlations above 0.4. Thus, high correlations should
not be an issue.
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[Table 2.7 about here]
[Figure 2.4 about here]
[Figure 2.5 about here]
The two figures allow a quick overview across samples by comparing the vertically aligned
graphs. It turns out that these are always very similar, which indicates that the valuation impact
of type and diversification is not different in Europe compared to the U.S. or other industrialised
countries. Therefore, our evidence does not support the hypothesis of Baele et al. (2007) that
the particular historical and regulatory conditions of diversification in Europe are reflected in a
valuation premium of diversified banks. The evidence also contradicts the hypothesis of Elsas et al.
(2010) that no direct effect of diversification exists when profitability is controlled for. Therefore,
our empirical results are consistent with our critical remarks on Baele et al. (2007) and Elsas et
al. (2010) in Section 2.2.
In the first period (1998-2002), we find a significant diversification discount and thus confirm
the finding of Laeven and Levine (2007) for the same period. We report highly significant coefficient
estimates of respectively −0.071 (asset-based measure) and −0.111 (income-based measure) for the
whole sample (Table 2.5), −0.089 (income-based measure) for the European sample (Table 2.6),
and −0.096 (income-based measure) for the industrialised sample (Table 2.7). We also confirm the
finding of a negative type effect which means that investment banks are more highly valued than
commercial banks. In the first period, we find highly significant coefficient estimates of respectively
−0.157 (asset-based measure) and −0.214 (income-based measure) for the whole sample, −0.107
and −0.169 for the European sample, and −0.130 and −0.146 for the industrialised sample.
The graphs displaying the combined effect in the left column of Figures 2.4 and 2.5 indicate that
the slope is clearly negative in the range of interest-income share (or net loans share) of 0.0 to 0.5
and almost flat between 0.5 and 1.0. The combined line suggests that the type and diversification
effects are driven by banks with a major investment banking profile (interest-income share or net
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loans share between 0.0 and 0.5). The number of these banks is small compared to the number of
banks with a major commercial banking profile (interest-income share or net loans share between
0.5 and 1.0). Among the commercial banks, Tobin’s Q is not systematically related to the share of
investment banking activities. As long as the investment banking activities are not predominant,
they are not rewarded by a valuation premium.
After the first period, the diversification discount drops substantially. Based on the income-
based measure, it is still significant in the second and third period (2003-2006 and 2007-2009,
respectively), but the magnitude of the coefficient is substantially lower compared to the first
period. The coefficient estimate drops in absolute terms from −0.111 in the fist period to −0.050 in
the second period and −0.061 in the third period in the whole sample, and from −0.096 in the first
period to−0.073 in the second period and to−0.064 in the third period in the industrialised sample.
The exception is the European sample that sees an increase in absolute terms from −0.089 in the
first period to −0.120 in the second period and −0.103 in the third period. In the fourth period,
diversification remains significantly negative in the sample of banks in industrialised countries
(−0.044). It is no longer statistically significant in the European and in the whole samples.
Based on the asset-based measure, the diversification coefficient is never significant (statistically
or economically) after the first period (except in the fourth period for the whole sample where it
is weakly significant).
The type effect also decreases substantially over time. In the whole sample, for example, the
diversification discount drops from −0.214 in the first period, to −0.048 in the second period and
to −0.073 in the third period. Banks in the European sample and in the sample of industrialised
countries also show a substantial decrease in the type effect over time, both in terms of magnitude
and statistical significance. A similar decrease is observed when using the asset-based measure.
At a glance, this decline of type and diversification effects is apparent from Figures 2.4 and 2.5
which show flatter lines in later periods.
We test the hypothesis that the difference between the type and diversification coefficients in
different time periods is equal to zero using the following formula: Z =
b1 − b2√
SEb21 + SEb
2
2
, where the
b’s represent coefficient estimates, 1 and 2 relate to the different time periods, and the SE’s are
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the standard errors of the respective slops. The difference between the type coefficient estimates
in the first and in the fourth period is highly significant both for the asset-based measure (Z =
−2.6, p = 0.0094) and the income-based measure (Z = −3.57, p = 0.0004). For Diversification, the
difference in coefficient estimates is also statistically significant for the income-based measure (Z =
−2.46, p = 0.0140), but not for the asset-based measure (Z = −1.5, p = 0.1329). Thus, most of the
tests conclude that the coefficients are different in the first period, in which they are statistically
significant, and in the fourth period, in which their respective effects practically vanish.
The most important control variable is operating profit. Its positive effect on Tobin’s Q is in
line with theoretical expectations. The results for the other control variables are less conclusive,
with differences across periods and samples.
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2.5. Robustness tests and endogeneity
In our baseline specification, Tobin’s Q was winsorised at 1% and 99%. We obtain practically the
same results when trimming (instead of winsorising) the observations below 1% and above 99%.10
The results are also very similar when Tobin’s Q is replaced by the market-to-book ratio of equity.
The specific set of control variables also does not seem to be crucial. We run estimations for a
reduced set of explanatory variables including only operating profit, log assets and country and
time fixed effects and obtain the same main results for type and diversification.
Sample selection in the sense of Heckman (1979) should not be an issue because we use the
entire sample of listed banks. However, there is some concern that type and diversification might
be choice variables which are correlated with unobservables contained in the error term. Such
a self-selection will produce an endogeneity bias which should be avoided by using instruments
for the endogeneous variables. However, it is almost impossible to find appropriate instrumental
variables. While variables proposed in the literature such as lagged diversification are correlated
with diversification as required, they might well be correlated with the error term in the explanatory
equation and thus suffer from the same problem as the diversification variable itself. Nevertheless,
as a robustness check, we estimate the type and diversification effects with two instrumental
variables proposed by Laeven and Levine (2007) (activity restriction in the country of origin, and
diversification of other banks in the same country) and lagged diversification which is proposed by
Elsas et al. (2010). The main conclusions remain valid. More specifically, we are able to replicate
the results of Laeven and Levine (2007) for their period under study. For the other time periods,
we confirm a weakening of the type and diversification effects over time for our three samples.
Another concern is that the results might be driven by a small number of highly valued invest-
ment banks. To examine this issue, Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show partial residual plots for the effect
of interest-income share and net loans share on Tobin’s Q. The graphs are the same as in Figures
2.4 and 2.5, but with residuals included. We also include an additional smooth nonparametric
regression line based on a locally-weighted polynomial regression (LOWESS). This method does
10Unless indicated otherwise, results for this section are reported in Appendix A.
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not make an assumption on the form of the regression, and it is less sensitive to outliers than a
linear OLS regression. A further advantage of the LOWESS regression is that the position of a
possible kink in the profile is extracted from the data rather than fixed in advance at a level of 0.5
as in the estimation approach so far.
[Figure 2.6 about here]
[Figure 2.7 about here]
A first interesting finding is that the LOWESS line can actually be approximated by a kinked
linear profile with a kink at 0.5. This is consistent with the view that the relevant transition
point is indeed 0.5 where the highest degree of diversification is achieved. The second important
observation is that the magnitudes of the type effect and the diversification effect are almost always
smaller compared to the standard regression. This is particularly true in the first period, where the
strong type and diversification effects apparent in the standard regressions for asset- and income-
based measures diminish considerably (to about half the effects or less). This finding is consistent
with the hypothesis that the diversification discount found in the first period is partly due to a few
rather extreme observations for investment banks that could be regarded as outliers. There is one
noteworthy exception from the general observation that the LOWESS estimates of diversification
effects are much smaller: for the European sample in the periods 2003-2006 and 2007-2009, the
LOWESS regression is almost identical with the standard regression, which confirms the finding
of a significant diversification discount in these periods. However, this discount is specific to the
income-based measures (Fig. 2.6). For asset-based measures, the LOWESS regressions never show
a pronounced diversification premium or discount. They suggest that only a small type effect (in
favour of investment banks) exists (see Fig. 2.7).
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2.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we aim to shed light on the conflicting results of prior studies on diversification effects
in bank valuation. We argue that some of these results are not directly comparable to each other
because the prior studies use different methodological frameworks in terms of estimation approach,
proxy variables for diversification and control variables. The commonly used diversification mea-
sures are intimately associated with bank type because both variables are defined as a function
of interest-income share. The diversification effect, by construction, has a symmetrical triangular
structure (V-shape or inverted V-shape) because the effect is strongest for interest-income share of
0.5, and falls off towards investment banks (share of 0) and commercial banks (share of 1). When
bank type is also relevant for valuation, there is a second effect running monotonically from an
interest-income share of 0 (pure investment banks) to a level of 1 (pure commercial banks). It
is not possible to identify the first effect without taking the second into account. However, bank
type is not always included in prior studies. We show that this problem is important enough to
explain the different results.
In a nutshell, our analysis yields the following results. In the first subperiod (1998-2002), we
find a significant premium for investment banks and a significant diversification discount. However,
this result is partly driven by a small number of large observations for investment banks, which is
why the effects are considerably smaller in a robust regression. The diversification discount declines
during the years before the financial crisis and practically vanishes in the last subperiod (2010-
2013). Compared to previous studies, we observe more important differences between income-
based and asset-based measures of diversification. For asset-based measures, we find no evidence
of diversification effects outside the first subperiod. The results are similar for US and European
banks and across regulatory regimes.
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Figure 2.1: Bank type and diversification proxies
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Figure 2.2: Tobin’s Q and interest-income share in prior studies
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Table 2.1: Description and source of variables
Variable Description and source
Tobin’s Q Ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities to the
book value of assets. Bankscope, Datastream
Type (assets) Ratio of loans to total earning assets. Bankscope
Diversification (assets) One minus the absolute value of the ratio of net loans minus other earning
assets divided by total earning assets. Bankscope
Type (income) Ratio of net interest income to total operating income. Bankscope
Diversification (income) One minus the absolute value of the ratio of net interest income minus other
operating income divided by total operating income. Bankscope
Deposit share Ratio of customer deposits to total liabilities. Bankscope
Wholesale share Ratio of wholesale funding, defined as total short-term funding minus cus-
tomer deposits, to total liabilities. Bankscope
Operating profit Ratio of operating profit to total assets. Bankscope
Cost-to-income Ratio of overheads divided by the sum of net interest revenue plus other op-
erating income. Bankscope
Loan loss provisions Ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans. Bankscope
Z-score Return on assets plus capital ratio divided by the standard deviation of the
return on assets. Bankscope
Growth of total assets This compares the current year’s growth in total assets as a percentage of the
previous year’s total assets. Bankscope
Log assets Natural logarithm of total assets. Bankscope
Equity Ratio of common equity to total assets. Bankscope
Inflation Consumer price inflation rate. World Bank
GDP growth Growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP). World Bank
GDP per capita GDP per capita in thousands of 2000 constant US dollars. World Bank
Capital regulation Index of capital regulatory oversight of bank, with higher values indicating
greater stringency. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013)
Diversification guidelines Index of asset diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from zero
to two, with higher values indicating more diversification. Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2013)
Regulatory restrictions Index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities, with higher values indicat-
ing more restrictive. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013)
Conglomerates restric-
tiveness
Index of overall financial conglomerates restrictiveness, with higher values
indicating more restrictive. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013)
Statement transparency The transparency of bank financial statement practices, with higher values
indicating better transparency. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013)
Deposit insurance Whether (0-1) there is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, with one indicat-
ing no such scheme. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013)
Supervisory power Index of power of commercial bank supervisory agency, measuring the power
of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct
problems, with higher values indicating greater power. Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2013)
Financial freedom Index of financial freedom, scaled from zero to one hundred, with higher val-
ues indicating greater freedom. Heritage Foundation
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Tobin’s q 19,677 1.04 0.15 0.70 2.69
Type (assets) 19,677 0.68 0.19 0.00 1.00
Diversification (assets) 19,677 0.53 0.25 0.00 1.00
Type (income) 19,677 0.70 0.20 0.00 1.00
Diversification (income) 19,677 0.48 0.26 0.00 1.00
Deposit share 19,677 0.77 0.22 0.00 1.00
Wholesale share 19,677 0.14 0.23 0.00 1.00
Operating profit 19,677 0.01 0.03 -0.99 2.27
Cost-to-income 19,677 65.56 33.14 1.48 960.99
Loan loss provisions 19,677 0.01 0.45 -21.13 53.27
Z-Score 19,677 0.67 4.65 -5.21 415.52
Growth in assets 19,677 11.50 26.90 -99.11 923.79
Log assets 19,677 15.02 2.10 11.51 22.06
Equity 19,677 0.10 0.09 -2.43 0.99
GDP growth 19,677 1.51 2.92 -16.59 16.20
GDP 19,677 37.85 18.11 0.74 133.73
Inflation 19,677 3.21 3.93 -4.86 74.30
Capital regulation 19,677 6.43 1.57 2.00 10.00
Activities restrictions 19,677 7.83 1.61 3.00 12.00
Conglomerate restrictiveness 19,677 7.69 1.58 3.00 12.00
Supervisory power 19,677 12.16 2.04 4.00 16.00
Diversification guidelines 19,677 1.42 0.57 0.00 2.00
No deposit insurance 19,677 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Statement transparency 19,677 5.21 0.70 1.50 6.00
Financial freedom 19,677 67.12 18.63 10.00 90.00
GDP in thousands USD; Z-score in 1000000 thousands, Cost-to-income in thousands; Growth in assets in thousands.
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Table 2.3: Country-specific descriptive statistics
Obs. Tobin’s q Type Div. Type Div. Log assets Equity
assets assets income income
Australia 84 1.04 0.79 0.39 0.69 0.52 17.75 0.06
Austria 125 0.97 0.63 0.72 0.66 0.61 16.92 0.07
Bahrain 118 1.07 0.42 0.56 0.48 0.47 14.93 0.18
Bangladesh 53 1.03 0.76 0.48 0.65 0.65 14.36 0.08
Belgium 29 1.01 0.37 0.67 0.66 0.65 18.34 0.07
Belize 7 0.87 0.78 0.43 0.69 0.63 13.72 0.28
Benin 6 0.99 0.51 0.89 0.67 0.66 13.82 0.09
Bosnia Herz. 19 1.05 0.85 0.31 0.67 0.63 12.88 0.11
Botswana 18 1.36 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.64 14.05 0.20
Brazil 234 0.96 0.45 0.66 0.74 0.44 15.56 0.13
Bulgaria 42 1.11 0.70 0.58 0.61 0.73 13.95 0.12
Canada 38 1.02 0.69 0.57 0.60 0.61 17.89 0.07
Chile 53 1.06 0.78 0.45 0.61 0.68 16.38 0.08
China 106 1.01 0.50 0.89 0.85 0.30 19.47 0.06
Colombia 104 1.02 0.74 0.50 0.52 0.73 15.62 0.09
Ivory Coast 6 1.04 0.74 0.52 0.41 0.83 13.60 0.12
Croatia 149 1.00 0.69 0.60 0.66 0.67 13.91 0.12
Cyprus 58 1.05 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.62 15.62 0.05
Czech Rep. 38 1.04 0.46 0.80 0.62 0.76 16.56 0.07
Denmark 437 1.01 0.68 0.60 0.69 0.60 13.74 0.11
Ecuador 45 1.06 0.66 0.65 0.54 0.74 13.67 0.09
Egypt 128 1.09 0.47 0.76 0.60 0.60 14.70 0.12
Estonia 24 1.10 0.77 0.45 0.60 0.78 15.19 0.10
Finland 26 1.02 0.57 0.64 0.39 0.63 16.51 0.06
France 437 0.99 0.63 0.43 0.52 0.61 15.86 0.11
Gambia 6 1.30 0.43 0.82 0.50 0.94 11.74 0.09
Georgia 3 0.94 0.79 0.43 0.56 0.88 15.01 0.17
Germany 309 1.03 0.49 0.56 0.60 0.51 17.17 0.07
Ghana 33 1.13 0.57 0.70 0.66 0.67 13.47 0.14
Greece 107 1.05 0.67 0.49 0.71 0.49 16.89 0.07
Honk Kong 112 1.06 0.59 0.76 0.69 0.59 16.61 0.13
Hungary 34 1.05 0.69 0.54 0.65 0.67 15.34 0.08
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Table 2.3: Country-specific descriptive statistics (continued)
Obs. Tobin’s q Type Div. Type Div. Log assets Equity
assets assets income income
Iceland 20 1.46 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.61 16.06 −0.42
India 520 1.05 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.57 15.74 0.08
Indonesia 317 1.09 0.60 0.61 0.75 0.39 14.69 0.11
Ireland 35 1.02 0.64 0.62 0.82 0.36 18.55 0.04
Israel 136 0.99 0.74 0.47 0.61 0.75 16.33 0.06
Italy 318 1.02 0.67 0.48 0.60 0.63 16.65 0.10
Japan 1, 780 1.00 0.69 0.58 0.76 0.32 17.00 0.06
Jordan 117 1.07 0.55 0.81 0.68 0.60 14.59 0.14
Kazakhstan 63 1.06 0.84 0.31 0.71 0.55 15.00 0.11
Kenya 120 1.15 0.68 0.59 0.64 0.70 13.64 0.13
Kuwait 159 1.21 0.41 0.46 0.40 0.37 14.89 0.29
Latvia 13 0.98 0.79 0.43 0.61 0.60 14.56 0.07
Lebanon 65 0.97 0.32 0.64 0.70 0.59 15.40 0.06
Lithuania 60 1.09 0.72 0.50 0.58 0.71 14.22 0.09
Luxembourg 45 1.01 0.40 0.62 0.40 0.60 16.85 0.08
Macedonia 21 0.95 0.85 0.31 0.70 0.59 12.75 0.13
Malawi 7 1.10 0.74 0.50 0.60 0.78 12.71 0.15
Malaysia 83 0.98 0.56 0.51 0.50 0.58 15.34 0.24
Malta 41 1.09 0.48 0.65 0.57 0.66 14.73 0.11
Mauritius 5 1.11 0.63 0.74 0.68 0.64 14.83 0.16
Mexico 135 1.26 0.57 0.65 0.62 0.62 16.32 0.14
Montenegro 18 1.12 0.82 0.36 0.73 0.54 12.96 0.11
Morocco 64 1.11 0.77 0.33 0.77 0.41 14.88 0.11
Namibia 9 1.10 0.80 0.39 0.57 0.85 14.47 0.12
Netherlands 71 1.09 0.49 0.64 0.52 0.55 17.43 0.06
New Zealand 1 1.00 0.96 0.08 0.20 0.41 12.64 0.09
Nigeria 50 1.03 0.53 0.82 0.66 0.65 15.66 0.08
Norway 209 0.96 0.82 0.29 0.71 0.49 15.27 0.07
Oman 75 1.12 0.78 0.38 0.75 0.48 14.56 0.17
Pakistan 105 1.01 0.59 0.74 0.62 0.48 13.55 0.10
Panama 16 0.95 0.75 0.49 0.77 0.46 15.27 0.12
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Table 2.3: Country-specific descriptive statistics (continued)
Obs. Tobin’s q Type Div. Type Div. Log assets Equity
assets assets income income
Peru 119 1.04 0.78 0.44 0.75 0.46 14.15 0.11
Philippines 136 1.05 0.48 0.74 0.61 0.70 14.93 0.13
Poland 143 1.11 0.68 0.57 0.56 0.82 16.12 0.10
Portugal 61 1.06 0.75 0.47 0.62 0.73 16.93 0.07
Qatar 69 1.27 0.62 0.74 0.69 0.62 16.04 0.16
Korea 127 0.95 0.58 0.38 0.70 0.43 16.60 0.11
Romania 45 1.10 0.73 0.48 0.57 0.81 15.09 0.11
Russia 132 1.02 0.73 0.48 0.65 0.58 15.86 0.12
Saudi Arabia 117 1.28 0.62 0.73 0.68 0.62 16.73 0.13
Serbia 38 0.93 0.72 0.52 0.42 0.63 13.17 0.23
Singapore 69 0.98 0.68 0.61 0.73 0.51 15.96 0.16
Slovakia 42 0.97 0.64 0.62 0.71 0.57 15.39 0.07
Slovenia 46 0.99 0.72 0.56 0.63 0.69 14.82 0.08
South Africa 123 1.13 0.65 0.47 0.45 0.76 15.71 0.17
Spain 103 1.02 0.73 0.49 0.65 0.67 17.99 0.06
Sri Lanka 36 1.02 0.75 0.49 0.72 0.49 13.38 0.12
Sweden 61 1.05 0.53 0.59 0.47 0.65 17.43 0.05
Switzerland 378 1.03 0.67 0.35 0.53 0.55 16.12 0.10
Thailand 281 1.03 0.68 0.52 0.57 0.54 15.12 0.18
Togo 5 0.96 0.62 0.77 0.51 0.96 16.51 0.11
Tunisia 156 1.02 0.82 0.35 0.70 0.55 13.71 0.13
Turkey 185 1.05 0.71 0.56 0.75 0.46 15.74 0.14
Uganda 15 1.21 0.59 0.81 0.73 0.54 13.06 0.14
Ukraine 28 1.06 0.87 0.25 0.71 0.57 14.46 0.13
United Arab Em. 181 1.15 0.68 0.53 0.63 0.60 15.53 0.19
United Kingdom 177 1.07 0.60 0.51 0.57 0.57 17.75 0.10
United States 8, 890 1.03 0.73 0.51 0.77 0.42 14.06 0.09
Venezuela 168 1.02 0.66 0.62 0.71 0.54 15.01 0.10
Vietnam 45 1.06 0.60 0.77 0.74 0.39 15.71 0.09
Zambia 12 1.15 0.59 0.80 0.55 0.85 13.25 0.09
Zimbabwe 23 1.01 0.82 0.35 0.36 0.61 12.62 0.14
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Table 2.4: Correlation matrix
Diversification (assets) Type (income) Diversification (income)
Type (assets) −0.479∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Div. (assets) 1.000 −0.003 0.138∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.00)
Type (income) 1.000 −0.447∗∗∗
(0.00)
Div. (income) 1.000
Pearson correlation coefficients. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of distributional characteristics of bank type and diversifi-
cation over time
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The boxplots illustrate the evolution of bank type (upper graphs) and diversification (lower graphs) over time for income- and asset-based
measures within the whole sample.
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Table 2.5: Regression results - Whole sample
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −0.157∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.069∗∗ −0.010 −0.214∗∗∗ −0.048∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.007
(0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.66) (0.00) (0.06) (0.02) (0.79)
Diversification −0.071∗∗ 0.015 0.019 −0.022∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.02) (0.41) (0.34) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21)
Deposit share −0.001 0.045∗∗ 0.052∗∗ −0.021 0.018 0.051∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ −0.021
(0.99) (0.03) (0.02) (0.26) (0.66) (0.02) (0.01) (0.27)
Wholesale share −0.016 0.049∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ −0.019 −0.066 0.035∗ 0.043∗ −0.016
(0.69) (0.01) (0.02) (0.22) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.30)
Operating profit 1.167 3.383∗∗∗ 0.511∗ 0.545∗∗ 1.156 3.236∗∗∗ 0.491 0.546∗∗
(0.16) (0.00) (0.09) (0.04) (0.13) (0.00) (0.10) (0.04)
Cost-to-income 0.063 0.154 −0.056 0.166 −0.125 0.147 −0.073 0.162
(0.76) (0.22) (0.66) (0.47) (0.54) (0.28) (0.57) (0.49)
Loan loss provisions 0.004 −0.005 0.005 −0.080∗ 0.007 −0.006 0.005 −0.080
(0.70) (0.66) (0.12) (0.10) (0.41) (0.52) (0.11) (0.10)
Z-Score −0.015∗∗ −0.002∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.012∗∗ −0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.01) (0.05) (0.84) (0.96) (0.02) (0.17) (0.29) (0.99)
Growth in assets 0.248∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.199 0.266∗ 0.184 0.278∗∗ 0.188 0.276∗
(0.08) (0.02) (0.29) (0.07) (0.18) (0.04) (0.34) (0.06)
Log assets 0.009∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.010∗∗ −0.002 −0.005∗ 0.003∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.35) (0.07) (0.07)
Equity 0.142 −0.056 −0.100 0.053 0.168 −0.052 −0.122 0.051
(0.47) (0.47) (0.44) (0.50) (0.39) (0.51) (0.33) (0.52)
Observations 3421 5171 4490 6595 3421 5171 4490 6595
R-squared 0.174 0.362 0.246 0.294 0.205 0.362 0.247 0.294
Macroeconomic
control variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulatory control
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Macroeconomic and regulatory control variables are included in the estimation but the coefficients are not
reported. The macroeconomic control variables are inflation, GDP growth rate and GDP per capita. Regulatory control variables used are capital
stringency, diversification guidelines, restrictions on bank activities, financial conglomerates restrictiveness, financial statement transparency, presence
of explicit deposit insurance scheme, supervisory power, and an index of financial freedom. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. p-values in parentheses.
45
T
h
e
V
alu
ation
of
D
iversifi
ed
B
an
k
s:
N
ew
E
v
id
en
ce
Table 2.6: Regression results - European sample
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −0.107∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.046 −0.043 −0.052∗
(0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.18) (0.27) (0.10)
Diversification −0.035 −0.001 0.024 −0.024 −0.089∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.043
(0.40) (0.98) (0.41) (0.44) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13)
Deposit share 0.015 0.011 0.073 0.053 0.028 0.037 0.083∗ 0.038
(0.79) (0.76) (0.16) (0.14) (0.61) (0.34) (0.10) (0.30)
Wholesale share −0.057 0.067 0.041 0.054 −0.028 0.050 0.026 0.042
(0.24) (0.11) (0.33) (0.18) (0.57) (0.20) (0.51) (0.30)
Operating profit 3.665∗∗∗ 3.155∗∗∗ 1.141 1.207∗∗ 3.528∗∗∗ 2.827∗∗∗ 1.034 1.341∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.01)
Cost-to-income 0.791∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.126 0.131 0.744∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗ 0.069 0.237
(0.03) (0.01) (0.47) (0.33) (0.01) (0.01) (0.68) (0.14)
Loan loss provisions 0.007 −0.008 0.009 0.038 0.012∗ −0.005 0.008 0.057∗
(0.35) (0.59) (0.13) (0.29) (0.09) (0.71) (0.18) (0.10)
Z-Score −0.004 0.001 0.002∗∗ 0.000 −0.007 0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.71) (0.56) (0.05) (0.64) (0.47) (0.21) (0.00) (0.25)
Growth in assets 0.171 0.233 −0.245 −0.658 0.115 0.236 −0.215 −0.591
(0.41) (0.12) (0.31) (0.27) (0.53) (0.13) (0.35) (0.35)
Log assets −0.003 −0.017∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.009∗ −0.002 −0.010∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.72) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.84) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Equity 0.617∗ −0.094 −0.119 −0.299∗∗ 0.520∗ 0.007 −0.126 −0.329∗∗
(0.06) (0.56) (0.44) (0.04) (0.08) (0.97) (0.36) (0.02)
Observations 428 636 819 1045 428 636 819 1045
R-squared 0.522 0.464 0.232 0.197 0.554 0.485 0.266 0.187
Macroeconomic
control variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulatory control
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Macroeconomic and regulatory control variables are included in the estimation but the coefficients are not
reported. The macroeconomic control variables are inflation, GDP growth rate and GDP per capita. Regulatory control variables used are capital
stringency, diversification guidelines, restrictions on bank activities, financial conglomerates restrictiveness, financial statement transparency, presence
of explicit deposit insurance scheme, supervisory power, and an index of financial freedom. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. p-values in parentheses.
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Table 2.7: Regression results - Industrialised countries sample
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −0.130∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.086∗∗ −0.058∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.69) (0.02) (0.03)
Diversification −0.039∗ 0.019 0.029 −0.002 −0.096∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.34) (0.20) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Deposit share 0.012 0.060∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.056∗ 0.023 0.056∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.71) (0.02) (0.00) (0.05) (0.45) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05)
Wholesale share −0.014 −0.016 0.055 −0.009 −0.003 −0.012 0.039 −0.018
(0.76) (0.35) (0.22) (0.72) (0.94) (0.48) (0.36) (0.46)
Operating profit 4.933∗∗∗ 5.168∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗ 0.327∗∗ 4.770∗∗∗ 5.237∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗ 0.342∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05)
Cost-to-income 1.311∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.115 −0.234 1.188∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗∗ 0.130 −0.217
(0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.14) (0.01) (0.00) (0.31) (0.23)
Loan loss provisions 0.019∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.078 0.022∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.081
(0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13)
Z-Score −0.017∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.03) (0.64) (0.04) (0.00) (0.36) (0.22) (0.26)
Growth in assets 0.457∗∗∗ 0.003 0.037 0.471∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ −0.084 0.037 0.497∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.97) (0.88) (0.00) (0.01) (0.23) (0.89) (0.00)
Log assets 0.014∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.004∗ 0.002 0.014∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.002 0.004∗∗
(0.00) (0.43) (0.08) (0.14) (0.00) (0.17) (0.39) (0.02)
Equity 0.794∗∗∗ 0.047 −0.132 −0.014 0.754∗∗∗ 0.075 −0.135 −0.041
(0.00) (0.69) (0.36) (0.84) (0.00) (0.55) (0.31) (0.55)
Observations 2111 3150 2311 3162 2111 3150 2311 3162
R-squared 0.486 0.182 0.151 0.139 0.493 0.178 0.141 0.141
Macroeconomic
control variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulatory control
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Macroeconomic and regulatory control variables are included in the estimation but the coefficients are not
reported. The macroeconomic control variables are inflation, GDP growth rate and GDP per capita. Regulatory control variables used are capital
stringency, diversification guidelines, restrictions on bank activities, financial conglomerates restrictiveness, financial statement transparency, presence
of explicit deposit insurance scheme, supervisory power, and an index of financial freedom. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. p-values in parentheses.
47
The Valuation of Diversified Banks: New Evidence
Figure 2.4: Net diversification effect (income)
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The graphs show the partial response of Tobin’s Q to interest-income share as implied in the regression coefficients of bank type and
diversification. The other independent variables included in the model are bank-level, macroeconomic and regulatory control variables.
“Whole” refers to the whole sample, “Europe” to the European sample, and “Industrialised” to the sample of 9 industrialised countries.
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Figure 2.5: Net diversification effect (assets)
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The graphs show the partial response of Tobin’s Q to net loans share as implied in the regression coefficients of bank type and
diversification. The other independent variables included in the model are bank-level, macroeconomic and regulatory control variables.
“Whole” refers to the whole sample, “Europe” to the European sample, and “Industrialised” to the sample of 9 industrialised countries.
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Figure 2.6: Partial residual plots (income)
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Figure 2.7: Partial residual plots (assets)
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Chapter 3
Profitability and Other Industry-Specific
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Abstract
This study investigates the predicting power of profitability and industry-specific variables on the
cross-section of U.S. bank stock returns between 1980-2014. While the profitability premium has
attracted growing attention in the past few years, its existence within the banking industry remains
unknown since banks are typically excluded from asset pricing studies. Overall, our findings do
not point at the existence of a strong profitability premium. However, we find convincing evidence
suggesting that book-to-market and past performance at a horizon of one month (short-term
return reversal), and several industry-specific variables such as loan loss provisions and asset mix
composition can predict the cross-section of expected returns. Results regarding short-term return
reversal are particularly strong in terms of statistical and economic significance.
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3.1. Introduction
The profitability premium that relates more profitable firms to higher stock returns had long
been the least explored market anomaly (Sehgal, 2012). In the past few years, however, it has
drawn particular interest from the academic literature. For example, Hou, Xue, and Zhang (in
press) showed that profitability proxied by ROE can help explain a large set of asset pricing
anomalies. Similarly, Novy-Marx (2013) showed that profitability proxied by gross profits-over-
assets has roughly the same power as book-to-market in predicting expected returns. Moreover,
Fama and French (2014) have extended their three-factor model to a five-factor model by including
a profitability-based factor. These various contributions underline the growing importance of the
profitability premium in the empirical literature.
Financial institutions are typically excluded from cross-sectional asset pricing studies because
they are “different” from nonfinancial firms. Fundamental differences relate to the high leverage
of financial institutions, their higher sensitivity to financial risk, and to the high level of regulation
prevailing in this industry.1 The exclusion of financial firms, making up a substantial fraction of
domestic equity markets, from empirical studies creates a sizeable holdout sample since a large
number of listed companies are not accounted for (Baek & Bilson, 2014; Barber & Lyon, 1997;
Cooper et al., 2003; Viale et al., 2009). This exclusion also means that the existence of market
anomalies among financial firms remains unclear. Financial institutions might therefore be charac-
terised by other patterns explaining stock market returns compared to nonfinancial firms (Barber
& Lyon, 1997; Cooper et al., 2003).
This study investigates the predicting power of profitability on the cross-section of expected
stock returns in the U.S. banking industry between 1980-2014. It looks at the holdout sample
created by the exclusion of financial institutions from the recent studies of Fama and French
(2006, 2008) and Novy-Marx (2013). To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study to explore
1Fama and French (1992) excluded financial firms from their initial study on the cross-section of expected stock
returns because of their initial interest in leverage as an explanatory variable for security returns (Barber & Lyon,
1997). As a result, subsequent studies relating to this topic have excluded financial firms as well. For more details
on differences relating to leverage, see for example Fama and French (1992), Barber and Lyon (1997), or Viale et
al. (2009); for financial risk, see Gandhi and Lustig (2013); and for regulation see Mishkin and Eakins (2012) or
Cooper et al. (2003).
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this particular market anomaly in the banking industry. In addition to profitability, we also
explore the ability of industry-specific variables to predict the cross-section of returns. Cooper et
al. (2003) investigated the relation between quarterly changes in several banking industry-specific
variables and stock market returns in order to analyse the effect of good/bad news shocks, rather
than predicting the determinants of expected cross-sectional returns. As underlined by the authors
of the study, they used a different approach compared to traditional studies such as Fama and
French (1992) or Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), or this study, that examine the relation
between expected returns and levels of fundamental variables. Finally, since we include control
variables accounting for well-know market anomalies such as size, book-to-market, and past returns
at different horizons, our study also provides fresh evidence about the predicting power of these
anomalies in the banking industry. To the best of our knowledge, the impact of momentum on the
cross-section of bank stock returns has never been investigated.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. We find mixed evidence regarding the pre-
dicting power of profitability. Evidence from Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression
suggests a positive relationship between profitability and expected stock returns. However, further
analysis shows that small market capitalisations are very influential in explaining this result; once
the smallest market capitalisations are excluded from the analysis, the statistical significance of
the relationship disappears. In addition, results from one-way sorts of returns on profitability are
largely inconclusive and do not point to the existence of a market premium. Similarly, evidence
indicating the presence of abnormal returns suggested by significant intercepts of long−short port-
folios regressed on the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) are very limited. These results contrast
with recent, clear-cut evidence from Novy-Marx (2013) suggesting that profitability is a strong
predictor of expected cross-sectional returns. Thus, the profitability premium seems to be much
more pronounced among nonfinancial firms than it is in the banking industry.
Second, among traditional market anomalies, we find evidence suggesting that book-to-market,
size, and past performance at a horizon of one month can predict the cross-section of expected
returns. Past performance at a horizon of one month, suggesting short-term return reversal, stands
out from the other variables investigated in terms of economic and statistical significance. In the
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one-way sorts portfolios, we find an average monthly return of 2.079% for the long−short portfolio
as well as a statistically significant intercept suggesting excess returns of 2.12% in time series
regression. In Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression, the statistical significance of
this variable stands out as well. Finally, we find the effect to be particularly stable over time and
persistent in all portfolios sorted on size, meaning that this short-term return reversal does not
result from high volume transactions among small, illiquid stocks. We also find convincing evidence
regarding the predicting power of book-to-market. As for the predicting power of size, it appears
to be, similar to profitability, largely driven by the smallest market capitalisations. Finally, our
results do not suggest that past performance at a horizon of two to 12 months (momentum) can
effectively predict expected stock returns.
And third, for industry-specific variables, our results show that loan loss provisions, loan share,
and activity diversification can all predict the cross-section of expected stock returns. Banks
with a lower ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets, a lower share of loans to total earnings
assets, and a higher degree of assets diversification are associated with higher returns. We find
convincing evidence in most of our tests (Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, one-way sort
portfolios, intercepts from time series regression). Finally, we find only limited evidence regarding
the predicting power of deposit share, and none regarding the predicting power of equity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we review the relevant
literature with special focus on market anomalies in banking, the profitability premium, and bank-
ing industry-specific variables as determinants of expected returns. In Section 3.3, we discuss the
variables and the methodology used in the empirical part, while we present the data and the de-
scriptive statistics in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents and discusses the results of the empirical
analysis. In Section 3.6, we conduct and discuss several robustness tests of our results. Section 3.7
concludes.
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3.2. Relevant literature
Market anomalies in banking
There is a lot of debate about whether market anomalies, i.e. patterns in average stock returns
not explained by the CAPM, are due to market efficiency or market inefficiency. The first view
is based on rational pricing and holds that market anomalies can be attributed to differences in
risk. Controlling for other variables, this stream of the literature views firms with, say, higher
book-to-market or lower market capitalisation, as riskier (e.g. higher cost of capital, greater
business risk) than firms with lower book-to-market or larger market capitalisation. Consequently,
investors require a higher rate of return as a compensation for this higher risk. The second
view typically relates the higher returns of market anomalies to irrational pricing and argues that
market participants misprice the value of these companies. This mispricing provides excess returns.
Irrational pricing (e.g. price under- or overreaction) is the result of cognitive errors that investors
make when incorporating information into prices. For example, investors may be too quick to draw
the conclusion that a given stock follows a particular “ideal type”, and they may be too slow to
update their beliefs when confronted with new evidence (Fama & French, 2006; Haugen & Baker,
1996; Li, Miffre, & O’Sullivan, 2008).
Since banks are typically excluded from cross-sectional asset pricing studies, the existence of
market anomalies remains largely unknown in this industry and limited to a few studies. Barber
and Lyon (1997) were the first to exploit this holdout sample in order to look at the size and
market-to-book anomaly in the financial industry. The authors analysed monthly cross-sectional
returns of U.S. financial institutions between 1973-1994 by sorting firms on size and book-to-
market value deciles (one-way sort portfolios) and compared the means of these deciles. Barber
and Lyon (1997) found that financial firms, similar to nonfinancial firms, had significant size (small
firm premium) and book-to-market premiums. Cooper et al. (2003) investigated the relationship
between quarterly changes in several bank-level fundamental variables and the cross-section of stock
market returns for a sample of U.S. banks between 1986-1999. They used one-way sort portfolios
and Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. Relevant for market anomalies, they
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controlled for size and book-to-market by including levels of these two variables. They did not
find any significant effect of either size or book-to-market.
More recently, Viale et al. (2009) and Baek and Bilson (2014) explored common risk factors
priced in stock returns of banks and other financial firms. Viale et al. (2009) focused on U.S.
banks over the period 1986-2003 using the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and
found no evidence suggesting that size or book-to-market are priced in bank stock returns (see
Viale et al. (2009, p. 467)). Baek and Bilson (2014) also used the three-factor model of Fama
and French (1993) and analysed U.S. financial firms between 1963-2012. Their results suggest a
negative relation between size and average returns and a positive relation between book-to-market
and average returns (see Baek and Bilson (2014, p. 18)). Baek and Bilson (2014) also analysed
cross-sectional returns using one-way sort portfolios, and found evidence, similar to Barber and
Lyon (1997), of both a size and a book-to-market premium (see Baek and Bilson (2014, p. 14)).
The banking literature briefly reviewed reveals conflicting findings about size and book-to-
market. While evidence found by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Baek and Bilson (2014) suggests
the existence of size and book-to-market premiums, the studies of Cooper et al. (2003) and Viale et
al. (2009) found no effect.2 Possible explanations for this discrepancy in results could relate to the
methodologies used in the different studies and to the time periods explored. For the studies using
one-way sort portfolios, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Baek and Bilson (2014) found significant
book-to-market and size premiums. In contrast, Cooper et al. (2003) found no significant effect.
This difference may possibly by explained by the different time periods analysed: Both Barber and
Lyon (1997) and Baek and Bilson (2014) included earlier years compared to Cooper et al. (2003).
Similarly, Baek and Bilson (2014) and Viale et al. (2009) both used the three-factor model of
Fama and French (1993) to assess size and book-to-market anomalies and found different results.
Again, differences relating to the time periods analysed may explain these discrepancies. Finally,
only Cooper et al. (2003) used Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions and found no
significant effect for size and book-to-market. As for profitability and momentum, the predicting
2It may be worth mentioning that both Cooper et al. (2003) and Viale et al. (2009) looked specifically at
banks, while Barber and Lyon (1997) and Baek and Bilson (2014) looked at nonfinancial firms in general, i.e.
banks, insurance and real estate companies. Baek and Bilson (2014) used a fourth group, trading and investment
companies. Both Barber and Lyon (1997) and Baek and Bilson (2014) further looked at the subset of banks and
were able to confirm their main findings for this subset.
58
Profitability and Other Industry-Specific Determinants of Banks’ Cross-Sectional Returns
power of these two variables has, to the best of our knowledge, never been investigated in the
banking industry.
Profitability and the cross-section of expected returns
Wang and Yu (2013) noted that most studies (e.g. Fama and French (2006, 2008), Novy-Marx
(2013)) investigating the profitability premium are generally agnostic about whether this anomaly
is due to rational or irrational pricing. For this reason, they do not discuss potential risk-related
or behavioural explanations, and such explanations remain very scarce in the literature.3
Among the few authors that offer an explanation for the profitability premium, Sehgal (2012)
proposed a risk-based explanation. He argued that investors might visualise profits as the reward
for growth and innovation strategies. These strategies might bear higher operating or financial risk.
For this reason, investors require higher returns. In other words, profit could be regarded as the
reward for risk-bearing, therefore explaining why more profitable firms yield higher returns. An-
other possible line of argumentation is that more profitable firms are less risky than less profitable
firms. Due to the higher earnings generated in past periods, more profitable firms have for exam-
ple higher investment opportunities, while less profitable firms can be the subject of bankruptcy
concerns. From this perspective, higher profitability should translate into lower returns. Results
from the empirical literature, however, largely support a positive association between profitability
and stock returns over a negative association.
Wang and Yu (2013) provided an explanation for the profitability premium based on irrational
pricing. They argued that investors’ behavioural bases such as underreaction to current profitabil-
ity news generate an uninformed demand shock leading to high profitability firms being relatively
underpriced compared to low profitability firms. Due to limits on arbitrage preventing rational
investors from fully absorbing this shock, the price adjustment does not occur today, but only over
a period of time, thus causing the profitability premium. Another possible explanation based on
irrational pricing is that investors do not extrapolate enough future developments of profitability.
3Several of these studies, agnostic on the matter (e.g. Fama and French (2006), Novy-Marx (2013), and Fama
and French (2014)), illustrate the underlying relationship between profitability and expected stock returns by using
the dividend discount model.
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Rather than reflecting a random walk, profitability in period t can be expected to be positively
correlated with profitability in period t− 1. Thus, profitability can be expected to be more or less
constant over the short term, and maybe over the medium term as well. For example, a company’s
high profitability can be explained by its long-lived business philosophy, the implementation of a
profitable strategy by its management, or from a particularly skilled labour force. Changes relating
to these factors, and to other factors impacting on profitability, will inevitably happen over time.
However, one can rationally expect that such changes will only happen gradually in most cases.
Thus, one can expect that profitability will be more or less constant over time and should therefore
be, on average, extrapolated over the short-term horizon.
Sehgal (2012) noted that, until recently, the profitability premium had become very little
interest compared to other market anomalies. In the past few years, however, it has gained
particular attention in the academic literature. Several empirical studies relating in a way or in
another profitability to stock returns have been conducted (e.g. Fama and French (2006, 2008),
Wang and Yu (2013), Novy-Marx (2013), Fama and French (2014), Hou et al. (in press), Ball,
Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Nikolaev (in press), Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Nikolaev (2015)).
Three of these studies (Fama and French (2006, 2008); Novy-Marx (2013)) are of particular interest
for our study because they explore the relationship between profitability and the cross-section of
monthly expected returns. These studies use a similar methodology, relying primarily on the Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regression framework and on one-way sort portfolios to explore this thematic.
They all excluded banks from the respective samples analysed.
In the first of these three studies, Fama and French (2006) analysed stock returns from U.S.
firms between 1963-2003 in order to assess whether more profitable firms earn higher returns.
They found that profitability had explanatory power in explaining subsequent average returns
in Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. In the second study, Fama and French
(2008) explored several market anomalies for U.S. firms between 1963-2005. In Fama and MacBeth
(1973) cross-sectional regression, the authors found that profitability had a significant and positive
effect on expected returns. However, results from one-way sorts of returns on profitability were
largely inconclusive. These profitability sorts produced weak average long−short portfolio returns
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compared to the other anomalies analysed.
Finally, Novy-Marx (2013) analysed U.S. firms between 1963-2010 in a study focusing on the
predicting power of profitability. Results from Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional
regression showed that profitability had roughly the same power as book-to-market in predicting
average returns. In addition, results from one-way sorts of returns on profitability showed sig-
nificantly positive long−short portfolio returns. Novy-Marx (2013) also showed the existence of
significantly positive abnormal returns (significant intercepts) of the long−short portfolio (prof-
itable minus unprofitable firms) relative to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Thus,
he concluded that the profitability premium found in the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression
was not captured by the various portfolios that proxy for risk. Novy-Marx (2013) attributed the
clear-cut character of his findings, in contrast with the mixed results found by Fama and French
(2008), to the different profitability proxies used. While Fama and French (2006, 2008) used income
before extraordinary items divided by book equity, Novy-Marx (2013) employed gross profitability
(revenues minus cost of goods sold) divided by total assets. He argued that gross profitability was
a better proxy since it represents a firm’s true economic profitability.
In addition, two recent studies explored the profitability premium using time series frameworks
similar to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) or the four-factor model of Carhart
(1997). Hou et al. (in press) used an empirical q-factor model consisting of the market factor, a
size factor, an investment factor, and a profitability factor. They found that this model performed
at least comparable to, and in several cases better than the three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993) or the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). Similarly, Fama and French (2014), notably
inspired by the results of Novy-Marx (2013), introduced a five-factor model that accounts for a
profitability factor. They found that this model performed better than the three factor-model of
Fama and French (1993).
Banking industry-specific variables
To our knowledge, only Cooper et al. (2003) have tried to relate banking industry-specific variables
to the cross-section of stock market returns in an empirical framework. They analysed monthly
61
Profitability and Other Industry-Specific Determinants of Banks’ Cross-Sectional Returns
returns of U.S. banks between 1986-1999 using one-way sorts of returns and Fama and MacBeth
(1973) cross-sectional regression. They employed “variables that have been shown to be important
in determining the fundamental riskiness of banks or reflect recent changes in business practices
that may affect bank risk” to predict the cross-section of bank stock returns.4 As previously noted,
the authors investigated the relation between quarterly changes in several bank-level fundamental
variables and stock market returns in order to analyse the effect of good/bad news shocks. There-
fore, they analysed the stock market reaction to good/bad news shocks and did not try to predict
the determinants of expected cross-sectional returns like we do in this study. Finally, they con-
trolled for size and book-to-market value by including levels of these two variables. Results from
one-way sorts and cross-sectional regressions showed that several variables relating to good/bad
news shocks (changes in these variables) were significant. Relevant for this study, Cooper et al.
(2003) did not find any significant effect for size or book-to-market (levels of these variables).
4The variables that Cooper et al. (2003) investigated are changes in earnings per share, loans-to-total assets,
loan-loss reserves to total loans, non-interest income to net income, total unused loan commitments to total loans,
total standby letters of credit to total loans, and interest rate swaps to total assets.
62
Profitability and Other Industry-Specific Determinants of Banks’ Cross-Sectional Returns
3.3. Proxy variables and methodology
3.3.1. Variables
In the empirical part, we explore whether lagged profitability and lags of industry-specific variables
are good predictors of bank stock returns. In addition, we control for variables reflecting well-known
market anomalies that are commonly used in cross-sectional asset pricing studies. In the following,
we briefly discuss these variables, for which definitions are given in Table 3.1.
[Table 3.1 about here]
Profitability
As observed by Novy-Marx (2013), determining the best measure of economic profitability remains
ultimately an empirical question. Fama and French (2006, 2008) used income before extraordinary
items divided by book value of equity as proxy for profitability. Novy-Marx (2013) advocated
that gross profit (revenues minus cost of goods sold) divided by total assets was a better proxy.
He further argued that gross profits was the “cleanest” accounting measure of true economic
profitability and added that “the further down the income statement one goes, the more polluted
profitability measures become, and the less related they are to true economic profitability” (Novy-
Marx, 2013, p. 2-3).
We take no ex ante position on the variable that best proxies profitability, but take note that
different proxies have been used in past studies. Thus, we consider several potential proxies for
profitability. Namely, we use Pre-impairment income scaled by total assets, Operating income
scaled by total assets, Pre-tax income scaled by total assets, and Net income scaled by book
equity. Worldscope income statement is displayed in Table 3.2 and our different proxies can be
observed from this table. The different proxies considered relate to different positions of a bank’s
income statement. In addition, the analysis of correlation coefficients confirms that these variables
are not identical and therefore measure different aspects of profitability.
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[Table 3.2 about here]
We compute Pre-impairment income by adding Provision for loan losses to Operating income.
Loan loss provisions are commonly used for earnings management purposes in banking. This prac-
tice is facilitated by the substantial latitude given to banks in determining the amount of provisions
(see e.g. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005); Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008)). By subtracting loan loss
provisions, earnings are drained from a potential source of manipulation of economic performance.
Pre-impairment income can therefore be considered as a form of pre-managed profitability, making
it arguably a good proxy of a bank’s profitability. It is perhaps the variable that comes the closest
to gross profitability, as defined by Novy-Marx (2013), in banking. However, absence manipula-
tion, earnings are also drained from a real source of performance if loan losses provisions are not
accounted for.
We further consider Operating income. Compared to Pre-impairment income, this measure may
potentially be subject to earnings management through the manipulation of loan loss provisions.
Absence manipulation, however, it can be considered as a more complete earnings proxy since it
reflects income from a bank’s core activities. The next variable considered is Pre-tax income. It is
commonly seen as a measure of profitability giving a clear picture of the aspects that a bank can
control. In addition, because Pre-tax income excludes taxes, this measure enables the profitability
of companies to be compared across locations where corporate taxes differ. Finally, we consider Net
income before extraordinary items. This variable, located at the bottom of the income statement,
is commonly referred to as reported earnings and often used by practitioners and researchers as a
proxy for profitability (e.g. Fama and French (2006, 2008)). All profitability proxies are expressed
in % of total assets or book equity.
Banking industry-specific variables
As discussed earlier, cross-sectional asset pricing studies typically exclude financial institutions
because they are different. Cooper et al. (2003) noted that, because of this different nature, there
may exist important links between industry-specific variables and the cross-section of banks’ stock
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returns. In the following, we discuss the industry-specific variables used in the empirical analysis.
Loan loss provisions (LLP/A)
Loan loss provisions are an indicator of the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. In principle, a
higher ratio should suggest poor asset quality. It indicates that a bank can be expected to write
off a substantial part of its loan portfolio in a foreseeable future, and is also likely to generate less
interest income from these loans given the delicate financial situation of the debtors. Thus, the
poor health of banks with higher ratios of loan loss provisions is likely to go in pair with poor stock
returns. However, loan loss provisions are commonly used for earnings management purposes since
banks have substantial latitude in determining these provisions. According to Beaver, Eger, Ryan,
and Wolfson (1989), a higher ratio of loan loss provisions could even signal economic strength by
indicating that investors perceive the earnings power of the bank as sufficiently strong to withstand
a hit in earnings in the form of additional provisions. According to the same logic, a lower ratio
may indicate that a bank is trying to avoid reporting losses (Ahmed et al., 1999). In this case,
a higher ratio of loan loss provisions would suggest economic strength. It should therefore be
associated with higher returns. We divide loan loss provisions by total assets (LLP/A) to reflect
the share of total assets at risk.
Loan share (LS) and asset diversification (AD)
This study also aims to shed some light on the controversial issue of the value of non-traditional
activities. In past decades, commercial banks have expanded their range of traditional activities
(lending) into investment activities (e.g. fees, trading, insurance). In theory, one could expect
that diversified banks that combine cash flows from non-correlated revenue sources should be
more stable and profitable than their constituent parts (Baele et al., 2007; Cooper et al., 2003).
Therefore, higher stock returns should go in pair with diversified banks. However, empirical
research from DeYoung and Roland (2001) has shown that traditional activities are actually more
stable and more recession-proof than investment activities. According to this view, less diversified
banks focusing on traditional activities should earn higher returns.
To explore the impact of diversification on the cross-section of bank stock returns, we con-
struct two variables inspired by Laeven and Levine (2007). The first variable, Loan share (LS), is
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constructed as the ratio of loans to total earnings assets, where total earnings assets include net
loans and total investments (including securities).5 High values (close to 100%) signal that a bank
specialises mainly in commercial activities (lending), and low values (close to 0%) signal that a
bank specialises in investment activities (non-lending).
The second variable, Asset diversification (AD) is constructed as
1−
∣∣∣∣Net loans−Other earnings assetsTotal earnings assets
∣∣∣∣, (3.1)
where Other earnings assets is proxied by total investments. It reflects the degree of diversification
of a bank, as opposed to its degree of specialisation. A bank focusing on commercial activities
and a bank focusing on investment activities both have a value of zero since they are specialised
institutions. A bank with a balanced mix of commercial and investment activities shows a value
of one reflecting the high degree of diversification.6
Deposit share (DS)
As next variable, we use the ratio of customers’ deposits to total liabilities. In the years leading
to the global financial crisis, an increase in the share of wholesale, non-deposit, funding has been
documented. It is commonly seen as one of the triggers of this crisis since it resulted in several U.S.
and European banks being unable to renew this expiring short-term funding source (Claessens et
al., 2012; International Monetary Fund, 2013; Laeven, 2011). It is indeed commonly argued that
deposit funding is a relatively cheap and stable source of funding compared to market funding,
presumably because deposits are usually covered by government guarantee (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012;
Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Laeven & Levine, 2007). A high deposit share (DS) may therefore
be expected to be linked with higher stock returns.
Equity (BE/A)
Banks were initially excluded from cross-sectional stock return studies because of fundamental
5Laeven and Levine (2007) used data from Bankscope and defined total earning assets as the sum of loans,
securities, and investments.
6Laeven and Levine (2007) also constructed two variables using income-based measures (interest versus noninter-
est income). Because of the substantial number of missing values for interest and noninterest income on Worldscope,
including these alternative constructions would have resulted in a substantial number of observations being deleted,
and we therefore did not construct these variables.
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differences in leverage structure. Due to the intermediation function fulfilled by banks, high lever-
age is considered to be usual in the banking industry while it typically suggests financial distress
in nonfinancial industries. Yet, extremely high leverage can also signal distress in the banking
industry. Because equity represents a buffer against losses, a bank that holds more equity can be
seen as more robust and less prone to solvability problems. However, equity is also seen as rather
expensive and less profitable for its shareholders.
Traditional stock return determinants
In related studies, Novy-Marx (2013) and Fama and French (2006, 2008) used control variables
accounting for well-known patterns in average stock returns in order to isolate the impact of
profitability. We include the same variables as Novy-Marx (2013) and control for book-to-market
(log(B/M)), size (log(ME)), and past performance measured at horizons of one month (r0,1) and 12
to two months (r2,12).
7 Previous research has shown that stocks with lower market capitalisation
earn higher average returns (size anomaly) relative to stocks with higher market capitalisation. It
has also shown that stocks with higher book-to-market ratio earn higher average returns (value
anomaly) compared to stocks with lower book-to-market ratio. Finally, research has shown that
stocks with high returns over the past year can be expected to have high returns in the next few
months (momentum anomaly), while stocks with high returns over the past month can be expected
to have low returns in the following month (short-term return reversal). There are therefore two
distinct effects for past performance at different horizons.
Research from Jegadeesh (1990), Lehmann (1990) or Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) have docu-
mented that stocks tend to reverse from one month to the next (reversal rather than continuation).
For example, Jegadeesh (1990) reported profits of about 2% per month over 1934-1987 using a
reversal strategy that buys and sells stocks on the basis of their prior-month returns and holds
them for one month. According to Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006), however, the profitabil-
ity of this strategy is questionable due to transaction costs likely to be expensive. Da, Liu, and
Schaumburg (2014) noted that the existence of short-term reversal profits are typically attributed
7We follow recent studies (e.g. Cooper et al. (2003); Fama and French (2006, 2008); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003); Novy-Marx (2013), similar in terms of methodology and design, and do not include market beta in the
Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions.
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to investors’ overreaction to information (sentiment-based explanation) or derived from positions in
small, high turnover, and illiquid stocks (liquidity-based explanation). According to the sentiment-
based hypothesis, investors overreact to new information, causing an important price increase or
decrease. In the following month, the overreaction is corrected, and this correction gives rise to the
short-term return reversal. According the the liquidity-based explanation, high volume trading in
one period causes prices to dramatically increase (or decrease). This effect is more likely among
lower market capitalisations and illiquid stocks since one transaction can result more easily in high
volume trading. The dramatic change in price is then corrected in the the next period as things
get back to normal, and this would explain the short-term return reversal.
Recent evidence from Novy-Marx (2013) and Da et al. (2014) confirm the existence of short-
term return reversal in recent time periods as well. Due to this short-term return reversal, empirical
studies looking at the momentum anomaly, or using momentum as a control variable, often chose
to either skip returns over the past month (e.g. Fama and French (2008, 2012)) or to include
both past performance measured at horizons of one month and 12 to two months (e.g. Novy-Marx
(2013) or this study).
3.3.2. Methodology
In order to assess the predicting power of the various explanatory variables on the cross-section
of monthly returns, we use three main methods. First, we look at average monthly returns for
portfolios formed on one-way sorts, and then at the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly
cross-sectional regression. We further analyse intercepts from the four-factor model of Carhart
(1997) to investigate the presence of excess returns above and beyond those suggested by the
four-factor model. We also employ portfolios’ Sharpe ratios to examine whether cross-sectional
profitability is due to increased risk. We discuss these methods in more detail in the following.
Average monthly returns for portfolios formed on one-way sorts
As a first cut for relating the independent variables to the cross-section of expected bank stocks
returns, we perform one-way quintile sorts. The main advantage of this approach is that it rep-
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resents a simple picture of how average returns vary across the spectrum of a variable. Sorts of
returns are, however, rather descriptive in nature as they do not allow to control for the impact of
other variables (Fama & French, 2006).
Monthly returns are calculated from July through June of the following year. The portfolios
are formed as follows. At the end of June of year t, stocks are allocated to quintiles based on lagged
values of the independent variables. To ensure that values of the sort variables are known when
the stocks are allocated to quintiles, we use accounting values from the fiscal period ending in year
t−1 to form the quintile portfolios. For size, we take market capitalisation values from June of year
t. For the two variables relating to past performance at different horizons, portfolios are updated
monthly. Based on these quintile groupings, equally weighted (EW) returns are calculated.8 In
the following, we refer to the lower quintile portfolios as “short” (quintile 1) and to the higher as
“long” (quintile 5).
In addition to showing average monthly returns of each quintile portfolio, we also show the
returns obtained from long−short portfolios since the anomaly literature tends to emphasise
long−short portfolio returns from positions in the extreme quintiles (Fama & French, 2008). We
also compute two tests to assess the significance of the results. We use a t-test with the null
hypothesis that the mean returns of long−short portfolios is zero. We also perform an analysis
of variance (ANOVA) to test the null hypothesis of equality of mean returns across the quintile
portfolios.
Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression can correct for some of the shortcomings associated with
one-way sorts of returns. In particular, multiple regression slopes can provide direct estimates of
marginal effects and allow to draw inferences on the variables that have unique information about
average returns and those that have little marginal ability to predict returns (Fama & French,
2006).9
Similar to Novy-Marx (2013), we include controls accounting for well-known anomalies such
8We use value-weighted portfolios for robustness purposes in Section 3.6.
9See Fama and French (2006) for a detailed comparison of one-way sorts of returns and Fama and MacBeth
(1973) cross-sectional regressions.
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as book-to-market (log(B/M)), size (log(ME)), and past performance measured at horizons of one
month (r0,1) and 12 to two months (r2,12) in each specification. The regression setup is similar
to that of the sorts. We estimate the regressions monthly, but again we update most of the
explanatory variables annually at the end of June. Thus, we use accounting values from fiscal
yearends between January and December of year t − 1 to forecast monthly returns from July of
t to June of t + 1. Size (market capitalisation) is measured at the end of June of t. The two
variables relating to past performance are again updated monthly. That is, to calculate r2,12,
values (total return index) of the oldest period is dropped in every new monthly regression (month
12 is dropped when it becomes month 13) and values from a newest period are added in every
new monthly regression (month 1 is added when it becomes month 2). As for r0,1, it is completely
updated every month, taking the value that the dependent variable had in the previous month.
Time series regression of long−short portfolio profits on a four-factor model
The variables included in the four-factor model proxy for sensitivity to common risk factors in
returns and have all been shown to significantly forecast future returns. This approach to testing
asset pricing models was first introduced by Fama and French (1993). In the time series regression
of portfolios of Fama and French (1993), monthly returns on portfolios are regressed on the returns
to a market portfolio of stocks and on two portfolios mimicking size and book-to-market. The
time series regression slopes are factors loadings that “have a clear interpretation as risk-factor
sensitivities” (Fama & French, 1993, p. 4). This three-factor model was later extended by Carhart
(1997) to a four-factor model including a portfolio mimicking momentum.
We use the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) and estimate the following time series regression:
Rt = α + β1 ∗MKTt + β2 ∗ SMBt + β3 ∗HMLt + β4 ∗ UMDt + t. (3.2)
For each variable, the long−short portfolio Rt is regressed on the monthly return of the CRSP
value-weighted index less the risk free rate (MKT), the monthly premium of the book-to-market
factor (HML), the monthly premium of the size factor (SMB), and the monthly premium of winners
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minus losers (UMD).10 The intercept α is the abnormal return on a strategy that buys quintile
5 portfolio and sells short quintile 1 portfolio. If quintile 5 differs significantly from quintile 1
in the characteristics of the mimicking portfolios (i.e. MKT , SMB, HML, UMD), differences
in exposure to risk may explain the difference in returns (Gompers et al., 2003). If this is the
case, these differences should be absorbed by the factors, and the intercept should be statistically
insignificant. In contrast, a significant intercept would signal “excess returns” above and beyond
that suggested by the four-factor model of Carhart (1997).11
In addition, finding evidence of a profitability premium not captured by the four-factor model
would confirm the usefulness of integrating a profitability factor in a bank-specific asset-pricing
model. Motivated by the results of Novy-Marx (2013) that found a significant intercept in the
time-series portfolio regression framework, Fama and French (2014) developed a five-factor model
integrating a profitability factor.
Portfolios’ Sharpe ratio
As an alternative method to investigate whether the predictability found in cross-sectional regres-
sions is due to increased risk, we examine Sharpe ratios for the average returns of the five quintile
portfolios. This ratio is a measure of risk-adjusted performance. From a simple mean-variance
standpoint, if the higher return portfolios are riskier, they should have a smaller Sharpe ratio
coming from their higher standard deviations compared to portfolios with lower returns (Cooper
et al., 2003). We follow Cooper et al. (2003) that used portfolio’s Sharpe ratio for the same risk-
adjustment purpose and compute the reported Sharpe ratios as average of monthly Sharpe ratios.
These monthly Sharpe ratios are calculated as the monthly average in returns of a portfolio divided
by its monthly standard deviation. In addition, we compute a t-test with the null hypothesis that
the mean of monthly Sharpe ratios of long−short portfolios is zero.
10Data are obtained from Kenneth French’s website. We are thankful for their provision.
11This technique was used by Gompers et al. (2003), Cooper et al. (2003), Novy-Marx (2013), or Von Lilienfeld-
Toal and Ruenzi (2014), among others.
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3.4. Data and descriptive statistics
3.4.1. Data
This study analyses monthly stock market returns of U.S. banks. Stock market data come from
Datastream and accounting data from Worldscope. Due to data availability in the Worldscope
database, the sample period covered in this study is from January 1980 to June 2014. Since we
use lagged data up to 18 months in most specifications, the first monthly returns predicted are for
July 1981. This time frame ensures the inclusion of periods with different business cycles and stock
market conditions (e.g. Dot-com bubble, economic expansion of the early 2000s, financial crisis,
Great Recession). Our sample is free from survivorship bias since we also consider banks that have
been delisted during the sample period. We exclude banks with missing data on accounting or
stock market variables.
Similar to Fama and French (2006, 2008), we address extreme values by winsorising all variables
at the 1% and 99% levels.We also trim our data at the 1% and 99% levels in the robustness
section, a technique used by Novy-Marx (2013). Although there is no absolute consensus in the
way researchers deal with extreme values, trimming or winsorising are two widespread practices
used in studies dealing with accounting and finance data. Extreme values are problematic since
they can distort estimated coefficients, and thus need to be dealt with (Leone, Minutti-Meza, &
Wasley, 2013).12 To highlight the need to address extreme values, we display in Figure 3.1 box
plots of the different variables used in order to show the dispersion of the data. As can be seen
from the various plots, several variables appear to include extreme values that deviate substantially
from the other observations.
[Figure 3.1 about here]
12Our choice of winsorising instead of trimming extreme values is mainly motivated by the fact that we consider
trimming more “intrusive” than winsorising. By this we mean that winsorising has only an impact on one dimension
of an observation. In contrast, trimming also impacts on all other dimensions since the observation is deleted from
the sample. Thus, winsorising presents the advantage of preserving the number of observations in the sample and
leaving unaffected the other dimensions of an observation. We opt for an across-the-board approach due to the
number of observations in the sample that makes it fairly difficult to review potential outliers on an individual basis.
72
Profitability and Other Industry-Specific Determinants of Banks’ Cross-Sectional Returns
3.4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 3.3 displays summary statistics for the variables used in Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly
cross-sectional regression. Our final sample includes 190,592 firm-months observations for each
variable. Regressions are estimated monthly, but most of the explanatory variables are updated
annually, i.e. the same value is used to predict 12 monthly returns. As can be seen, PII/A is bigger
than OI/A since loan loss provisions, i.e. the difference between these two earnings measures, are
almost always an expense. OI/A is in turn slightly bigger than PTI/A, indicating that the income
stream occurring between these two positions is, on average, negative and represents an expense.
Due to scaling effects, NI/E is substantially bigger than the other profitability proxies scaled by
total assets. Expressed in absolute terms, however, pre-tax income is bigger than net income,
reflecting the fact that tax expenses reduce income.
[Table 3.3 about here]
Average loan share is 71.05% while asset diversification is 55.18%. The first number reflects the
fact that most banks in the sample are commercial banks, i.e. banks mainly active in loan-making
(0 % indicates full specialisation in non-lending activities and 100% full specialisation in lending).
The second number reflects the fact that the average bank is somewhat diversified (0% indicates
full specialisation and 100% full diversification). These two findings complete each other since the
fact that most banks concentrate their activities on loan-making also means that most banks are
not fully diversified. Finally, customer deposits constitute the biggest part of banks’ total liabilities
(deposit share of 85.85%). This indicates that banks, on average, rely more heavily on traditional
funding sources. Finally, the average equity ratio is 9.41%.
3.4.3. Correlation
Table 3.4 shows Spearman rank correlations between the independent variables employed in Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regression. As expected, the various profitability proxies are strongly and
significantly correlated to each other. They are, however, not identical. This confirms that the
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measures considered capture different aspects of profitability. Compared to the other correlations
between profitability proxies, the correlation between PII/A and NI/E is substantially lower (0.67),
which may in part be due to scaling effect. Finally, the correlation between PTI/A and OI/A is
0.97, indicating that these two variables are very close. There is also a significantly negative
correlation between LLP/A and various profitability proxies (except PII/A). This indicates that a
higher ratio of loan loss provisions is associated with lower profitability.
[Table 3.4 about here]
The significantly negative correlations between log(B/M) and the various profitability proxies
(around 0.5) suggest that profitability is complementary to book-to-market. In addition, there is a
significantly positive correlation, though slightly weaker, between log(ME) and various profitability
proxies. As noted by Novy-Marx (2013) who found similar correlations among nonfinancial firms,
this result reflects the fact that more profitable firms have higher market values. Profitable banks
have, on average, lower book-to-market ratios and higher market capitalisations.
Log(ME) is significantly correlated with several industry-specific variables. The negative cor-
relation between log(ME) and LS suggests that larger banks focus less on commercial activities
and more on investment activities. Similarly, the positive correlation between log(ME) and AD
suggests that larger banks are more diversified than smaller banks. Furthermore, the negative
correlation between log(ME) and DS suggests that larger banks rely less heavily on customers’
deposits compared to smaller banks. The negative correlation with BE/A indicates that larger
banks tend to hold less equity.
Finally, LS and AD are practically perfectly (negatively) correlated (−0.97). While such a
high coefficient may be surprising at first glance, this correlation reflects the fact that specialised
institutions are predominantly banks with a higher loan share.13 The remaining industry-specific
variables do not have strong correlations with other variables.
13The highly significant correlation between LS and AD of −0.97 differs from the highly significant correlation
between Type (assets) and Diversification (assets) of −0.48 found in the first paper of the thesis. This difference can
be explained by differences relating to: the samples’ composition (international vs. U.S. banks), the time periods
analysed (1998-2013 vs. 1980-2014) and the type of correlation coefficients used (Pearson versus Spearman rank).
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3.5. Results
3.5.1. Average monthly returns for portfolios formed on one-way sorts
Table 3.5 shows the average monthly returns for portfolios formed on one-way sorts of the lagged
variables. Results suggest that a subset of the independent variables is important in predicting
future stock returns.
[Table 3.5 about here]
Several long−short portfolios are statistically significant. For example, the results for log(B/M)
means that banks with small book-to-market ratios (portfolio 1) earn significantly lower returns
than banks with large book-to-market ratios (portfolio 5). Similarly, banks with large market cap-
italisation (log(ME)) earn significantly higher returns than banks with small market capitalisation
(large firm premium), banks with large returns at a horizon of two to 12 (r2,12) months earn higher
monthly returns than banks with small returns at a horizon of two to 12 months (momentum),
and banks with a large degree of diversification (AD) earn higher returns than banks with a small
degree of diversification. Table 3.5 further shows that banks with large returns at a horizon of one
month (r0,1) earn significantly lower monthly returns than banks with small returns at a horizon
of one month (short-term return reversal), while banks with large loan loss provisions (LLP/A)
earn lower returns than banks with small loan loss provisions, and banks with large loan share
(LS) earn lower returns than banks with small loan share.
In addition, one can observe statistically significant differences, as judged by the ANOVA test,
in monthly returns across the portfolios formed from log(B/M), log(ME), r0,1, and r2,12. In the
case of log(B/M), log(ME) and r2,12, one can see an increasing pattern in average returns for most
quintiles across the portfolio spectrum. For r0,1, a decreasing pattern in returns can be observed.
These results are in line with the results from the t-test of long−short portfolio returns.
For profitability, we find no significant returns from long−short portfolios. Similarly, we cannot
reject the hypothesis of equality of monthly returns across the quintile portfolios. In addition, we
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do not observe any clear increasing or decreasing pattern in returns along the spectrum from small
to large portfolio. While all mean returns from long−short portfolios are positive, reflecting the
fact that average returns are higher in the portfolio of the most profitable firms compared to the
portfolio of the least profitable firms, average returns are even higher in the portfolios in-between.
Finally, we do not see any clear pattern in mean returns for DS and BE/A. One can, however,
observe from the long−short portfolios that banks with a higher share of deposits (DS) and holding
more equity (BE/A) tend to earn lower returns.
In terms of economic significance, r0,1 produces the largest absolute long−short monthly re-
turns. This means that, on average, stocks in the small portfolio (i.e. stocks with low returns in
the previous month) earn returns that are larger by 2.078% compared to stocks in the large port-
folio (i.e. stocks with high returns in the previous month) and reflects a short-term return reversal
comparable in magnitude to the one reported by Jegadeesh (1990). Though smaller, long−short
returns in the sorts on log(B/M), log(ME), r2,12, LLP/A, LS and AD are also relatively large. For
example for log(ME), they reflect the fact that stocks in the large portfolio earn average monthly
returns larger by 0.603% relative to stocks in the small portfolio.
3.5.2. Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression
Table 3.6 shows results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression of returns
on various profitability proxies and industry-specific variables. In each regression, we also control
for well-known market anomalies. We start by discussing the results for these control variables.
[Table 3.6 about here]
The coefficient for log(B/M) is significantly positive across all specifications, reflecting the
fact that banks with higher book-to-market ratios earn higher returns. This result underlines
the existence of a book-to-market effect in the banking industry. Log(ME) is also significantly
positive across all regressions, suggesting that larger banks earn higher returns compared to smaller
banks. This result contrasts with the traditional view of a small firm effect (see e.g. Fama and
French (2008) or Novy-Marx (2013)) found in the nonfinancial industry. The coefficient of r0,1 is
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significantly negative across all specifications, which confirms the prediction of short-term return
reversal. Compared to the other variables, the statistical significance of r0,1 stands clearly out.
Similar to Novy-Marx (2013), this variable has by far the highest t-value (not reported). As
expected, r2,12 is positive, indicating that stocks with high returns over the past year have high
returns in the next few months. This variable has, however, the weakest statistical significance
among the control variables.
Coefficients for all profitability proxies except PII/A are significantly positive at the 1% sig-
nificance level. This result for PII/A means that our proxy for gross profitability in the banking
industry fails to predict returns. The difference in magnitude between the coefficients of OI/A (or
PTI/A) and NI/E of roughly 10% can be explained by scaling effects. As seen in the descriptive
statistics, common equity is just under 10% of total assets. Thus, an increase in Net income rep-
resenting 1% of total assets is roughly equivalent to an increase in Net income representing 10% of
book equity. Overall, results suggest that banks with higher profitability earn higher subsequent
returns compared to banks with lower profitability. In terms of significance, Net income (NI/E)
has the largest predicting power among profitability proxies. Given the negative correlation found
between the various profitability proxies and book-to-market, strategies formed on the basis of
profitability can be a good hedge for strategies formed on book-to-market ratios.
Four industry-specific variables are statistically significant. The coefficient of loan loss provi-
sions is significantly negative. This suggests that banks with higher ratios of loan loss provisions
have lower returns compared to banks with lower ratios of loan loss provisions. This negative ef-
fect on cross-sectional returns may possibly reflect the poor quality of bank assets associated with
higher LLP. The coefficient estimate associated with loan share is significantly negative, suggesting
that commercial banks, i.e. banks focusing on lending, earn lower returns than investment banks
focusing on other business lines. This supports the view that investment activities are perceived
as more profitable by investors. The coefficient associated with asset diversification is significantly
positive, suggesting that more diversified banks earn higher returns. As discussed earlier, the de-
gree of diversification appears to be largely driven by the high proportion of commercial banks.
Thus, the explanation for loan share may also apply to diversification. The coefficient estimate as-
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sociated with DS is significantly positive. This suggests that banks with a higher share of deposits
in total liabilities earn higher returns, thus supporting the hypothesis that a higher deposit share
reflects greater access to cheap and stable funding and supports the view that deposits funding
appears more profitable to investors. Finally, BE does not appear to play a major role.
3.5.3. Intercept from time series regression of long−short portfolio
returns on a four-factor model
Results from time series regression of the long−short portfolios’ returns on the four-factor model of
Carhart (1997) are displayed in Table 3.7. With this framework, we examine whether differences in
exposure to risk proxied by the four-factor model can explain the differences in returns. Significant
intercepts signal excess returns above and beyond those suggested by the four-factor model.
[Table 3.7 about here]
Table 3.7 shows that log(B/M), r0,1, LLP/A, LS and AD all have statistically significant in-
tercepts at the highest confidence level. All these variables were already found to be significant in
predicting the cross-section of bank stock returns, and we also found evidence of their predicting
power in the one-way sort portfolios. Once again, past performance at a horizon of one month
stands out from the other explanatory variables since the intercept of this variable suggests excess
return of 2.12%. As for the profitability proxies, no intercept appears is highly significant. The
economic explanation behind this is that the predictability found in the cross-section of monthly
returns can be explained by the four-factor model. These results contrast with evidence from
Novy-Marx (2013) of significant intercepts for the nonfinancial industry.
Taken together, one-way sort portfolios, Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, and intercepts
from time series regression provide reasonably strong evidence supporting the existence of bank-
industry-wide cross-sectional predictability. This predictability comes from book-to-market, past
performance at a horizon of one month, loan loss provisions, loan share, and asset diversification.
The predicting power of past performance at a horizon of one month is particularly strong. In
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addition, elements of one-way sorts and/or Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions also provide
some evidence of predictability arising from various profitability proxies, size and deposit share.
Particular attention should therefore be paid to these variables in the following sections focusing
on risk-adjustment and robustness checks.
3.5.4. Portfolios’ Sharpe ratios
We report results from portfolios’ Sharpe ratios on Table 3.8. We saw earlier that the average
returns from portfolios sorted e.g. on log(ME) or AD showed an increasing pattern across most
quintiles. We can observe a similar pattern for Sharpe ratios. This tends to indicate that higher
returns portfolios are not necessarily riskier than lower returns portfolios. Similarly, we found a
decreasing pattern in returns for r0,1 or LS. For these two variables, Table 3.8 shows the same
decreasing pattern in Sharpe ratios. Overall, the pattern is of higher Sharpe ratios in the quintiles
characterised by higher average returns, and lower Sharpe ratios in the quintiles characterised by
lower average returns. From a mean-variance standpoint, this does not suggest that the higher
performing portfolios are necessarily riskier. Thus, increased risk does not appear to be the main
driver of the returns observed earlier.
[Table 3.8 about here]
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3.6. Robustness tests
We conduct several robustness tests of our results. First, we repeat the cross-sectional regressions
with a wider set of control variables. Second, we show the results of the cross-sectional regressions
when we use trimming instead of winsorising to address extreme values. Third, we analyse whether
our results are driven by the characteristics of small caps representing only a small fraction of total
market equity. Fourth, we look at the evolution over time of the predicting power of the variables.
Fifth, we use a three-factor model instead of a four-factor model to analyse whether the inclusion
of a momentum factor can be responsible for the different results regarding excess returns of
profitability between this study and the study of Novy-Marx (2013). Finally, we take a closer look
at past performance at a horizon of one month since results for this variable stands out relative to
the other variables.
Additional control variables
For robustness purposes, we repeat the cross-sectional regressions with a wider set of control
variables consisting in all independent variables considered in the paper. We display the results in
Table 3.9. Given the high correlation coefficients found earlier, we include only one profitability
proxy per specification. Similarly, we do not include simultaneously LS and AD. With the exception
of Operating income that loses its statistical significance, we come to similar results.
[Table 3.9 about here]
Alternative treatment of extreme values
In the paper, we used winsorising to address extreme values. For robustness purposes, we trim
the variables at the 1% and 99% levels and show results of the cross-sectional regressions in Table
3.10. As can be seen, results do not substantially differ. The only exception is PII/A, which is
now statistically significant.
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[Table 3.10 about here]
Potential effect of small caps
As noted by Fama and French (2008), small caps can be influential in frameworks using equally
weighted returns since each observation carries the same weight although small caps represents
only a small fraction of the total market equity. In order to check whether our results are driven
by characteristics of smaller market stocks, we take two measures. First, we use value-weighted
returns instead of equally-weighted returns to compute average monthly returns for portfolios
formed on one-way sorts. The results are displayed in Table 3.11.
[Table 3.11 about here]
Overall, results from VW returns indicate that small market capitalisations could be influential
in our sample. For example, both LS and AD lose their statistical significance in the tests. In
contrast, two profitability proxies (PII/A and NI/E) as well as DS and BE/A are now significant.
For this reason, we exclude observations that belong to the small portfolio formed on market cap-
italisation and re-run the Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions. Results
are displayed in Table 3.12. We also perform cross-sectional regressions including only observations
that belong to the small portfolio and display the results in Table 3.13.
[Table 3.12 about here]
[Table 3.13 about here]
As can be seen, profitability loses its statistical significance when banks in the smaller portfolio
sorted on market capitalisation are dropped from the sample. When only smaller market capitali-
sations are considered, however, profitability is again significant. Therefore, the significant results
reported earlier for profitability are likely to be driven by characteristics of small banks, and do
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not appear to apply to the rest of the sample. Similarly, small market capitalisations appear to be
influential in the results found for size. While log(ME) is significantly positive in the whole sample,
it loses its significance when small market capitalisations are excluded. It is significantly positive
again in the sample including only small market capitalisations. Finally, we use value-weighted
returns to calculate the mean returns from long−short portfolios for time series regression and
display the results in Table 3.14. Results reveal that only past performance at a horizon of one
month has a significant intercept suggesting excess returns.
[Table 3.14 about here]
Evolution over time
Over our sample period from 1980 to 2014, the competitive nature and financial performance of the
banking industry changed dramatically. For instance, the last half of this period was characterised
by deregulation and increased competition resulting from the repealing of the Glass Steagall Act.
As a consequence, we would expect a larger proportion of diversified banks in the second half of
the sample. This may in turn result in a lesser effect of asset diversification.
We examine the stability of the cross-sectional regression results by splitting our sample into
two equal subperiods. Results for the first subperiod (1981-1998) are displayed in Table 3.15 and
results for the second subperiod (1999-2014) in Table 3.16. In the first subperiod, only NI/E,
LLP/A, and AD are statistically significant. Among control variables, log(B/M) and r0,1 are
highly significant across all specifications, while log(ME) and r2,12 are also significant in most
specifications, but at a lower confidence level. As for the second subperiod, results are fairly close
to those found in the sample that covers the whole time period.
[Table 3.15 about here]
[Table 3.16 about here]
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One should, however, be careful while interpreting differences in results between the first and the
second time period. A possible explanation for the different results is that predictors of expected
returns have simply changed over time. Another possible explanation may lie in the structure of
the data. Datastream and Bankscope provide data for substantially more banks in later years
compared to earlier years. As a result, the second subperiod is characterised by substantially more
observations (134,270) than the first subperiod (56,334).
We further investigate the evolution over time by showing monthly coefficient estimates from
the first step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure in Figure 3.2. As can be seen, early years
are characterised by important variations in the coefficient estimates of most profitability proxies,
industry-specific variables, and past performance at a horizon of 12 to two months. This may
be due to the lower number of observations available in these early years. In addition, the plots
of several variables are characterised by larger variations in the monthly coefficient estimates in
the years following the financial crisis. For past performance at a horizon of one month, however,
the stability of monthly coefficient estimates is particularly striking, underlining once again the
robustness of the short-term return reversal.
[Figure 3.2 about here]
Three- versus four-factor model
Novy-Marx (2013, p. 5, Table 2) found a significant intercept for profitability suggesting excess
returns. Unlike this paper, he used the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and not the
four-factor model of Carhart (1997), therefore not controlling for the effect captured by the portfolio
mimicking momentum. We conduct time series regression of long−short portfolio on a three-factor
model and report the results in Table 3.17. We find intercepts slightly more significant for the
profitability proxies, thus suggesting that the momentum portfolio captures part of the difference
in returns between banks in the most profitable portfolio and banks in the the least profitable
portfolio. As can be seen from Table 3.2, the momentum factor was highly significant in almost
all specifications, suggesting that it captures part of the difference in returns for most variables.
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[Table 3.17 about here]
Short-term return reversal
This study has highlighted that the predicting power of past performance at a horizon of one
month stands out from the predicting power of the other variables. In the one-way sort portfolios,
we found a monthly return of 2.079% for the long−short portfolio that was substantially higher
compared to the other variables. In Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression,
the significance of the coefficient estimate was also very high. In time series regression, we found
a statistically significant intercept suggesting excess returns of 2.12%, which again was substan-
tially higher compared to the other variables. Finally, we found short-term return reversal to be
remarkably stable over time.
Given these results, we further investigate the robustness of short-term return reversal across
the five portfolios sorted on size. It is sometimes argued that short-term return reversal is caused
by one or a few high volume transactions among small and illiquid stocks. If the short-term return
reversal observed in our study comes from the illiquid character of the small market capitalisations,
the predicting power of past performance at a horizon of one month should be stronger among
small market capitalisations (Avramov et al., 2006; Da et al., 2014). We use the setting of the
first regression of Table 3.6, i.e. the one including PII/A and the four control variables. As can be
seen from Table 3.18, the coefficient estimates of r0,1 are highly significant in each quintile formed
on market capitalisation and the coefficients do not vary substantially across quintiles. Thus, the
strong predicting power of r0,1 found in the paper does not appear to be driven by small, illiquid
market capitalisations, but seems to apply to the whole sample.
[Table 3.18 about here]
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3.7. Conclusion
This study investigates the predicting power of profitability, industry-specific, and traditional
anomaly variables on the cross-section of bank stock returns. Banks are typically excluded from
cross-sectional asset pricing studies because they are different from nonfinancial firms. As a result,
the existence of market anomalies, notably the profitability premium that has attracted particular
attention in recent years, remains unclear for a large number of listed companies. In addition,
important links between industry-specific variables and expected stock returns may be a direct
consequence of the different nature of banks.
Findings about the profitability premium are mixed. Evidence from Fama and MacBeth (1973)
cross-sectional regression suggests a positive relationship between profitability and expected stock
returns. However, further analysis shows that small market capitalisations are very influential in
explaining this result; once the smallest market capitalisations are excluded from the analysis, the
statistical significance of the relationship disappears. In addition, results from one-way sorts of
returns on profitability are largely inconclusive and do not point to the existence of a profitability
premium. Similarly, evidence indicating the presence of abnormal returns suggested by significant
intercepts of long−short portfolios regressed on the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) are very
limited. These findings contrast with recent, clear-cut evidence from Novy-Marx (2013) suggesting
that profitability is a strong predictor of expected cross-sectional returns. Thus, the profitability
premium seems to be much more pronounced among nonfinancial firms than it is in the banking
industry.
Evidence further shows that, among market anomalies, book-to-market and past performance
at a horizon of one month are strong predictors of the cross-section of expected returns. Regarding
industry-specific variables, we find that loan loss provisions, loan share, and activity diversification
can all predict expected bank stock returns. For all these variables, we find convincing evidence
both in the one-way sort portfolios, Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression, as well as
significant abnormal returns relative to the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). Results relating
to past performance at a horizon of one month (short-term return reversal) are particularly strong
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both in terms of statistical and economic significance. In the one-way sort portfolios, we find a
monthly returns of 2.079% for the long−short portfolio as well as a statistically significant intercept
suggesting excess returns of 2.12% in time series regression.
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Table 3.1: Variables description
Variable Description and source
Outcome variable
Returns Monthly stock market returns constructed from the total return index of
Thomson Reuters Datastream (in %). Datastream
Profitability variables
PII/A Pre-impairment income, representing operating income before provision for loan
losses, divided by total assets (in %). Worldscope
OI/A Operating income, representing the difference between sales and total operating
expenses, divided by total assets (in %). Worldscope
PTI/A Pre-tax income, representing all income/loss before any federal, state or local
taxes (extraordinary items reported net of taxes are excluded), divided by total
assets (in %). Worldscope
NI/E Net income before extraordinary items/preferred dividends, representing in-
come before extraordinary items and preferred and common dividends, but af-
ter operating and non-operating income and expense, reserves, income taxes,
minority interest and equity in earnings, divided by book equity (in %). Datas-
tream
Bank-industry specific variables
LLP/A Loan loss provisions, representing losses that the bank expects to take as a re-
sult of uncollectable or troubled loans, divided by total assets (in %). World-
scope
LS Loan share, defined as net loans divided by the sum of net loans plus total in-
vestments in securities (in %). Worldscope
AD Asset diversification, defined as one minus the absolute value of the difference
between net loans and total investments in securities divided by the sum of net
loans plus total investments in securities (in %). Worldscope
DS Deposits share, defined as the share of customers’ deposits divided by total lia-
bilities (in %). Worldscope
BE/A Book equity, representing common shareholders’ investment in a company, di-
vided by total assets (in %). Worldscope
Traditional stock returns determinants
log(B/M) Logarithm of book equity to market equity, representing the balance sheet
value of the ordinary (common) equity divided by the market value of ordinary
(common) equity. Datastream
log(ME) Logarithm of market capitalisation. Datastream
r1,0 Past returns at horizon of one month (in %). Datastream
r12,2 Past returns at horizon of 12 to two months (in %). Datastream
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Table 3.2: Worldscope income statement
01016 Interest Income - Total
01007 Interest and Fees on Loans
01008 Interest Income on Federal Funds
01009 Interest Income on Bank Deposits
01010 Interest Income on Government Securities
01011 Other Interest or Dividend Income
01075 Interest Expense - Total
01072 Interest Expense on Bank Deposits
01073 Interest Expense on Federal Funds
01074 Interest Expense on Other Borrowed Funds
01251 Interest Expense on Debt
01255 Interest Capitalized
01076 Net Interest Income
01021 Non-Interest Income
01018 Foreign Exchange Income
01270 Gains/Losses on Sale of Securities - Pre-tax
01266 Non-Operating Interest Income
01017 Trading Account Income
01019 Trusts & Fiduciary Income/Commission & Fees
01014 Trust Income
01015 Commission & Fees
01020 Other Operating Income
01245 Non-Interest Expense
01084 Staff Costs
01085 Equipment Expense
04049 Depreciation and Depletion
01204 Taxes Other than Income Taxes
01302 Operating Provisions
01230 Other Operating Expenses
01271 Provision for Loan Losses
01250 Operating Income
01253 Extraordinary Credit - Pre-tax
01254 Extraordinary Charge - Pre-tax
01262 Other Income/Expense - Net
01267 Pre-tax Equity in Earnings
01301 Reserves - Increase/Decrease
01401 Pre-tax Income
01451 Income Taxes
18186 Current Domestic Income Tax
18187 Current Foreign Income Tax
18188 Deferred Domestic Income Tax
18189 Deferred Foreign Income Tax
18185 Income Tax Credits
01501 Minority Interest
01503 Equity in Earnings
01504 After Tax Other Income/Expense
01505 Discontinued Operations
01551 Net Income before Extraordinary Items/Preferred Dividends
01701 Preferred Dividend Requirements
01706 Net Income after Preferred Dividends (Basic EPS)
01601 Extraordinary Items & Gain/Loss Sale of Assets
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Figure 3.1: Box plots to screen the presence of extreme values
The figures show the variation in the raw, unwinsorised/untrimmed sample of data used in Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-
sectional regression by means of box plots.
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Figure 3.1: Box plots to screen the presence of extreme values (continued)
The figures show the variation in the raw, unwinsorised/untrimmed sample of data used in Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-
sectional regression by means of box plots.
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Figure 3.1: Box plots to screen the presence of extreme values (continued)
The figures show the variation in the raw, unwinsorised/untrimmed sample of data used in Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-
sectional regression by means of box plots.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Q25 Median Q75 Max.
Returns 190, 604 0.908 9.009 −29.272 −3.241 0.490 4.910 33.330
PII/A 190, 604 1.495 0.751 −1.950 1.103 1.516 1.930 3.452
OI/A 190, 604 1.120 1.015 −4.449 0.772 1.254 1.684 3.342
PTI/A 190, 604 1.065 1.105 −5.054 0.741 1.230 1.666 3.178
NI/E 190, 604 7.707 12.674 −81.657 5.490 9.981 13.531 27.056
log(B/M) 190, 604 −0.196 0.511 −1.421 −0.531 −0.231 0.105 1.470
log(ME) 190, 604 11.683 1.749 7.904 10.480 11.432 12.687 16.738
r0,1 190, 604 0.910 8.988 −29.272 −3.249 0.490 4.910 33.332
r2,12 190, 604 10.222 31.021 −79.396 −7.840 8.447 27.343 111.187
LLP/A 190, 604 0.370 0.531 −0.089 0.096 0.205 0.401 3.390
LS 190, 604 71.049 13.218 26.529 63.689 72.499 80.368 94.784
AD 190, 604 55.181 21.805 9.659 39.026 54.538 71.152 98.871
DS 190, 604 84.853 11.396 42.643 78.602 87.190 93.642 100.000
BE/A 190, 604 9.410 4.117 1.946 7.065 8.660 10.551 35.518
The table provides summary statistics for the variables used in Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression. The sample
covers U.S. banks between 1980-2014. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Regressions are estimated monthly, but most of
the explanatory variables are updated annually, i.e. the same value is used to predict 12 monthly returns. r0,1 and r2,12 are updated monthly.
Returns are monthly returns of the total return index of Datastream, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, OI/A
is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value
of equity, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance
measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to two months, LLP/A is loan loss provisions
divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets. All
variables except log(B/M) and log(ME) are expressed in %.
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Table 3.4: Spearman rank correlations between independent variables used in Fama and
MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression
PII/A OI/A PTI/A NI/E B/M ME r0,1 r2,12 LLP/A LS AD DS
OI/A 0.89
(0.00)
PTI/A 0.86 0.97
(0.00) (0.00)
NI/E 0.67 0.73 0.77
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(B/M) −0.48 −0.55 −0.54 −0.53
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(ME) 0.45 0.38 0.37 0.46 −0.39
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
r0,1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
r2,12 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LLP/A 0.03 −0.33 −0.33 −0.17 0.20 0.06 0.00 −0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.00)
LS 0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.09 0.03 −0.13 −0.04 −0.10 0.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AD −0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 −0.03 0.13 0.04 0.11 −0.15 −0.97
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DS 0.05 0.04 0.05 −0.07 0.04 −0.29 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BE/A 0.17 0.24 0.23 −0.26 0.00 −0.11 −0.01 −0.05 −0.26 0.02 −0.02 0.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The table provides Spearman rank correlations between independent variables used in Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression. The
sample covers U.S. banks between 1980-2014. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Returns are monthly returns of the total return index
of Datastream, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax
income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the
natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to
two months, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity
divided by total assets.
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Table 3.5: Average monthly returns for portfolios formed on one-way sorts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)−(1)a ANOVAb
PII/A 0.647 0.879 0.870 0.812 0.674 0.027 0.985
OI/A 0.566 0.926 0.873 0.787 0.733 0.167 0.772
PTI/A 0.537 0.934 0.861 0.833 0.720 0.183 0.695
NI/E 0.516 0.912 0.856 0.836 0.763 0.247 0.537
log(B/M) 0.521 0.655 0.858 0.905 0.962 0.440∗∗∗ 0.093∗
log(ME) 0.361 0.791 0.809 0.962 0.963 0.602∗∗ 0.056∗
r0,1 1.635 1.141 0.950 0.585 −0.443 −2.079∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
r2,12 0.294 0.862 0.925 0.940 0.869 0.575
∗∗∗ 0.071∗
LLP/A 0.876 0.865 0.772 0.887 0.481 −0.395∗∗ 0.254
LS 0.890 0.858 0.898 0.746 0.493 −0.396∗∗∗ 0.175
AD 0.464 0.763 0.878 0.853 0.929 0.465∗∗∗ 0.125
DS 0.819 0.750 0.766 0.787 0.761 −0.058 0.906
BE/A 0.704 0.787 0.901 0.815 0.677 −0.027 0.968
The table shows averages of monthly equal-weight stock returns for each portfolio and for the (5)−(1) portfolio obtained from long-short positions
in the extreme quantiles. The sample covers U.S. banks between 1980-2014. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Average
monthly returns are expressed in %; Returns are monthly returns of the total return index of Datastream, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating
income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net
income divided by book value of equity, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity,
r0,1 is past performance measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to two months, LLP/A is
loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by
total assets. a t-test and significance; The null hypothesis is that the mean of long−short portfolios is zero. b p-values for the ANOVA test; The
null hypothesis is equality of average monthly portfolio returns across quantile sorts for a given sort. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.6: Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PII/A 0.035
(0.603)
OI/A 0.168∗∗∗
(0.008)
PTI/A 0.179∗∗∗
(0.006)
NI/E 0.022∗∗∗
(0.000)
LLP/A −0.752∗∗∗
(0.000)
LS −0.007∗∗
(0.020)
AD 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
DS 0.010∗∗∗
(0.006)
BE/A −0.007
(0.672)
log(B/M) 0.734∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(ME) 0.183∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
r0,1 −0.107∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2,12 0.005
∗ 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005∗ 0.005∗
(0.055) (0.103) (0.107) (0.191) (0.267) (0.100) (0.101) (0.082) (0.078)
Avg. R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Obs. 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604
Months 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
The table shows average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions to predict stock returns of U.S. banks between 1980 and 2014. All variables are winsorised at
the 1% and 99% levels. Returns are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating
income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, LLP/A is loan loss provisions
divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm
of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured
at a horizon of 12 to two months. p-values under parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.7: Time series regression of long−short portfolios’ returns on the four-factor model
of Carhart (1997)
Ranked by α βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD R
2 Months
PII/A −0.04 (0.78) 0.08 (0.03)∗∗ −0.10 (0.06)∗ 0.08 (0.16) 0.00 (0.93) 0.03 396
OI/A 0.25 (0.14) −0.07 (0.06)∗ −0.18 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.09 (0.15) 0.03 (0.49) 0.04 396
PTI/A 0.28 (0.10)∗ −0.09 (0.02)∗∗ −0.18 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.11 (0.07)∗ 0.03 (0.43) 0.05 396
NI/E 0.25 (0.14) 0.04 (0.31) −0.26 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.07 (0.24) 0.03 (0.40) 0.05 396
log(B/M) 0.39 (0.01)∗∗ −0.02 (0.52) 0.15 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.09 (0.12) 0.03 (0.46) 0.02 396
log(ME) 0.21 (0.39) 0.48 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.20 (0.01)∗∗ 0.28 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.02 (0.73) 0.17 396
r0,1 −2.12 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.08 (0.04)∗∗ −0.10 (0.10)∗ 0.05 (0.44) 0.14 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.07 396
r2,12 0.48 (0.00)
∗∗∗ −0.04 (0.27) −0.15 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.08 (0.19) 0.27 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.16 396
LLP/A −0.58 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.23 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.13 (0.01)∗∗ 0.25 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.10 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.18 396
LS −0.54 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.15 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.04 (0.34) 0.14 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.00 (0.98) 0.07 396
AD 0.61 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.14 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.04 (0.38) −0.13 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.00 (0.92) 0.07 396
DS 0.23 (0.07)∗ −0.35 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.05 (0.23) −0.21 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.01 (0.71) 0.28 396
BE/A 0.23 (0.10) −0.31 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.02 (0.73) −0.19 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.00 (0.95) 0.20 396
The table provides results from time series regression of average equal-weight returns from long−short portfolios for U.S. banks between 1980-2014 on
a four-factor model. α represents the excess returns, i.e. returns above and beyond that suggested by the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). Returns
are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by
total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of
book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured at horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance
measured at horizon of 12 to two months, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is
deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets. p-values under parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.8: Portfolios’ Sharpe ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)−(1)a
PII/A 0.049 0.116 0.118 0.125 0.103 0.054∗∗∗
OI/A 0.041 0.122 0.120 0.126 0.112 0.071∗∗∗
PTI/A 0.038 0.125 0.122 0.130 0.113 0.074∗∗∗
NI/E 0.040 0.123 0.120 0.128 0.105 0.065∗∗∗
log(B/M) 0.055 0.090 0.112 0.121 0.105 0.050∗∗∗
log(ME) 0.035 0.104 0.109 0.133 0.136 0.101∗∗
r0,1 0.182 0.157 0.129 0.083 −0.064 −0.247∗∗∗
r2,12 0.027 0.123 0.138 0.139 0.098 0.070
∗∗∗
LLP/A 0.101 0.133 0.107 0.122 0.039 −0.062∗∗∗
LS 0.119 0.107 0.122 0.095 0.045 −0.074∗∗∗
AD 0.041 0.095 0.120 0.109 0.125 0.084∗∗∗
DS 0.101 0.094 0.088 0.098 0.098 −0.003
BE/A 0.059 0.095 0.120 0.115 0.098 0.039∗∗
The table provides Sharpe ratios of the one-way sort portfolios for U.S. banks between 1980-2014 using
equal-weight returns. The Sharpe ratios are computed as average of monthly Sharpe ratios. Returns
are monthly return of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by
total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by
total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of
book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured
at horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at horizon of 12 to two months, LLP/A is
loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit
share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets. a t-test and significance; The null hypothesis is
that the mean Sharpe ratio of long−short portfolios is zero.
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Table 3.9: Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression with
additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PII/A 0.087 0.097
(0.191) (0.143)
OI/A 0.084 0.093
(0.198) (0.151)
PTI/A 0.154∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.018) (0.013)
NI/E 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
LLP/A −0.619∗∗∗ −0.539∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.439∗∗∗ −0.610∗∗∗ −0.520∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006)
LS −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
AD 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DS 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/A −0.020 −0.020 −0.027∗ −0.016 −0.018 −0.018 −0.025∗ −0.013
(0.182) (0.185) (0.066) (0.287) (0.234) (0.238) (0.094) (0.382)
log(B/M) 0.920∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(ME) 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r0,1 −0.113∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2,12 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.799) (0.800) (0.865) (0.934) (0.820) (0.819) (0.885) (0.917)
Avg. R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Obs. 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604 190,604
Months 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
The table shows average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions to predict stock returns of U.S. banks between 1980 and
2014. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Returns are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is
Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax
income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total
assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets, log(B/M) is
the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured
at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to two months. p-values under parentheses;
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.10: Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression - Sample with all
variables trimmed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PII/A 0.196∗∗∗
(0.004)
OI/A 0.281∗∗∗
(0.000)
PTI/A 0.285∗∗∗
(0.000)
NI/E 0.035∗∗∗
(0.000)
LLP/A −0.517∗∗∗
(0.000)
LS −0.012∗∗∗
(0.000)
AD 0.008∗∗∗
(0.000)
DS 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
BE/A 0.010
(0.484)
log(B/M) 0.846∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 1.001∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(ME) 0.161∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
r0,1 −0.110∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2,12 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.232) (0.448) (0.450) (0.541) (0.642) (0.400) (0.445) (0.308) (0.397)
Avg. R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Obs. 166,439 166,439 166,439 166,439 166,439 166,439 166,439 166,439 166,439
Months 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
The table shows average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions to predict stock returns of U.S. banks between 1980 and 2014. All variables are
trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Returns are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total
assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value
of equity, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity
divided by total assets, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance
measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to two months. p-values under parentheses; ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.11: Average monthly returns for portfolios formed on one-way sorts - Value-
weighted average stock returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)−(1)a ANOVAb
PII/A 0.116 0.137 0.142 0.283 0.419 0.303∗ 0.011∗∗
OI/A 0.165 0.197 0.169 0.270 0.297 0.133 0.222
PTI/A 0.174 0.211 0.177 0.266 0.270 0.097 0.351
NI/E 0.144 0.163 0.135 0.240 0.417 0.274∗ 0.032∗∗
log(B/M) 0.346 0.186 0.213 0.165 0.189 −0.157 0.210
log(ME) 0.009 0.022 0.044 0.103 0.921 0.912∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
r0,1 0.362 0.269 0.274 0.213 −0.020 −0.381∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
r2,12 0.232 0.237 0.256 0.164 0.209 −0.023 0.660
LLP/A 0.075 0.121 0.164 0.356 0.382 0.307∗ 0.007∗∗∗
LS 0.282 0.249 0.161 0.200 0.206 −0.076 0.466
AD 0.213 0.211 0.162 0.287 0.226 0.013 0.706
DS 0.690 0.191 0.099 0.068 0.049 −0.641∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
BE/A 0.397 0.328 0.217 0.098 0.058 −0.338∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
The table shows averages of monthly value-weight stock returns for each portfolio and for the hedged portfolio obtained from long-short positions
in the extreme quantiles. The sample covers U.S. banks between 1980-2014. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Average
monthly returns are expressed in %; Returns are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided
by total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided
by book value of equity, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past
performance measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to two months, LLP/A is loan loss
provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets. a
t-test and significance; The null hypothesis is that the mean of long−short portfolios is zero. b p-values for the ANOVA test; The null hypothesis
is equality of average monthly portfolio returns across quantile sorts for a given sort. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.12: Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression - Smaller market
capitalisations excluded from the sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PII/A −0.071
(0.319)
OI/A 0.030
(0.664)
PTI/A 0.024
(0.737)
NI/E 0.008
(0.246)
LLP/A −0.517∗∗
(0.010)
LS −0.006∗
(0.056)
AD 0.006∗∗∗
(0.003)
DS 0.004
(0.323)
BE/A −0.020
(0.364)
log(B/M) 0.663∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(ME) 0.096 0.091 0.092 0.087 0.103∗ 0.097 0.100 0.112∗ 0.092
(0.121) (0.142) (0.138) (0.157) (0.094) (0.119) (0.105) (0.066) (0.129)
r0,1 −0.106∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2,12 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.482) (0.605) (0.602) (0.763) (0.977) (0.710) (0.720) (0.664) (0.631)
Avg. R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Obs. 152,334 152,334 152,334 152,334 152,334 152,334 152,334 152,334 152,334
Months 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
The table shows average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions to predict stock returns of U.S. banks between 1980 and 2014. All variables are
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Observations included in the small (1) portfolio formed on market capitalisation are excluded from the sample.
Observations included in the small (1) portfolio formed on market capitalisation are excluded from the sample. Returns are monthly returns of the total
return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax
income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan
share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market,
log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at
a horizon of 12 to two months. p-values under parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.13: Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression - Only smaller
market capitalisations included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PII/A 0.065
(0.685)
OI/A 0.286∗∗
(0.047)
PTI/A 0.342∗∗
(0.016)
NI/E 0.029∗∗
(0.021)
LLP/A −1.181∗∗∗
(0.000)
LS −0.008
(0.112)
AD 0.006∗
(0.063)
DS 0.021∗∗
(0.022)
BE/A 0.024
(0.361)
log(B/M) 1.053∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(ME) 0.642∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r0,1 −0.114∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2,12 0.007
∗ 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.006∗ 0.006 0.005
(0.064) (0.129) (0.155) (0.121) (0.527) (0.107) (0.081) (0.115) (0.155)
Avg. R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Obs. 38,270 38,270 38,270 38,270 38,270 38,270 38,270 38,270 38,270
Months 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
The table shows average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions to predict stock returns of U.S. banks between 1980 and 2014. All variables are
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Only observations included in the small (1) portfolio formed on market capitalisation are included in the sample.
Returns are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating income
divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, LLP/A is loan loss provisions
divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets, log(B/M) is the
natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured at a horizon of one month,
r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to two months. p-values under parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.14: Time series regression of long−short portfolios’ returns on the four-factor model
of Carhart (1997) - Value-weighted average stock returns
Ranked by α βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD R
2 Months
PII/A 0.05 (0.71) 0.38 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.00 (0.92) 0.34 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.17 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.41 396
OI/A 0.06 (0.52) 0.18 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.07 (0.04)∗∗ 0.12 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.13 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.25 396
PTI/A 0.04 (0.65) 0.14 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.03 (0.35) 0.08 (0.02)∗∗ −0.10 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.17 396
NI/E 0.06 (0.66) 0.35 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.11 (0.02)∗∗ 0.23 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.13 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.32 396
log(B/M) 0.01 (0.95) −0.25 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.06 (0.09)∗ −0.21 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.13 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.35 396
log(ME) 0.16 (0.44) 0.98 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.05 (0.49) 0.72 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.20 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.58 396
r0,1 −0.32 (0.03)∗∗ −0.04 (0.20) 0.00 (0.98) −0.01 (0.82) −0.05 (0.09)∗ 0.01 396
r2,12 −0.13 (0.26) 0.02 (0.45) −0.07 (0.08)∗ 0.04 (0.39) 0.15 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.09 396
LLP/A 0.03 (0.83) 0.44 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.04 (0.36) 0.38 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.22 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.46 396
LS 0.02 (0.91) −0.17 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.11 (0.01)∗∗ −0.24 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.19 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.23 396
AD −0.05 (0.71) 0.12 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.11 (0.01)∗∗ 0.24 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.18 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.21 396
DS −0.10 (0.58) −0.73 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.01 (0.85) −0.59 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.21 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.54 396
BE/A −0.12 (0.19) −0.32 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.13 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.12 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.02 (0.24) 0.38 396
The table provides results from times series regressions of average value-weight returns from long−short portfolios for U.S. banks between 1980-2014 on
a four-factor model. α represents the excess returns, i.e. returns above and beyond that suggested by the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). Returns
are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by
total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of
book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured at horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance
measured at horizon of 12 to two months, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is
deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets. p-values under parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Figure 3.2: Monthly coefficient estimates from the first step of the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) procedure
The figure shows the monthly coefficient estimates of the first step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure displayed on Table 3.6.
The coefficient estimates of the control variables log(B/M), log(ME), r0,1 and r2,12 come from the first (1) specification.
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Figure 3.2: Monthly coefficient estimates from the first step of the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) procedure (continued)
The figure shows the monthly coefficient estimates of the first step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure displayed on Table 3.6.
The coefficient estimates of the control variables log(B/M), log(ME), r0,1 and r2,12 come from the first (1) specification.
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Figure 3.2: Monthly coefficient estimates from the first step of the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) procedure (continued)
The figure shows the monthly coefficient estimates of the first step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure displayed on Table 3.6.
The coefficient estimates of the control variables log(B/M), log(ME), r0,1 and r2,12 come from the first (1) specification.
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Figure 3.2: Monthly coefficient estimates from the first step of the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) procedure (continued)
The figure shows the monthly coefficient estimates of the first step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure displayed on Table 3.6.
The coefficient estimates of the control variables log(B/M), log(ME), r0,1 and r2,12 come from the first (1) specification.
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Figure 3.2: Monthly coefficient estimates from the first step of the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) procedure (continued)
The figure shows the monthly coefficient estimates of the first step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure displayed on Table 3.6.
The coefficient estimates of the control variables log(B/M), log(ME), r0,1 and r2,12 come from the first (1) specification.
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Table 3.15: Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression 1981-1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PII/A −0.024
(0.840)
OI/A 0.121
(0.264)
PTI/A 0.154
(0.174)
NI/E 0.023∗∗
(0.026)
LLP/A −0.862∗∗∗
(0.001)
LS −0.008
(0.113)
AD 0.008∗∗∗
(0.006)
DS 0.006
(0.318)
BE/A 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
log(B/M) 0.710∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(ME) 0.123∗ 0.129∗ 0.131∗ 0.119 0.149∗∗ 0.127∗ 0.131∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.113
(0.085) (0.071) (0.067) (0.101) (0.036) (0.071) (0.061) (0.026) (0.104)
r0,1 −0.097∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2,12 0.009
∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.030) (0.067) (0.074) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.038)
Avg. R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Obs. 56,334 56,334 56,334 56,334 56,334 56,334 56,334 56,334 56,334
Months 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
The table shows average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions to predict stock returns of U.S. banks between 1981 and 1998. All variables are
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Returns are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total
assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value
of equity, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity
divided by total assets, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance
measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to two months. p-values under parentheses; ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.16: Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression 1999-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PII/A 0.102∗
(0.069)
OI/A 0.221∗∗∗
(0.000)
PTI/A 0.207∗∗∗
(0.000)
NI/E 0.021∗∗∗
(0.000)
LLP/A −0.629∗∗∗
(0.000)
LS −0.006∗
(0.056)
AD 0.004∗∗
(0.029)
DS 0.014∗∗∗
(0.000)
BE/A −0.003
(0.802)
log(B/M) 0.760∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(ME) 0.251∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004)
r0,1 −0.118∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2,12 0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.794) (0.918) (0.911) (0.878) (0.637) (0.965) (0.998) (0.892) (0.824)
Avg. R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
Obs. 134,270 134,270 134,270 134,270 134,270 134,270 134,270 134,270 134,270
Months 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186
The table shows average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions to predict stock returns of U.S. banks between 1999 and 2014. All variables are
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Returns are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total
assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value
of equity, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity
divided by total assets, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance
measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a horizon of 12 to two months. p-values under parentheses; ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.17: Time series regression of long−short portfolios’ returns on the
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993)
Ranked by α βMKT βSMB βHML R
2 Months
PII/A −0.04 (0.79) 0.08 (0.02)∗∗ −0.10 (0.06)∗ 0.08 (0.15) 0.03 396
OI/A 0.27 (0.10) −0.08 (0.04)∗∗ −0.18 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.09 (0.11) 0.04 396
PTI/A 0.30 (0.07)∗ −0.10 (0.01)∗∗ −0.18 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.12 (0.05)∗∗ 0.05 396
NI/E 0.28 (0.09)∗ 0.03 (0.40) −0.26 (0.00)∗∗∗ −0.08 (0.18) 0.05 396
The table provides results from times series regressions of average equal-weight returns from long−short portfolios for U.S. banks
between 1980-2014 on a three-factor model. α represents the excess returns, i.e. returns above and beyond that suggested by the
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). Returns are monthly returns of the total return index, PII/A is Pre-impairment
operating income divided by total assets, OI/A is Operating income divided by total assets, PTI/A is Pre-tax income divided by
total assets, NI/E is Net income divided by book value of equity, log(B/M) is the natural logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME)
is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past performance measured at horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance
measured at horizon of 12 to two months, LLP/A is loan loss provisions divided by total assets, LS is loan share, AD is asset
diversification, DS is deposit share, BE/A is book equity divided by total assets. p-values under parentheses. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Table 3.18: Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-
sectional regression of returns for each size quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PII/A 0.065 −0.115 −0.022 −0.161 0.045
(0.685) (0.374) (0.890) (0.235) (0.816)
log(B/M) 1.053∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
log(ME) 0.642∗∗∗ 0.421∗ 0.256 0.158 −0.096
(0.000) (0.080) (0.451) (0.477) (0.314)
r0,1 −0.114∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2,12 0.007
∗ 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.064) (0.948) (0.759) (0.577) (0.688)
Avg. R2 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.21
Obs. 38,270 38,131 38,102 38,140 37,961
Months 396 396 396 396 396
The table shows average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions to predict stock returns
of U.S. banks between 1980 and 2014. We run separate regression for each size portfolio, (1)
being the smallest and (5) the largest portfolio formed on market capitalisation. All variables
are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Returns are monthly returns of the total return index,
PII/A is Pre-impairment operating income divided by total assets, log(B/M) is the natural
logarithm of book-to-market, log(ME) is the natural logarithm of market equity, r0,1 is past
performance measured at a horizon of one month, r2,12 is past performance measured at a
horizon of 12 to two months. p-values under parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Abstract
This paper uses a distributional approach to explore earnings management in banking. Starting
from a smooth pre-managed distribution, earnings measures further down the income statement
show the progressive apparition of a kink around zero earnings. The magnitude of the kink culmi-
nates in the distribution of net income. A closer investigation reveals that banks with relatively
high pre-managed earnings are characterised by significantly higher impairment charges on loans,
securities, and other credits and higher tax expenses relative to banks with smaller pre-managed
earnings. Differences relating to impairment charges are likely to reflect at least some degree of
earnings management since banks with small pre-managed earnings may be tempted to understate
these charges to avoid reporting losses. In contrast, differences in tax expenses are more difficult to
reconcile with an earnings management explanation given the positive relationship between earn-
ings and tax expenses. Though a whole stream of the literature associates the kink with earnings
management, it appears to be only a partial explanation.
Keywords: Earnings management, Banks, Earnings distribution, Discretionary accruals, Fi-
nancial performance.
JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G28, M41.
∗University of Fribourg, Bd de Pe´rolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland. Email: nicolas.guerry@unifr.ch
114
Earnings Management in Banking: Dissecting the Kink
4.1. Introduction
Research has shown that accounting numbers, and earnings in particular, have informational con-
tent for various stakeholders such as investors, financial analysts, or regulators (Degeorge et al.,
1999; Hayn, 1995). Yet, earnings management may cause reported earnings to not properly reflect
the underlying economic reality. According to the earnings management literature, insiders, and
managers in particular, use their discretion in accounting to overstate the true level of earnings
reported to the external audience in order to hide unfavourable figures, or to smooth out their
fluctuations. Doing so should notably bolster investors’ interest and affect stock prices, and with
them managers’ own wealth, e.g. through option and stock compensation (Cornett, McNutt, &
Tehranian, 2009; Degeorge et al., 1999).1 Earnings management may also be the result of perceived
bankruptcy concerns (Fonseca & Gonzalez, 2008; Laeven & Majnoni, 2003), or serve the purpose
of window dressing of financial statements prior to public securities offerings (Cornett et al., 2009).
Banks, and more generally financial firms, are often excluded from earnings management studies
(Shen & Chih, 2005). This exclusion lies in the high degree of regulation in the banking indus-
try, the difficulty associated with estimating a bank’s discretionary accruals, and industry-specific
characteristics that make banks more opaque than firms in other industries. Such fundamental dif-
ferences require a separate analysis from the nonfinancial industry (Bouvatier, Lepetit, & Strobel,
2014). While some aspects of earnings management have been explored in the banking industry
(e.g. presence of a kink in the distribution of reported earnings, see Shen and Chih (2005)), others
remain largely unexplored.
Due to the intermediation function fulfilled by banks, analysing earnings management within
the banking industry is of importance since this practice compromises the faithful representation
of underlying economic condition and riskiness. This may in turn reduce substantially the ability
of stakeholders (e.g. regulators, supervisors, shareholders, debtholders) to properly monitor banks.
The banking literature posits that informational transparency plays an important role since it al-
lows market participants to monitor and discipline excessive risk-taking. The availability of timely,
1One of the motivation behind earnings management is the conjecture that investors rely on simple low-cost
heuristics, such as earnings benchmarks, in firm valuation (Beatty et al., 2002).
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consistent, and reliable information on banks’ financial performance is particularly crucial (Bush-
man & Williams, 2012). As witnessed by the global financial crisis, the likelihood of bank failures
increases curtailing economic development, and welfare more generally, when insiders exploit banks
for their own purposes (Bouvatier et al., 2014; Bushman & Williams, 2012). In addition, incentives
to practice earnings management in order to improve risk perception may be particularly strong
given the high degree of regulation in banking.2
This paper explores earnings management in banking using a distributional approach for a sam-
ple of international banks between 1999-2013. We start by analysing the presence of a king around
zero earnings. We find convincing evidence indicating the presence of a kink in the distribution of
Net income and therefore confirm findings of Shen and Chih (2005) for earlier years (1993-1999).
In a second step, we show that the banking industry is characterised by the presence of a smooth
pre-managed earnings distribution (Pre-impairment operating income), thus echoing findings from
Dechow et al. (2003) for the nonfinancial industry. In order to examine which components of
earnings are managed and contribute to the kink, we analyse different earnings streams that occur
between these two earnings measures. This research design has, to the best of our knowledge,
never been implemented in a study focusing on earnings management within the banking industry.
Our study shows that the distribution of Net income is asymmetrically shifted to the left relative
to the distribution of Pre-impairment operating profit, and this causes the kink. This asymmetrical
shift affects mostly banks with positive earnings, while the portion of the distribution located left
to zero is largely unaffected. More specifically, banks with relatively high pre-managed earnings
are disproportionally shifted to the left compared to banks with smaller positive earnings. This
partial shift reflects higher earnings streams, that reduce more heavily reported earnings, among
banks with higher pre-managed earnings. This finding is compatible with a loss avoidance story
predicting that firms manage earnings in order to report profits, even small ones. Compared to
banks with higher pre-managed earnings that can afford stronger hits, banks with modest earnings
are more likely to understate subsequent earnings streams to avoid reporting losses. This difference
2Others argue that earnings management in banking is a desirable feature under certain certain circumstances,
e.g. to avoid bank runs after significant losses. Iannotta and Kwan (2014) noted that regulators may have a bias in
favour of earnings management through loan losses provisions. Overestimating loan loss provisions in good times
may for example increase the capacity of banks to absorb losses from future credit impairments in bad times.
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in earnings streams among these two earnings groups result in an accumulation of observations in
the small earnings area causing the kink.
The decomposition of total earnings streams shows that banks with higher pre-managed earn-
ings have on average (1) higher impairment charges on loans, securities, and other credits as well
as (2) higher tax expenses relative to smaller earnings banks. We show that both earnings streams
are responsible for the apparition of the kink and its subsequent reinforcement. In the light of
these results, earnings management appears to be a plausible explanation for the kink, but only a
partial one. The use of impairment charges for earnings management purposes is well-known and
has been widely documented in the banking literature. Thus, the difference in terms of impairment
charges among earnings groups is likely to reflect at least some degree of earnings management.
It is, however, less likely that earnings management is the main driver of the difference relating
to tax expenses. Given that tax expenses are largely a positive function of earnings, the fact
that banks with higher earnings have higher tax expenses can rationally be explained without an
earnings management story. Thus, our results suggest that earnings management is only a partial
explanation for the kink, though a whole stream of the literature attributes the presence of this
irregularity to earnings management without further investigation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we briefly review the
relevant literature with special focus on earnings management in general, the main research de-
signs used to investigate earnings management, the distributional approach, and the specificity of
earnings management in banking. In Section 4.3, we discuss the data and the methodology used
for the empirical part of this study. In Section 4.4, we analyse distributions from several earnings
measures and investigate more closely the presence of an irregularity around zero earnings. In Sec-
tion 4.5, we investigate what particular earnings streams are responsible for the kink, and whether
earnings management is the cause of the kink. In Section 4.6, we conduct several robustness tests
of our results. Section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2. Relevant literature
Extensive literature reviews on earnings management have been provided by Schipper (1989),
Healy and Wahlen (1999), Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001), and Verbruggen, Christiaens, and Milis
(2008). Another literature review focusing on the characteristics of commonly applied designs in
the earnings management literature has been provided by McNichols (2000).
Earnings management
Managers use accounting and reporting to communicate information on the firm performance
to various external stakeholders (e.g. providers of debt, equity, and labour, auditors, financial
analysts, bond rating agencies, regulators, suppliers, customers). If adequately used, financial
reporting can enable the best-performing firms to distinguish themselves from poor performers
and should therefore facilitate efficient resource allocation by stakeholders. To be able to fulfil this
role, released accounting information should reflect true differences in firms’ economic positions and
performance (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Accounting and financial reporting are, however, no exact
science and contain significant elements of subjectivity. Since auditing is not perfect, this situation
creates opportunities for managers to use discretionary judgement in order to hide unfavourable
earnings realisations, or, in other words, for practising earnings management. Managers’ judgement
is notably required in order to estimate various future economic events that are reflected in financial
statements, e.g. expected lives and salvage values of long-term assets, obligations for pension
benefits and other post-employment benefits, or losses from bad debts and asset impairments
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management consists in managers choosing
reporting methods and estimates that do not reflect the true underlying economic performance of
their firms in order to mislead some stakeholders and/or to generate some form of private benefit.
Concrete motivations for exercising earnings management include, but are not limited to: window-
dressing of financial statements prior to public securities offerings; management buyouts; corporate
managers’ compensation and job security; lending contracts covenants; and regulatory purposes
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(e.g. avoid violating regulations or increase regulatory benefits).3 Moreover, the widespread use
of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks also creates
incentives for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence stock price performance
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
Commonly applied research designs
Three main research designs prevail in the earnings management literature. The first approach
attempts to identify discretionary accruals based on the relation between total accruals and hy-
pothesised explanatory factors. Accruals are non-cash transactions included in financial reporting.
Because they consist in non-cash transaction, accruals, or at least some of these accruals labelled as
“discretionary”, are assumed to contain some degree of subjectivity that can be used for earnings
management purposes. Consequently, “normal” accruals, normal in the sense of accruals in the
absence of earnings management, are often assumed to be unknown (McNichols, 2000).
The widely used (modified) Jones (1991) model is employed to estimate these normal accruals.
More specifically, normal accruals are estimated from elements such as firm assets, property, plant,
and equipment, or change in sales. “Abnormal” or discretionary accruals are the difference between
actual accruals and the estimated accruals from the modified Jones model. Firms with consistently
large discretionary accruals are deemed more likely to manipulate earnings (Cohen et al., 2014).
Studies using this design usually investigate the presence of earnings management by examining
whether discretionary accruals, as proxy for the degree of earnings management, are systematically
related to potential drivers of earnings management activities.
The second research design consists in modelling a specific accrual (e.g. residual provision for
bad debt; see McNichols (2000)). Studies employing this approach often focus on industry settings
in which a single accrual (e.g. provision for loan losses in the banking industry) is sizable and
requires substantial judgement. As with aggregate accruals studies, a key aspect of the research
design task is modelling the behaviour of each specific accrual to identify its discretionary and
nondiscretionary components.
3For more details on motives for earnings management, see e.g. Verbruggen et al. (2008, pp. 5-8), “4. Motives
for earnings management”.
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Finally, a third method commonly used is the distributional approach. With this approach,
researchers analyse the distribution of earnings around certain thresholds, typically zero earnings.
Absent earnings management, this approach assumes a smooth probability distribution around
zero earnings in which the expected number of observations in an interval is the average of the
two adjacent intervals. Discontinuity around the thresholds are typically interpreted as evidence
of earnings management. Studies using this research design typically investigate whether earnings
management is present in the sample analysed as well as the magnitude of earnings management
(Verbruggen et al., 2008). Because the distributional approach is the approach used in this study,
it will be further discussed in the following.
The distributional approach
Studies such as Hayn (1995), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al. (1999), or Dechow et
al. (2003) have reported the existence of a relatively smooth, bell-shaped distribution of reported
earnings across most of the earnings spectrum, with one notable exception: the presence of an
irregularity around zero earnings that is commonly labelled as “kink”.4 This kink is typically seen
as evidence that too few firms report small losses and too many firms report small profits. In other
words, it is seen as evidence that the frequency of small profit firms is abnormally high relative
to the frequency of small loss firms. The kink is commonly interpreted as evidence suggesting the
presence of earnings management.
[Figure 4.1 about here]
[Figure 4.2 about here]
The empirical literature assumes that managers take as given an accounting target and manage
earnings in response (Schipper, 1989). Reporting a profit, even a small one, is often assumed to
4We report the histograms displayed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Dechow et al. (2003) on Figures 4.1
and 4.2.
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be the accounting target in question (loss avoidance hypothesis, see e.g. Dechow et al. (2003)).
Consequently, reaching at least the zero earnings benchmark is seen as an important motivation
behind earnings management.5 As a result, if a kink around zero is reported in the distribution
of reported earnings, it is typically interpreted as evidence that a certain number of firms in the
sample use earnings management in order to avoid reporting negative profits.
The work of Dechow et al. (2003) is of particular interest for this study. Not only did the authors
confirm the existence of a kink around zero earnings in the distribution of reported earnings, but
they also showed the existence of a smooth “pre-managed” earnings distribution with no sign of
irregularity around zero earnings. They further compared earnings streams that occur between
the smooth pre-managed earnings distribution and the kinked distribution of reported earnings
in order to investigate whether earnings management was responsible for the apparition of the
kink. They hypothesised that, in order to avoid a loss, firms with small pre-managed losses would
boost earnings in order to report a profit, resulting in too few firms reporting small losses and
too many firms reporting small profits. They found that firms with small pre-managed losses
had significantly higher earnings streams compared to all other firms. However, they found no
significant difference in earnings streams between small loss firms and small profit firms. While
they conceded that the first finding was consistent with small profit firms engaging in earnings
management, they concluded from the second finding that the kink was not explained by earnings
management since both sets of firms have a similar proportion of positive discretionary accruals.
The authors concluded that this result left open the question of what causes the kink.
Earnings management in banking
Banks are important for the economy due to their intermediation function. For this reason, it
is important for various stakeholders (shareholders, debtholders, regulators, supervisors) to have
5According to Degeorge et al. (1999), there is an important psychological distinction between reporting positive
and negative profits. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) further underlined the existence of anecdotal evidence of
incentives to report positive earnings. The literature further underlines the role of reported earnings to communicate
information to external stakeholders. For example, results from a survey conducted by Graham, Harvey, and
Rajgopal (2005) that asked CFOs to describe their choices related to reporting accounting numbers and voluntary
disclosures revealed that CFOs believed that earnings, and not cash flows, were the key metrics considered by
outsiders. In addition, the same study revealed that meeting or exceeding benchmarks (e.g. positive earnings) is
very important.
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access to faithful information on a bank’s underlying economic condition and riskiness. In order
to effectively monitor and discipline banks, the banking literature posits that informational trans-
parency is crucial. Yet, earnings management is likely to impede information transparency by
introducing a bias in reported financial performance.
As underlined by Shen and Chih (2005), financial institutions are often excluded from earnings
management studies (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); Dechow et al. (2003); DeFond and
Subramanyam (1998)). We briefly review some of the reasons advanced in the literature. Financial
institutions, and banks in particular, are subject to a high level of regulations that can affect
incentives to avoid reported losses (Shen & Chih, 2005). In addition, several ratios (e.g. equity, non-
performing loans) are strictly scrutinised and regulated, and earnings management is a technique
used by banks to avoid violating regulations (Shen & Chih, 2005). Moreover, the estimation of
discretionary accruals, seen as crucial for the analysis of earnings management of nonfinancial
firms, can be problematic in the banking industry (DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998). Futhermore,
the particular characteristics of banks (financial structure, higher leverage) makes them inherently
more opaque than other firms and requires a separate analysis (Bouvatier et al., 2014). Finally,
and maybe most importantly, variables of interest for the analysis of earnings management are
different for banks and other financial institutions that are not engaged in sales-based businesses.
As noted by Cohen et al. (2014), the focus of earnings management studies in the banking industry
is on variables specific to this industry (e.g. loan loss provisions, realisation of gains or losses on
securities).
Banking has provided a fertile ground for earnings management research since numerous studies
have investigated this practice. Studies have primarily focused on loan loss provisions (e.g. Ahmed
et al. (1999); Beaver and Engel (1996); Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013); Bikker and Metzemak-
ers (2005); Bouvatier et al. (2014); Bushman and Williams (2012); El Sood (2012); Fonseca and
Gonzalez (2008); Laeven and Majnoni (2003); Pe´rez, Salas-Fuma´s, and Saurina (2008)).6 Other
studies have also explored security gains and losses (e.g. Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, and Rhee
(2007); Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1995); Beatty et al. (2002); Collins, Shackelford, and
6Loan loss provisions is a relatively large accrual that has a significant impact on earnings. The purpose of loan
loss provisions is to adjust banks’ loan loss reserves to reflect expected future losses. The recognition of expected
loan losses occurs through the loan loss provision, classified as an expense account (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005).
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Wahlen (1995); Cornett et al. (2009)).7
These two elements have been labelled as discretionary accruals because they involve a signif-
icant degree of subjectivity (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005; Cornett et al., 2009). In the presence
of earnings management, these two elements are predicted to vary with nondiscretionary earn-
ings (Shrieves & Dahl, 2003). Banks with relatively unfavourable nondiscretionary earnings are
expected to underestimate loan loss provisions more than banks with more favourable figures in
order to avoid reporting small losses. Similarly, banks with relatively unfavourable earnings are
expected to realise more security gains or fewer security losses.
In the studies briefly mentioned, the presence of earnings management is typically assessed
within a regression framework relating some earnings measure to loan loss provisions (or security
gains and losses). In this study, we opt for the distributional approach, a relatively modern study
design that, to our knowledge, has only been used by Shen and Chih (2005) for the banking
industry. Using a sample consisting of 70,955 (bank-year) observations for the fiscal years 1993-
1999 across 48 countries and 47,154 banks, the authors reported the presence of a kink around zero
earnings that, similar to prior studies for the nonfinancial industry, was interpreted as evidence
of earnings management. Unlike Dechow et al. (2003) for the nonfinancial industry, they did not
consider the existence of a potential pre-managed earnings distribution. Similarly, they did not
analyse earnings streams occurring between pre-managed and reported income to find the cause of
the kink. These issues remain, to the best of our knowledge, unexplored for the banking industry.
Compared to prior results for the nonfinancial industry (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997),
Dechow et al. (2003)), the shape of the distribution found by Shen and Chih (2005) as well as the
kink differ. Studies in the nonfinancial industry have reported a bell-shaped distribution over the
whole earnings spectrum with one irregularity around zero earnings. The distribution reported
by Shen and Chih (2005) shows a half-normal distribution.8 As observed by Shen and Chih
(2005), earnings less than zero in general, and not only small losses, occur much less frequently
than positive earnings. In addition, the frequency distribution shows a continuously decreasing
7Due to data availability, studies exploring security gains and losses are, to the best of our knowledge, limited to
the U.S. and Japan. International studies that typically use data from Bankscope do not look at this issue because
of insufficient data availability.
8We report the histogram displayed by Shen and Chih (2005) on Figure 4.3.
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pattern on the left side of its peak. Shen and Chih (2005) underlined these patterns as important
differences between the financial and the nonfinancial industry. Earnings management in banking
seems therefore to be characterised by a lower frequency of firms with negative earnings, and not
only by a lower frequency of small loss firms compared to small profit firms as it is the case in the
nonfinancial industry.
[Figure 4.3 about here]
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4.3. Data and methods
4.3.1. Data
We use data from Bankscope, a database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk which contains financial
information on banks. Similar to related studies, we consider listed banks, thus ensuring a relatively
high quality of data and enhancing comparability across countries (Laeven & Levine, 2007). Since
listed banks are usually the largest, the sample that we consider also accounts for the majority of
total assets. Our sample covers the 15-year period between 1999-2013. This time frame ensures
the inclusion of periods with different business cycles and stock market conditions (e.g. Dot-com
bubble, economic expansion of the early 2000s, financial crisis, Great Recession, sovereign debt
crisis). Our sample is free from survivorship bias since we also consider banks that have been
delisted at some point during the sample period. We eliminate banks classified as Islamic banks
because the accounting information does not match with the rest of the sample (Laeven & Levine,
2007).
Many empirical studies focus on the discretionary portion of a manager’s financial report, i.e.
transactions for which managers are more likely to exercise financial judgement, and several focus
on earnings streams that occur between cash flows from operations and reported net income (Healy
& Wahlen, 1999). Due to the specificity of the banking industry and data availability, we focus on
earnings streams that occur between Pre-impairment operating profit and Net income. We argue
that, similar to cash flow from operations among nonfinancial firms, Pre-impairment operating
profit can be considered as a measure of pre-managed earnings. First, as a measure of operating
profit, it reflects a bank’s revenue from its core activities. Second, it is largely unaffected by
impairment charges that are known to be used for earnings management purposes in banking.
And third, as displayed in Figure 4.4, Pre-impairment operating profit shows a smooth underlying
distribution. It is therefore similar to the earnings distribution reported by Dechow et al. (2003)
for nonfinancial firms and labelled as pre-managed earnings.
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[Figure 4.4 about here]
Table 4.1 shows how Bankscope displays data from the income statement. While the income
statement shows a certain degree of granularity, several positions are characterised by a high pro-
portion of missing values. Exploring every single position would therefore result in the exclusion of
a substantial number of observations, sometimes almost all of them. For this reason, we decided to
concentrate on the positions marked in bold in Table 4.1. These positions are Pre-impairment op-
erating profit, Operating profit, Pre-tax profit, and Net income.9 Following Dechow et al. (2003),
we scale earnings measures by beginning-of-the-year common equity. In the robustness section,
we also scale earnings measures by beginning-of-the-year total assets.10 We address extreme val-
ues, similar to Dechow et al. (2003) or Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and winsorise accounting
variables at the 1% and 99% level.
[Table 4.1 about here]
4.3.2. Methods
As noted by Healy and Wahlen (1999), central questions addressed in the empirical literature
are about the positions of the income statement that are used to manage earnings as well as
the magnitude of earnings management. To answer these questions, we employ the distributional
approach and proceed as follows. First, we analyse the distributions of several earnings measures
in order to assess the presence of a kink and the existence of a potential smooth pre-managed
distribution. We then analyse several earnings streams occurring between pre-managed earnings
and net income to assess which of these streams contribute to the kink, and ultimately whether
earnings management is the cause of the kink.
9Sufficient data on Net income before profit transfers were available as well, but we decided not to focus on this
position since it is largely identical to Net income. Thus, differences between Pre-tax profit and Net income comes
from Tax expense and Profit/Loss from discontinued operations, but not from Profit transfers to parent companies.
10Several studies (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008)) use beginning-of-the-year
figures as well to scale earnings measures in order avoid simultaneity bias.
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Kink and smooth pre-managed earnings
To investigate the presence of a kink around zero earnings as well as the presence of a smooth
pre-managed earnings distribution, we consider the distribution of various earnings measures. We
conduct an initial inspection of the distributions by plotting the underlying histograms of Pre-
impairment operating profit, Operating profit, Pre-tax profit, and Net income. In addition to
displaying these histograms, we also show superimposed histograms in order to better highlight
differences between distributions.
We then conduct the three statistical tests used by Shen and Chih (2005) to assess the presence
and the extent of an irregularity around zero earnings. The null hypothesis of these various tests
is that there is no discontinuity around zero earnings. To set intervals (or bin) width for the
statistical tests, we use the method described by Wand (1995) in which bin width is defined as
2(IQR)n−1/3, where IQR is the sample interquartile range of the variable and n is the number
of available observations. This method was also used by Degeorge et al. (1999) in a study about
earnings management.
The first statistic used by Shen and Chih (2005), EM1, comes from Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997). EM1 is the difference between the actual and the expected number of observations in the
interval immediately to the right of zero, such that
EM1 =
AQi − EQi
SDi
. (4.1)
AQi and EQi are respectively the actual and the expected number of observations in interval i,
the interval immediately right to zero. EQi is defined as the average of the number of observations
in the two immediately adjacent intervals. SDi is the estimated standard deviation of the differ-
ence between AQi and EQi.
11 Under the null hypothesis, these standardised differences will be
11EQi = (AQi−1 + AQi+1)/2; Since, according to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p. 103), the number of obser-
vations in an interval is a random variable which is approximately independent of the number in adjacent intervals,
the variance of the difference between the observed and expected number of observations is approximately the sum
of the variances of the components of the difference. Denoting the total number of observations as N and the
probability that an observation will fall into interval i by pi (proportion of the actual number of observations for
interval i, AQi/N), the variance of the difference between the observed and expected number of observations for
interval i is approximately SDi = [Npi(1− pi) + (1/4)N(pi−1 + pi+1)(1− pi−1 − pi + 1)]1/2.
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distributed approximately normally with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 (Burgstahler & Dichev,
1997).
The second statistic, EM2, comes from Degeorge et al. (1999). EM2 considers a broader portion
of the distribution, namely five intervals to the left of zero, and five intervals to the right of the
first interval immediately right to zero. Formally,
EM2 =
∆pi −MEAN(∆p−i)
SD(∆p−i)
, (4.2)
where pi is the ratio of the actual number of observations for interval i to bank-years and ∆pi =
pi − pi−1. MEAN(∆p−i) is the average value of ∆p, excluding pi, i.e. (
∑5
k=−5;k 6=0 ∆pi+k)/10 and
SD(∆pi) is the standard deviation of ∆p, excluding ∆pi. k stands for intervals, while i stands for
the interval immediately right to zero. EM2 is distributed as Student’s t distribution under the
null hypothesis (Degeorge et al., 1999; Shen & Chih, 2005).12
The third statistic, EM3, is inspired by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Leuz, Nanda, and
Wysocki (2003). It computes the ratio of the actual number of observations for interval i (small
profits) to that of observations for the interval i− 1 (small losses), or formally
EM3 = AQi/AQi−1. (4.3)
EM3 represents the ratio of the frequency of small profits to small losses. Unlike EM1 or EM2,
it is not a statistic, but a simple ratio that cannot be used to formally assess the null hypothesis.
A value for EM3 much greater than unity is interpreted as evidence that banks manage earnings,
and a large value suggests a high degree of earnings management.
Earnings streams
In a second step, we analyse various earnings streams occurring between the different earnings
positions considered. We construct stream variables by subtracting values of earnings positions
12As noted by Degeorge et al. (1999), the distribution of EM2 is likely to be well approximated by the Student’s
t-distribution under the null hypothesis if the distribution of ∆pi is approximately Gaussian. See Degeorge et al.
(1999) for more details.
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described earlier. First, we analyse the total earnings stream defined as the difference between
Pre-impairment operating profit and Net income (PIOP−NI). We further decompose PIOP−NI
into PIOP−OP (earnings stream between Pre-impairment operating profit and Operating profit),
OP−PTP (earnings stream between Operating profit and Pre-tax profit) and PTP−NI (earnings
stream between Pre-tax profit and Net income). The relation between the various levels and
streams variables can be illustrated as follows:
Net Income (NI)
+ PTP − NI
= Pre-tax profit (PTP)
+ OP − PTP
= Operating profit (OP)
+ PIOP − OP
= Pre-impairment operating profit (PIOP)
The decomposition of total earnings stream can be illustrated as follows:
PIOP − NI = PIOP − OP
+ OP − PTP
+ PTP − NI
Finally, the composition of each earnings stream, as shown in Table 4.1, can be illustrated as
follows:
PIOP-OP

−Loan Impairment Charge
−Securities and Other Credit Impairment Charges
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OP-PTP

+Non-recurring Income
−Non-recurring Expense
+Other Non-operating Income and Expenses
+Equity-accounted Profit/ Loss - Non-operating
+Change in Fair Value of Own Debt
PTP-NI

−Tax expense
−Profit/Loss from Discontinued Operations
+Profit transfers to parent companies
Earlier, we highlighted differences between the frequency distributions of financial and nonfinan-
cial firms. Nonfinancial firms are characterised by a lower frequency of small loss firms compared
to small profit firms while banks are characterised by a lower frequency of firms reporting losses
in general relative to firms reporting profits. Given this important difference, it is unlikely that
the kink in the distribution of banks comes exclusively from small profit firms and small loss firms
managing earnings streams differently, as hypothesised by Dechow et al. (2003).13 Thus, unlike
Dechow et al. (2003), we do not focus our analysis on the earnings streams of these two earnings
groups, but consider other portions of the distributions that are in our view more likely to cause
the kink.
Our approach focuses on banks with small positive earnings versus banks with larger earnings.
As can be observed from the superimposed histogram displayed in Figure 4.5, the number of banks
located left to zero appears to be relatively constant for both Net income and Pre-impairment
operating profit. In contrast, the number of observations located in the first intervals right to
zero (approximately in the 15 first intervals right to zero) appears to be substantially higher in
the Net income distribution. The number of observations beyond this threshold, reflecting banks
13Given the shape of the distribution prevailing in the nonfinancial industry, Dechow et al. (2003) hypothesised
that small profit firms should have earnings streams boosting reported earnings more heavily relative to small loss
firms if the kink is driven by earnings management. According to the authors, this would explain why firms move
from reporting a small loss to reporting a small profit, i.e. by managing earnings up, ultimately resulting in a low
proportion of firms in the small loss group and a high proportion of firms in the small profit group.
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with relatively high earnings, is higher in the distribution of Pre-impairment operating profit.
From this histogram, one can observe that the kink results from an asymmetrical shift to the left
from the distribution of Pre-impairment operating profit. This shift is asymmetrical in the sense
that it appears to affect mainly banks with positive earnings, while, at first glance, banks with
negative earnings seem to remain largely unaffected. One could get the impression that the kink
and the half-normal distribution both result from the accumulation of (1) banks with small positive
pre-managed earnings staying in the small earnings area and (2) banks with higher pre-managed
earnings being shifted into the small earnings area.
[Figure 4.5 about here]
In order to stay in the positive earnings area, banks with small pre-managed earnings seem
more likely to manage earnings streams by understating them in absolute terms. In contrast,
banks with higher pre-managed earnings can afford higher earnings streams, i.e. streams that
reduce reported income more heavily, and therefore do not need to practice earnings management.
As for banks with negative earnings, we refrain from making any prediction. If reporting positive
earnings is the only motivation behind earnings management (i.e. under a simple loss avoidance
story, see Dechow et al. (2003)), banks with negative pre-managed earnings are unlikely to manage
earnings. If, on the other hand, the magnitude of negative earnings matters, they may manage
earnings, similar to small earnings banks, in order to avoid reporting too heavy losses.
To empirically test this intuition that practising earnings management depends on the level
of pre-managed earnings, we compare earnings streams from three different earnings groups. The
first group consists of banks with negative pre-managed earnings (negative earnings banks), the
second group consists of banks with relatively small positive earnings (small earnings banks), and
the third group consists of banks with higher earnings (higher earnings banks). We define small
earnings banks as those banks with pre-managed earnings located within the first 15 intervals
right to zero based on the following arguments. The first 15 intervals right to zero correspond
to the portion of the distribution in which there are more observations in the distribution of Net
income compared to the distribution of Pre-impairment operating profit. This portion of earnings
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is also particularly important since most of the distributional changes happen in this interval. It
also roughly corresponds to the portion of positive earnings left to the peak of the distribution of
Pre-impairment operating profit (interval 17). In the robustness section, we consider alternative
definitions for the earnings groups based on different interval numbers. We use a graphical approach
and compute mean differences between earnings streams in the three earnings groups to formally
assess the significance of the results.14 Our ultimate goal is to assess what earnings streams,
starting from a smooth pre-managed distribution, contribute to the apparition of the kink around
zero in the distribution of Net income.
4.3.3. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the various levels and streams variables are displayed in Table 4.2. Pre-
impairment operating profit divided by common equity (PIOP) has the highest mean value,
followed by Pre-tax profit (PTP), Operating profit (OP), and finally Net income (NI). Conse-
quently, total earnings stream occurring between Pre-impairment operating profit and Net income
(PIOP−NI) reflects an earnings reduction. Similarly, PIOP−OP and PTP−NI also reflect earn-
ings reductions between the respective positions. As we have seen, these earnings streams are
constituted mainly by impairment charges (on loans, securities, and other credits) and by tax
expenses. OP−PTP reflects a slight earnings increase. Finally, Table 4.3 displays country-specific
descriptive statistics to show the geographical composition of the sample. Similar to many interna-
tional studies in the banking industry, the share of U.S. banks is not negligible. In the robustness
section, we consider various geographical subsets to see whether geographical characteristics may
drive the results obtained in the whole sample.
[Table 4.2 about here]
[Table 4.3 about here]
14In addition to Dechow et al. (2003), Beatty et al. (2002) also used the same formal test to compare measures
of earnings management across groups of banks characterised by different attributes, notably ownership structure
and inclusion into specific earnings groups.
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Table 4.4 displays correlation coefficients between the variables analysed. As expected, the
various earnings measures are significantly and positively correlated to another. For example, PIOP
is positively and significantly correlated with OP (0.87), PTP (0.60), and NI (0.45). The further
down the income statement one goes, the smaller the coefficients are. These earnings measures
further down the income statement (OP, PTP, OP) therefore increasingly distance themselves from
PIOP, a progressive discrepancy caused by earnings streams happening in-between.
[Table 4.4 about here]
The correlations between PIOP and the various earnings streams are significantly positive.
The correlations between PIOP and PIOP−NI, PIOP−OP, and PTP−NI are particularly high.
This reflects the fact that banks with higher Pre-impairment operating profit also have higher
earnings streams, i.e. earnings streams that reduce reported profit more heavily than earnings
streams of banks with smaller Pre-impairment operating profit. Finally, the correlation between
OP and PTP−NI is also highly significant and quite large, suggesting that banks with higher
Operating profit also have higher tax expenses. The correlations briefly discussed might be a first
hint suggesting that PIOP−OP and PTP−NI are responsible for the apparition of the kink in the
earnings distribution.
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4.4. Earnings distributions’ analysis
As noted earlier, earnings management to avoid losses is likely to be reflected in cross-sectional
distributions of earnings in the form of a threshold-driven discontinuity in the earnings distribution,
typically a kink around zero earnings. Thus, if earnings management is prevalent in the banking
industry, we expect to find evidence suggesting the existence of this irregularity in the form of a
kink.
4.4.1. Graphical evidence
On Figure 4.6, we display histograms of the various earnings measures considered. For the inspec-
tion of the graphs, we set the bin width at 0.01 for every earnings measure to guarantee graphical
homogeneity and to facilitate the comparison between distributions. The first histogram (Pre-
impairment operating profit) shows a single-peaked, bell-shaped distribution. At first glance, this
distribution does not show any irregularity around zero earnings that may suggest the presence of
earnings management.
[Figure 4.6 about here]
The second histogram (Operating profit) is different in the sense that it does not show a
distribution as smooth and regular as the first one. We can observe the formation of a kink around
zero earnings suggesting that the frequency of small profit banks to small loss banks is abnormally
high. The same conclusion applies to the third graph (Pre-tax profit). It displays a similar
histogram, and no obvious departure from the previous position can be observed. On the fourth
histogram (Net income), the distribution further departs from the initial smooth distribution and
the kink around zero appears to be reinforced. This distribution comes relatively close to the
“half-normal” distribution reported by Shen and Chih (2005).
In order to further highlight the evolution of earnings between Pre-impairment operating profit
and Net income, superimposed histograms are displayed in Figure 4.7. The first graph shows the
distributions of Pre-impairment operating profit and Net income, i.e. the total evolution of earnings
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between the initial smooth distribution and the final distribution of reported earnings. The overall
picture suggests that the distribution of Pre-impairment operating profit is asymmetrically shifted
to the left. As a consequence, more banks end up reporting relatively small earnings. The shift
appears to be asymmetrical since it seems to affect primarily banks with positive earnings rather
than applying symmetrically to the whole distribution.
[Figure 4.7 about here]
In the three following graphs, we superimpose earnings of subsequent positions down the income
statement in order to decompose the partial shift to the left. The second graph shows a first
pronounced shift between Pre-impairment operating profit and Operating profit and the apparition
of the kink. As a result, more banks report smaller earnings and fewer report larger earnings.
Finally, the peak of the two distributions seems to be at relatively similar height. The third graph
reinforces the impression that Operating profit and Pre-tax profit do not substantially differ from
another. The fourth graph shows that a second substantial shift to the left takes place between
Pre-tax profit and Net income. Again, fewer banks end up reporting large earnings and more
banks end up reporting small earnings. In addition, the peak of the distribution is now higher.
Again, the negative area does not seem to be substantially affected.
Looking at (superimposed) histograms reinforces our initial idea based on descriptive statistics
and on the correlation matrix. Earnings streams occurring between Pre-impairment operating
profit and Operating profit, and between Pre-tax profit and Net income appear to be the main
drivers behind the apparition of the kink and its subsequent reinforcement. The analysis of super-
imposed histograms further shows that these earnings streams result in a greater number of banks
reporting small earnings, and a smaller number of banks reporting larger earnings. The area of
the distribution located to the left of zero (negative earnings) appears to be largely unaffected.
4.4.2. Statistical tests
After looking at graphical evidence suggesting the progressive apparition of a kink in the distribu-
tion of successive earnings positions, we proceed with the three statistical tests described in Section
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4.3 to formally assess the presence of an irregularity around zero earnings. For the graphical anal-
ysis, we have uniformly set histogram bin width at 0.01 in order to facilitate the comparison of
the various distributions. For this statistical test, we use the method described in Section 4.3 that
results in more precise estimates. For each earnings variable, results of the three statistical tests
are reported in Table 4.5. The null hypothesis of these various tests is that there is no discontinuity
around zero earnings.
[Table 4.5 about here]
For Pre-impairment operating profit, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no irregularity
with both EM1 and EM2. In addition, EM3 is not substantially larger than one. Thus, Pre-
impairment operating profit does not show any sign of an irregularity around zero earnings. For
all other earnings measures, however, the statistical tests indicate the presence of a kink around
zero earnings. Both EM1 and EM2 are statistically significant at the highest significance level. In
addition, EM3 is substantially greater than unity. The various statistics further indicate a bigger
irregularity around zero earnings in the distribution of Net income. Compared to Operating profit
and Pre-tax profit, this variable has the highest values for the three earnings management statistics.
Results from these statistical tests reinforce the idea that, starting from a smooth, bell-shaped
distribution (Pre-impairment operating profit), earnings measures further down the income state-
ment show the progressive apparition of a discontinuity around zero earnings. This irregularity
culminates with a pronounced kink around zero in the distribution of Net income. This evolution
is consistent with earnings streams occurring between Pre-impairment operating profit and Net in-
come causing the kink. It is likely that earnings streams play a major role between Pre-impairment
operating profit and Operating profit (apparition of the kink) and between Pre-tax profit and Net
income (reinforcement of the kink).
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4.5. Earnings streams’ analysis
4.5.1. Graphical evidence and statistical tests
In this section, we analyse earnings streams of different earnings groups. Our main hypothesis
is that banks manage earnings streams depending on their level of pre-managed earnings. More
precisely, we expect to find higher earnings streams among higher earnings banks (located beyond
earnings interval 15) relative to small earnings banks (interval 1 to 15). Under a simple loss
avoidance story, higher earnings banks can afford a larger reduction of their pre-managed earnings
relative to small earnings banks.
As a first cut to relate Pre-impairment operating profit to subsequent earnings streams, Figure
4.8 plots bank-year observations for the different earnings streams as a function of Pre-impairment
operating profit. From the upper-left panel (PIOP−NI), one can observe a positive relationship
between these two variables. This relationship prevails in the positive portion of the x axis, i.e. for
banks with positive pre-managed earnings. It reflects the fact that banks with higher pre-managed
earnings also have higher total earnings stream. The same positive relationship can also be observed
between pre-managed earnings and PTP−NI (lower-right panel). A positive relationship, though
less clear-cut, between pre-managed earnings and PIOP−OP also appears to be reflected on the
upper-right panel of Figure 4.8.
[Figure 4.8 about here]
Due to the large number of observations included in this study, the various plots displayed on
Figure 4.8 may appear confusing for the graphical analysis. To address this issue, we use smooth
nonparametric regressions based on locally-weighted polynomial regression (LOWESS). Given the
concentration of observations showed in the middle area of the graphs of Figure 4.8, there is concern
that extreme observations may strongly affect estimation results of a least square regression. We
plot the regression line for each earnings stream on Figure 4.9.
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[Figure 4.9 about here]
The four plots of this figure confirm our prior impressions. One can recognise a positive
association between total earnings streams PIOP−NI and Pre-impairment operating profit (upper-
left panel) reflecting the fact that small earnings banks have lower earnings streams further down
the income statement compared to higher earnings banks. The line seems to flatten for banks
with the smallest positive earnings. The decomposition of total earnings streams shows that small
earnings banks have lower PIOP−OP (upper-right panel) than higher earnings banks, with again
a flattening of the line observed for the smallest positive earnings banks. For PTP−NI (lower-right
panel), the plot also shows a positive relationship between this stream variable and pre-managed
earnings, but without flattening of the line for the smallest positive earnings banks. Finally, the
lower-left panel (OP−PTP) shows a flat line and no obvious association.
In Figure 4.10, we display the four earnings distributions investigated in this study. Each
distribution is broken down by earnings groups. Negative earnings banks are displayed in white,
small earnings banks in lightgrey, and higher earnings banks in darkgrey. With this way of breaking
down earnings, we can see where banks, grouped according to their level of pre-managed earnings,
end up in each earnings distribution further down the income statement. The upper panel shows
the smooth, pre-managed earnings distribution of Pre-impairment operating profit. Since earnings
groups are formed based on this distribution, there is a clear-cut horizontal separation between the
three earnings groups. This is not the case on the next graphs, in which several banks-observations
are shifted compared to their initial position, mostly to the left.
[Figure 4.10 about here]
Figure 4.11 displays the distribution of Net income for each earnings group on a separate plot.
As can be seen, negative earnings banks (upper panel) do not appear to play a major role in the
apparition of the kink. In contrast, one can observe a kink around zero earnings for small earnings
banks (middle panel). As for higher earnings banks (lower panel), there is no obvious kink around
zero earnings. This graphical evidence indicates that the kink is likely to come from the small
earnings group.
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[Figure 4.11 about here]
We show on Figures 4.12 to 4.15 histograms of the various earnings streams investigated. For
each variable, we show the distribution of each earnings group separately. In addition, we compute
mean difference tests in order to compare the earnings streams of the different earnings groups in
a more formal way. Results of the tests are shown in Table 4.6.
[Figure 4.12 about here]
[Figure 4.13 about here]
[Figure 4.14 about here]
[Figure 4.15 about here]
[Table 4.6 about here]
We start the analysis with total earnings stream PIOP−NI. As can be seen from Figure 4.12,
the peak of the distribution of small earnings banks is closer to zero compared to the peak of the
distribution of higher earnings banks. In addition, the tail on the right side of the distribution
of higher earnings banks is fatter compared to the tail on the right side of the distribution of
small earnings groups. This pattern is reflected by a significantly lower earnings stream for small
earnings banks compared to higher earnings banks in the mean difference test (Panel A of Table
4.6). The interpretation is that banks with higher pre-managed earnings have larger total earnings
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streams, i.e. earnings streams that reduce reported profits more heavily, compared to banks with
smaller pre-managed earnings, and the difference is statistically significant.
Next we turn to PIOP−OP. As discussed earlier, this earnings stream mostly consists of im-
pairment charges on loans, securities, and other credits. Both small earnings banks and higher
earnings banks have their peak at the same interval, the first interval right to zero (see Figure
4.13). Again, the tail on the right side of the distribution of higher earnings banks is fatter than
the tail on the right side of the distribution of small earnings banks. Mean difference tests for this
stream variable (Panel B of Table 4.6) show that higher earnings banks have a higher earnings
stream compared to small earnings banks, and the difference is again highly significant.
Confirming the intuition developed so far, the next earnings stream, OP−PTP does not appear
to play a major role in explaining the kink in the distribution of reported earnings. The various
plots of Figure 4.14 show that this stream variable is mostly centred around zero, especially in the
distributions of small earnings banks and higher earnings banks. That is, this earnings stream is
unlikely to be responsible for the apparition of the kink. This is confirmed by the mean differences
tests of Table 4.6 (Panel C). Average mean of small earnings banks and higher earnings banks are
very close to zero, and none of the mean difference is statistically significant.
The last earnings stream variable is PTP−NI. This earnings stream mainly reflects tax ex-
penses. Similar to PIOP−NI, the peak of the distribution of small earnings banks is closer to zero
compared to the peak of the distribution of higher earnings banks (Figure 4.15). In addition, the
tail on the right side of the distribution of higher earnings banks is fatter than the tail of the right
side of the distribution of small earnings banks. All three mean difference tests are statistically
significant at the highest level (Panel D of Table 4.6). This earnings stream is higher among higher
earnings banks than it is among smaller earnings banks. It is in turn higher among smaller earn-
ings banks than it is among negative earnings banks. This is very likely to reflect the fact that
tax expenses are largely a positive function of earnings. Finally, the three earnings groups show a
surge of observations in the first interval right to zero. This might be caused by the report of a
tax relief following negative earnings in past periods and resulting in no tax expense in the current
period (see also Section 4.5.2).
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Finally, if we decompose total earnings stream for each earnings group, we can see that the
larger earnings stream of smaller earnings banks is PIOP−OP (0.0534 of 0.0632). OP−PTP is
negligible (−0.0016), and PTP−NI (0.0114) is fairly small in comparison. The composition of
total earnings stream is slightly different for higher earnings banks. PIOP−OP is again the largest
portion (0.1410 of 0.2237), and OP−PTP is again negligible (0.0010). PTP−NI, however, plays a
bigger role (0.0816).
4.5.2. Synthesis
The two questions we seek to answer in this paper are (1) which specific earnings streams are
responsible for the kink, and (2) is earnings management the driving force behind this irregularity.
The evidence gathered in this paper shows that, depending on the level of pre-managed earnings,
differences relating to impairment charges and tax expenses contribute to the formation and the
reinforcement of the kink. The banking literature has widely documented the use of impairment
charges for earnings management purposes. This earnings stream involves a significant degree of
subjectivity that allows banks to use them for earnings management purposes. It is therefore likely
that earnings management is, at least partially, behind the apparition of the kink.
Tax expenses, however, are a positive function of earnings. Banks with higher earnings have
higher tax expenses compared to banks reporting smaller earnings. In this case, earnings man-
agement is not expected to play a major role. Thus, we argue that a portion of the kink in the
distribution of reported earnings should not be attributed to earnings management. In order to
better explain the kinking effect of taxation, we show the following model calculation.
We define Net income NI as Pre-tax profit minus tax expenses such as
NI = PTP · (1− s), (4.4)
where s is the tax rate. In this example, we fix the tax rate at 20% of Pre-tax profit. We consider
two banks that, for simplicity purposes, hold the same level of common equity. If Bank 1 has PTP
of 1000 monetary units, it will have tax expenses of 200 and NI of 800. If Bank 2 has PTP of
100, it will have tax expenses of 20 and NI of 80. If we take a distributional approach, the shift
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of Bank 1 caused by tax expenses is 200 while the shift of Bank 2 is only 20. Thus, Bank 1 is
disproportionately shifted to the left compared to Bank 2. This is for banks reporting positive
earnings.
In case of negative PTP, in the U.S., the country that accounts for the highest number of banks
in our sample, as well as in other countries (e.g. France) a bank, or another firm, can apply a tax
relief. It can apply the loss to its past tax payments and receives a tax credit, or it can apply the
loss to future income tax payments, reducing the need to make payments in future periods. The
terms of the tax relief and how it can be applied vary by jurisdiction. Usually, loss applying to
past tax payments are limited to the past few years (one to three years) and capped to a certain
amount of money. In contrast, loss applied to future tax payments can be forwarded much more
to the future (seven to 10 years) and are not capped. While each case is different, loss applied
to future tax payments appear, on average, more likely. In addition, this difference in treatment
of losses is unlikely to affect significantly our predictions regarding the kinking effect of taxation
since banks reporting negative PTP are quite rare.
To illustrate our prediction regarding the kinking effect of taxation, we draw a random sample
of 30,000 observations approximating a normal distribution with mean at 0.125 and standard
deviation of 0.1 so that this random sample approximately fits (x and y range) with the sample of
banks used in this study. This random distribution is used as a proxy for PTP. We multiply all
observations with positive PTP of the random sample by 0.8% in order to simulate the effect of a
tax rate of 20%. For the reason explained earlier, the observations with negative earnings are left
unchanged. We display the result of this simulation in Figure 4.16 using superimposed histograms
for these two earnings distributions.
[Figure 4.16 about here]
As can be seen, the result of this simulation fits quite well with the empirical data used in this
study. Compared with the histogram of PTP, the histogram of NI shows less observations with
high positive earnings and more observations with small positive earnings. Due to our assumption
about negative earnings banks, the whole area left to zero earnings is identical for both earnings
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measures.
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4.6. Robustness tests
We conduct several robustness tests of our results, both for the different earnings management
statistics and for the mean difference tests of earnings streams among earnings groups. In these
robustness tests, we consider sample splits according to geographical criteria, a different scaling of
earnings, and the possibility that banks’ main activities can have an influence on the results. We
also consider alternative measures of intervals for both statistical tests. Overall, these robustness
tests largely confirm our main results.
Geographic samples
So far, we have analysed the whole sample of international banks that covers developed as well as
developing countries. As underlined by Elsas et al. (2010), banks in these different groups can be
very heterogeneous with regard to regulation, ownership or market structures. This heterogeneity
can have implication in terms of incentives and opportunity to conduct earnings management.
To account for the heterogeneity in economic development, we conduct a first robustness check
by splitting the overall sample into OECD and non-OECD countries. Among both groups, results of
the earnings management statistic tests confirm the presence of a smooth pre-managed distribution
around zero earnings (Pre-impairment operating profit), as well as the presence of a discontinuity in
distributions of earnings further down the income statement. Regarding earnings streams (Tables
4.8 and 4.9), mean difference tests confirm that higher earnings banks have higher total earnings
streams PIOP−NI, impairment charges PIOP−OP, and tax expenses PTP−NI relative to smaller
earnings banks. Mean differences are statistically significant at the highest confidence level.
[Table 4.7 about here]
[Table 4.8 about here]
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[Table 4.9 about here]
We further look at results for samples of US and non-US banks. US banks traditionally make up
a substantial share of banks in international studies. In this study, 11,069 of the 27,585 observations
included in the final sample come from U.S. banks. Considering separate subsets allows us to check
whether results are driven by characteristics of U.S. banks or whether they apply to the rest of the
sample as well. Results for the earnings management statistics are displayed in Table 4.7 (Panels
C and D) and mean difference tests of earnings streams in Table 4.11. Overall, the relative sample
concentration on US banks does not appear to drive the significance of the results found in the
paper.
[Table 4.10 about here]
[Table 4.11 about here]
Scaling effect
In the paper, we scaled the various earnings measures by common equity. For robustness purposes,
we recalculate the primary results after scaling earnings measures by total assets. We display results
for the earnings management statistics in Table 4.7 (Panel E) and for the mean difference tests of
earnings streams in Table 4.12. These results are largely in line with those found in the paper.
[Table 4.12 about here]
Type of banks
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argued that certain firm-level characteristics can make earnings
management an easier practice. A bank’s main activity could be a characteristic that influences
the degree of earnings management. Since the literature primarily emphasises the role of loan loss
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provisions, commercial banks focusing on lending could be more prone to earnings management
practices than investment banks relying more heavily on nonlending activities. Results gained
earlier could therefore be driven by banks with these characteristics. To investigate this possibility,
we exclude specialised institutions from the sample.
Following Laeven and Levine (2007), we define specialised banks as those banks with net
interest income below 10% of total income and above 90% of total income. Alternatively, Laeven
and Levine (2007) also define specialised banks as those banks with net loans below 10% and
above 90% of total earnings assets. As can be seen from Panels F and G of Table 4.7 for earnings
management statistics and from Tables 4.13 and 4.14 for earnings streams, excluding specialised
banks from the sample does not substantially influence the results. Our main findings are therefore
not driven by characteristics of specialised institutions.
[Table 4.13 about here]
[Table 4.14 about here]
Alternative measures
Finally, we consider alternative measures for the various statistical tests conducted in the paper.
For earnings management statistics, we alter the number of intervals considered to give more
robustness to the results. We calculate EM1 as the difference between the actual and expected
number of observations in the two intervals immediately right to zero. We compute the expected
number of observations as the average of observations in the two intervals directly right and left
to these two intervals. To compute EM2, we also consider a broader portion of the distribution.
Instead of considering five intervals to the left of zero and five intervals to the right of the first
positive interval, we consider 10 intervals to the left of zero and ten intervals to the right of the
first positive interval. For EM3, we consider the two first intervals to the left of zero and the two
first intervals to the right of zero instead of the first interval to the left of zero and the first interval
to the right of zero. We find results similar to those reported earlier.
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As for earnings streams, we defined small earnings banks as those banks with pre-managed
earnings within the first 15 intervals to the left of zero. Similarly, we labelled as higher earnings
banks all banks with pre-managed earnings located beyond the fifteenth interval. As robustness
check, we define as small earnings banks those banks that are within the first 20 intervals (Table
4.15) or 10 intervals (Table 4.16) to the right of zero. Again, we found results close to those
reported in the paper.
[Table 4.15 about here]
[Table 4.16 about here]
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4.7. Conclusion
This paper analyses earnings management in banking and applies a distributional approach for
a sample of international banks including 27,585 cross-sectional observations between 1999 and
2013. Banks being usually excluded from empirical earnings management studies, several thematics
relating to this topic remain unexplored in the banking industry. Among other unexplored issues,
the existence of a smooth pre-managed earnings distribution and whether earnings management
does explain the kink in the distribution of reported earnings have, to our knowledge, never been
addressed in the banking industry.
Evidence from graphical analyses and from statistical tests shows the presence of a smooth
pre-managed earnings distribution (Pre-impairment operating profit), thus confirming previous
findings from Dechow et al. (2003) for the nonfinancial industry. Evidence further shows the
progressive apparition of a kink around zero earnings in earnings measures further down the income
statement. The kink first appears in the distribution of Operating profit, and is further reinforced
in the distribution of Net income. In order to investigate whether earnings management is behind
the kink, we investigate earnings streams occurring between Pre-impairment operating profit and
Net income.
Our results show that the apparition and reinforcement of the kink come from an asymmetric
shift to the left affecting mostly banks with positive earnings. Between Pre-impairment operating
profit and Net income, banks with relatively high pre-managed earnings are decisively shifted to
the left, while banks with relatively small earnings are only moderately shifted to the left. This
shift reflects higher total earnings stream among banks with higher pre-managed earnings, i.e.
earnings streams that reduce more heavily reported earnings. This result is compatible with a loss
avoidance story predicting that firms manage earnings in order to report profits, even small ones.
Compared to banks with modest pre-managed earnings, banks with higher pre-managed earnings
can afford higher hits to their earnings. Banks with smaller pre-managed earnings are therefore
more likely to manage, i.e. understate, these earnings streams in order to avoid reporting losses.
We further decompose total earnings streams to investigate which specific earnings stream has
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an impact on the apparition and development of the kink. We find that banks with higher pre-
managed earnings have on average (1) higher impairment charges on loans, securities, and other
credits as well as (2) higher tax expenses relative to smaller earnings banks. The use of impairment
charges, explained by the high degree of subjectivity associated with these expenses, for earnings
management purposes is well-known and has been well-documented in the literature. However,
since tax expenses are a positive function of earnings, earnings management does not seem to be
the main driver behind the kinking effect of taxation. Therefore, the kink appears to be only
partially caused by earnings management.
Several studies of the empirical literature have attributed the presence of a kink around zero
earnings to earnings management without further investigation of the cause of the kink. The
magnitude of the kink is further used to gauge the degree of earnings management in several
studies. Our findings show that this approach is not unproblematic since factors other than
earnings management, in our case tax expenses, also have a kinking effect. Thus, interpreting
the presence of a kink around zero earnings as evidence of earnings management without further
investigation bears the risk of drawing wrong conclusions.
149
Earnings Management in Banking: Dissecting the Kink
Figure 4.1: Distribution of reported earnings taken from Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997, Figure 3, p. 109)
The figure shows the distribution of annual net income scaled by beginning of the year market value. The distribution
intervals widths are 0.005 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the dashed line. The sample
includes all available observations on the annual industrial and research Compustat databases for the year 1976-1994
which meet minimal data requirements of the study of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Banks, financial institutions,
and firms in regulated industries (e.g. utilities) are deleted. The final sample includes 64,466 observations.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of reported earnings taken from Dechow et al. (2003,
Figure 5, p. 373)
The figure shows the distribution of net income scaled by market value. The distribution intervals widths are
0.005. The sample includes all firm-years from 1988-2000 on Compustat that have the required financial statement
information of the study of Dechow et al. (2003). The final sample consists of 47,847 firm-years.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of reported earnings taken from Shen and Chih (2005,
Figure 1, Panel B, p. 2677)
The figure shows the distribution of annual net income scaled by year-end common equity for U.S. banks for the
period 1993 to 1999. The data are obtained from the Bankscope database. The sample consists of 7,461 observations.
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Figure 4.4: Histograms of pre-managed and reported earnings
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The figure shows histograms of various earnings measures for a sample of international banks between 1999-2013.
All variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all histograms. The
location of zero earnings is marked by the dashed line.
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Figure 4.5: Superimposed histograms of pre-managed and reported earnings
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The figure shows superimposed histograms of various earnings measures for a sample of international banks between
1999-2013. All variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all
histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the dashed line.
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Table 4.1: Bankscope income statement (Univer-
sal format)
10040 Gross Interest and Dividend Income
10010 Interest Income on Loans
+10020 Other Interest Income
+10030 Dividend Income
10070 Total Interest Expense
10050 Interest Expense on Customer Deposits
+10060 Other Interest Expense
10080 Net Interest Income
10040 Gross Interest and Dividend Income
−10070 Total Interest Expense
10140 Total Non-Interest Operating Income
10090 Net Gains on Trading and Derivatives
+10100 Net Gains on Other Securities
+10105 Net Gains on Assets at FV through Income Statement
+10110 Net Insurance Income
+10120 Net Fees and Commissions
+10130 Other Operating Income
10170 Total Non-Interest Expenses
10150 Personnel Expenses
+10160 Other Operating Expenses
10190 Pre-Impairment Operating Profit (PIOP)
10080 Net Interest Income
+10140 Total Non-Interest Operating Income
−10170 Total Non-Interest Expenses
+10180 Equity-accounted Profit/ Loss - Operating
10220 Operating Profit (OP)
10190 Pre-Impairment Operating Profit
−10200 Loan Impairment Charge
−10210 Securities and Other Credit Impairment Charges
10270 Pre-tax Profit (PTP)
10220 Operating Profit
+10240 Non-recurring Income
−10250 Non-recurring Expense
+10260 Other Non-operating Income and Expenses
+10230 Equity-accounted Profit/ Loss - Non-operating
+10255 Change in Fair Value of Own Debt
10283 Net Income before Profit Transfers
10270 Pre-tax Profit
−10280 Tax expense
+10282 Profit/Loss from Discontinued Operations
10285 Net Income (NI)
10283 Net Income before Profit Transfers
−10284 Profit transfers to parent companies
10340 Fitch Comprehensive Income
10285 Net Income
+10310 Change in Value of AFS Investments
+10315 Revaluation of Fixed Assets
+10320 Currency Translation Differences
+10330 Remaining OCI Gains/Losses
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min. Max.
PIOP 27, 585 0.269 0.184 6.047 −536.438 516.879
OP 27, 585 0.185 0.135 4.428 −169.414 506.091
PTP 27, 585 0.210 0.137 4.953 −169.414 506.091
NI 27, 585 0.168 0.102 4.505 −165.179 400.394
PIOP−NI 27, 585 0.101 0.082 5.706 −663.840 138.620
PIOP−OP 27, 585 0.084 0.034 3.092 −367.024 136.972
OP−PTP 27, 585 −0.025 0.000 3.147 −468.234 58.667
PTP−NI 27, 585 0.042 0.031 1.362 −80.857 105.697
The table provides descriptive statistics for the levels and streams variables used in this study. The sample
covers international banks between 1999-2013. Variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate
the impact of outliers. PIOP is Pre-impairment operating profit, OP is Operating profit, PTP is Pre-tax profit,
NI is Net income, PIOP−NI is Earnings stream between PIOP and NI, PIOP−OP is Earnings stream between
PIOP and OP, OP−PTP is Earnings stream between OP and PTP, PTP−NI is Earnings stream between PTP
and NI. All variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity.
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Table 4.3: Country-specific descriptive statistics
Obs. Assets Equity PIOP OP PTP NI
Argentina 99 6, 055 654 0.319 0.202 0.183 0.115
Armenia 16 129 23 0.220 0.197 0.197 0.163
Australia 106 187, 641 10, 856 0.228 0.186 0.212 0.184
Austria 150 62, 086 3, 773 0.207 0.104 0.113 0.084
Bahrain 143 5, 930 659 0.145 0.089 0.102 0.100
Bangladesh 44 1, 837 148 0.441 0.308 0.308 0.159
Barbados 26 5, 304 686 0.149 0.111 0.153 0.131
Belgium 59 191, 330 11, 618 0.192 0.157 0.139 0.098
Belize 7 931 273 0.143 0.068 0.078 0.078
Benin 13 697 54 0.549 0.361 0.335 0.254
Bermuda 137 6, 875 1, 364 0.166 0.149 0.169 0.150
Bolivia 20 939 79 0.233 0.102 0.095 0.075
Bosnia-Herz. 82 374 41 0.227 0.089 0.033 0.031
Botswana 48 1, 027 119 0.656 0.559 0.568 0.440
Brazil 312 29, 410 2, 613 0.340 0.040 0.021 0.064
Bulgaria 60 1, 311 129 0.235 0.154 0.157 0.135
Burkina Faso 14 308 22 0.665 0.445 0.398 0.265
Canada 54 195, 401 9, 523 0.166 0.140 0.137 0.104
Cape Verde 9 670 41 0.279 0.179 0.179 0.147
Cayman Islands 14 1, 015 86 0.137 0.123 0.122 0.122
Chile 56 20, 579 1, 471 0.392 0.281 0.275 0.233
China 133 556, 219 33, 255 0.412 0.334 0.334 0.216
Colombia 124 12, 292 981 10.928 7.960 8.581 6.014
Costa Rica 58 600 65 0.258 0.192 0.197 0.176
Ivory Coast 40 679 76 0.308 0.185 0.172 0.134
Croatia 263 2, 151 256 0.134 0.062 0.063 0.045
Cyprus 60 15, 939 1, 002 0.345 0.118 0.120 0.175
Czech Rep. 34 25, 987 2, 089 0.305 0.248 0.260 0.200
Denmark 463 13, 981 603 0.202 0.104 0.104 0.074
Ecuador 70 1, 782 132 0.248 0.083 0.157 0.121
Egypt 270 2, 540 264 0.861 0.668 0.457 0.437
El Salvador 85 1, 604 151 0.326 0.156 0.190 0.154
Estonia 22 11, 281 1, 139 0.268 0.197 0.199 0.196
Finland 59 17, 605 1, 920 0.200 0.184 0.168 0.138
France 508 131, 834 4, 557 0.194 0.163 0.180 0.133
Gambia 14 89 9 0.788 0.704 0.704 0.461
Georgia 34 720 115 0.297 0.021 0.031 0.014
Germany 448 131, 766 3, 718 0.140 0.072 0.062 0.029
Ghana 45 804 98 0.589 0.487 0.489 0.351
Greece 106 41, 472 2, 169 0.068 −0.072 −0.360 −0.425
The table provides country-specific information about the number of observations and average values of different
variables for the sample of international banks between 1999-2013 used in this study. Obs. is the number of
bank-year observations, Assets is total book assets, Equity is total book equity, PIOP is Pre-impairment
operating profit scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity, OP is Operating profit scaled by beginning-
of-the-year common equity, PTP is Pre-tax profit scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity, NI is Net
income scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity.
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Table 4.3: Country-specific descriptive statistics (continued)
Obs. Assets Equity PIOP OP PTP NI
Hong Kong 143 31, 333 3, 280 0.152 0.122 0.141 0.125
Hungary 36 13, 929 1, 503 14.700 14.303 14.303 11.322
Iceland 26 14, 944 −1, 455 0.236 0.196 0.196 0.167
India 676 19, 595 1, 297 0.536 0.515 0.519 0.427
Indonesia 420 6, 068 688 0.261 0.179 0.183 0.128
Iraq 53 296 75 0.299 0.290 0.286 0.272
Ireland 46 157, 965 5, 708 0.158 −0.245 −0.236 −0.179
Israel 123 30, 309 1, 704 0.240 0.159 0.169 0.102
Italy 359 83, 348 5, 668 0.223 0.125 0.115 0.057
Jamaica 74 1, 554 224 0.280 0.261 0.292 0.234
Japan 2, 070 87, 523 2, 968 −0.026 0.000 0.315 0.363
Jordan 161 4, 070 528 0.238 0.173 0.175 0.126
Kazakhstan 186 3, 909 273 0.431 0.087 0.074 0.043
Kenya 119 1, 167 159 0.417 0.294 0.295 0.205
Kuwait 211 6, 360 852 0.154 0.126 0.129 0.112
Kyrgyzstan 22 116 22 0.288 0.251 0.261 0.237
Laos 11 853 37 0.039 0.396 0.400 0.281
Latvia 14 2, 512 186 0.217 0.002 0.004 −0.011
Lebanon 67 8, 847 617 0.243 0.237 0.240 0.197
Liechtenstein 20 14, 199 1, 151 0.115 0.098 0.096 0.087
Lithuania 64 2, 849 234 0.169 0.081 0.096 0.086
Luxembourg 53 39, 556 2, 027 0.304 0.198 0.265 0.322
Macedonia 146 302 38 0.132 0.040 0.041 0.034
Malawi 28 256 40 0.634 0.607 0.558 0.395
Malaysia 106 14, 569 1, 245 0.261 0.164 0.181 0.148
Malta 57 3, 496 308 0.580 0.510 0.508 0.378
Mauritius 28 2, 719 374 0.245 0.218 0.227 0.190
Mexico 169 21, 324 2, 493 0.284 0.175 0.220 0.174
Monaco 14 3, 890 248 0.209 0.210 0.209 0.209
Montenegro 71 350 37 0.217 0.053 0.074 0.064
Morocco 75 9, 459 749 0.267 0.149 0.170 0.103
Namibia 16 1, 851 199 0.627 0.565 0.580 0.407
Nepal 208 257 22 0.351 0.285 0.291 0.197
Netherlands 112 232, 764 8, 134 0.598 0.520 0.527 0.395
New Zealand 2 346 31 0.043 −0.007 −0.007 0.002
Niger 14 169 17 0.350 0.302 0.279 0.187
Nigeria 147 3, 741 329 1.264 0.449 0.455 0.350
Norway 219 19, 584 1, 107 0.212 0.174 0.176 0.131
Oman 121 2, 948 367 0.247 0.191 0.190 0.171
Pakistan 167 1, 029 83 0.079 0.012 0.083 0.079
The table provides country-specific information about the number of observations and average values of different
variables for the sample of international banks between 1999-2013 used in this study. Obs. is the number of
bank-year observations, Assets is total book assets, Equity is total book equity, PIOP is Pre-impairment
operating profit scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity, OP is Operating profit scaled by beginning-
of-the-year common equity, PTP is Pre-tax profit scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity, NI is Net
income scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity.
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Table 4.3: Country-specific descriptive statistics (continued)
Obs. Assets Equity PIOP OP PTP NI
Palestine 25 617 74 0.209 0.191 0.192 0.142
Panama 74 3, 163 316 0.248 0.180 0.188 0.170
Peru 208 2, 982 302 0.434 0.208 0.241 0.169
Philippines 170 5, 267 540 0.226 0.184 0.190 0.155
Poland 154 15, 055 1, 566 0.299 0.190 0.196 0.158
Portugal 70 46, 003 2, 381 0.218 0.036 0.055 0.031
Qatar 61 15, 130 1, 983 0.287 0.226 0.231 0.230
Korea 176 56, 740 4, 284 0.198 0.114 0.116 0.085
Moldova 51 328 52 0.424 0.384 0.372 0.324
Romania 47 5, 780 588 0.314 0.196 0.197 0.174
Russia 622 9, 468 994 0.299 0.193 0.201 0.140
Saudi Arabia 112 21, 653 2, 761 0.258 0.217 0.218 0.218
Serbia 221 735 153 0.174 −0.006 0.010 0.007
Singapore 109 44, 682 4, 072 0.137 0.123 0.132 0.109
Slovakia 75 5, 238 450 0.053 0.351 0.348 0.358
Slovenia 68 3, 183 243 0.383 0.009 0.046 −0.016
South Africa 158 31, 788 2, 216 0.420 0.321 0.324 0.296
Spain 117 237, 622 13, 313 0.261 0.073 0.045 0.005
Sri Lanka 47 988 108 0.278 0.226 0.235 0.157
Swaziland 14 182 21 0.409 0.395 0.395 0.279
Sweden 73 182, 014 7, 867 0.169 0.154 0.156 0.079
Switzerland 455 79, 143 3, 386 0.187 0.164 0.155 0.128
Syria 49 880 78 0.202 0.091 0.078 0.063
Taiwan 184 24, 116 1, 732 0.131 0.070 0.073 0.061
Thailand 348 10, 491 832 0.241 0.070 0.070 0.037
Togo 11 9, 373 1, 007 0.419 0.312 0.316 0.220
Trinidad and T. 38 4, 556 625 0.320 0.291 0.295 0.231
Tunisia 182 1, 604 145 0.223 0.103 0.108 0.065
Turkey 201 21, 755 2, 346 0.230 0.171 0.177 0.141
Uganda 40 384 43 0.660 0.590 0.609 0.461
Ukraine 114 1, 709 205 0.404 0.093 0.075 0.036
United Arab Em. 224 12, 569 1, 451 0.247 0.190 0.192 0.191
United Kingdom 670 153, 278 6, 445 0.238 0.135 0.131 0.114
Tanzania 12 1, 092 125 0.424 0.342 0.343 0.245
United States 11, 065 20, 914 1, 380 0.125 0.076 0.075 0.053
Uruguay 3 1, 547 −136 6.441 10.448 9.366 9.316
Venezuela 202 5, 689 479 0.558 0.439 0.441 0.408
Vietnam 91 6, 112 468 0.329 0.247 0.249 0.191
Zambia 59 483 56 0.451 0.288 0.337 0.168
Zimbabwe 26 494 59 0.859 0.674 0.283 0.121
The table provides country-specific information about the number of observations and average values of different
variables for the sample of international banks between 1999-2013 used in this study. Obs. is the number of
bank-year observations, Assets is total book assets, Equity is total book equity, PIOP is Pre-impairment
operating profit scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity, OP is Operating profit scaled by beginning-
of-the-year common equity, PTP is Pre-tax profit scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity, NI is Net
income scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity.
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Table 4.4: Correlation matrix
OP PTP NI PIOP− PIOP− OP− PTP−
NI OP PTP NI
PIOP 0.87∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
OP 1.00 0.78∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PTP 1.00 0.96∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NI 1.00 −0.32∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PIOP− 1.00 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
NI (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PIOP− 1.00 0.28∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
OP (0.00) (0.00)
OP− 1.00 0.33∗∗∗
PTP (0.00)
The table shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the various levels and streams
variables used in this study. The sample covers international banks between 1999-2013. PIOP
is Pre-impairment operating profit, OP is Operating profit, PTP is Pre-tax profit, NI is Net
income, PIOP−NI is Earnings stream between PIOP and NI, PIOP−OP is Earnings stream
between PIOP and OP, OP−PTP is Earnings stream between OP and PTP, PTP−NI is
Earnings stream between PTP and NI. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Figure 4.6: Histograms of individual earnings measures
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The figure shows histograms of various earnings measures for a sample of international banks between 1999-2013.
All variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all histograms. The
location of zero earnings is marked by the dashed line.
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Figure 4.7: Superimposed histograms of earnings measures
D
en
si
ty
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
0
1
2
3
4
5
Net income
Pre−imp. op. profit
D
en
si
ty
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
0
1
2
3
4
5
Operating profit
Pre−imp. op. profit
D
en
si
ty
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
0
1
2
3
4
5
Pre−tax profit
Operating profit
D
en
si
ty
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
0
1
2
3
4
5
Net income
Pre−tax profit
The figure shows superimposed histograms of various earnings measures for a sample of international banks between
1999-2013. All variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all
histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the dashed line.
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Table 4.5: Earnings management statistics
Obs. EM1 EM2 EM3
Pre-impairment operating profit 27,585 0.20 1.19 1.35
Operating profit 27,585 3.45∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗ 2.04
Pre-tax profit 27,585 3.88∗∗∗ 5.35∗∗∗ 2.34
Net income 27,585 4.04∗∗∗ 5.42∗∗∗ 2.99
The table shows results of the statistical tests to assess the presence of an irregularity around
zero earnings. The sample analysed covers international banks between 1999-2013. Variables are
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the impact of outliers. The null hypothesis is that
there is no discontinuity around zero earnings. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; EM3 is not a
statistic but a simple ratio (no significance test computed).
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Figure 4.8: Earnings streams plotted as a function of Pre-impairment operating
profit
Each scatter plot shows an earnings stream variable plotted as a function of Pre-impairment operating profit. The
sample analysed covers international banks between 1999-2013.
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Figure 4.9: Robust regression plots of earnings streams and Pre-impairment op-
erating profit
The figure shows smooth nonparametric regression line based on a locally weighted polynomial regression
(LOWESS). In each plot, an earnings stream variable is displayed as a function of Pre-impairment operating
profit.
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Figure 4.10: Histograms of earnings measures decomposed by earnings groups
The figure shows histograms of various earnings measures for a sample of international banks between 1999-2013.
The various shades of grey refer to the classification as negative earnings banks (white; banks with negative Pre-
impairment operating profit), small earnings banks (lightgrey; banks with Pre-impairment operating within the first
15 intervals right to zero) or higher earnings banks (darkgrey; banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located
beyond interval 15). All variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for
all histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the dashed line.
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Figure 4.10: Histogram of earnings measures decomposed by earnings groups (con-
tinued)
The figure shows histograms of various earnings measures for a sample of international banks between 1999-2013.
The various shades of grey refer to the classification as negative earnings banks (white; banks with negative Pre-
impairment operating profit), small earnings banks (lightgrey; banks with Pre-impairment operating within the first
15 intervals right to zero) or higher earnings banks (darkgrey; banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located
beyond interval 15). All variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for
all histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the dashed line.
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Figure 4.11: Contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of net income
The figure shows the contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of Net income. The sample analysed
covers international banks between 1999-2013. The various shades of grey refer to the classification as negative
earnings banks (white; banks with negative Pre-impairment operating profit), small earnings banks (lightgrey;
banks with Pre-impairment operating within the first 15 intervals right to zero) or higher earnings banks (darkgrey;
banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval 15). All variables are scaled by beginning-of-
the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the
dashed line.
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Figure 4.12: Contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of PIOP−NI
The figure shows the contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of PIOP−NI. The sample analysed
covers international banks between 1999-2013. The various shades of grey refer to the classification as negative
earnings banks (white; banks with negative Pre-impairment operating profit), small earnings banks (lightgrey;
banks with Pre-impairment operating within the first 15 intervals right to zero) or higher earnings banks (darkgrey;
banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval 15). All variables are scaled by beginning-of-
the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the
dashed line.
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Figure 4.13: Contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of PIOP−OP
The figure shows the contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of PIOP−OP. The sample analysed
covers international banks between 1999-2013. The various shades of grey refer to the classification as negative
earnings banks (white; banks with negative Pre-impairment operating profit), small earnings banks (lightgrey;
banks with Pre-impairment operating within the first 15 intervals right to zero) or higher earnings banks (darkgrey;
banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval 15). All variables are scaled by beginning-of-
the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the
dashed line.
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Figure 4.14: Contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of OP−PTP
The figure shows the contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of OP−PTP. The sample analysed
covers international banks between 1999-2013. The various shades of grey refer to the classification as negative
earnings banks (white; banks with negative Pre-impairment operating profit), small earnings banks (lightgrey;
banks with Pre-impairment operating within the first 15 intervals right to zero) or higher earnings banks (darkgrey;
banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval 15). All variables are scaled by beginning-of-
the-year common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the
dashed line.
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Figure 4.15: Contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of PTP−NI
The figure shows the contribution of each earnings group to the distribution of PTP−NI. The sample analysed covers
international banks between 1999-2013. The various shades of grey refer to the classification as negative earnings
banks (white; banks with negative Pre-impairment operating profit), small earnings banks (lightgrey; banks with
Pre-impairment operating within the first 15 intervals right to zero) or higher earnings banks (darkgrey; banks
with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval 15). All variables are scaled by beginning-of-the-year
common equity. Bin width is set at 0.01 for all histograms. The location of zero earnings is marked by the dashed
line.
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Table 4.6: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.7164 0.0632 −0.7796∗
N = 2134 N = 8533 (0.059)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.7164 0.2237 −0.9401∗∗
N = 2134 N = 16918 (0.023)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0632 0.2237 −0.1605∗∗∗
N = 8533 N = 16918 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.2440 0.0534 −0.2974
N = 2134 N = 8533 (0.164)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.2440 0.1410 −0.3851∗
N = 2134 N = 16918 (0.072)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0534 0.1410 −0.0877∗∗∗
N = 8533 N = 16918 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.3191 −0.0016 −0.3175
N = 2134 N = 8533 (0.188)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.3191 0.0010 −0.3201
N = 2134 N = 16918 (0.184)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0016 0.0010 −0.0026
N = 8533 N = 16918 (0.644)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.1533 0.0114 −0.1646∗∗∗
N = 2134 N = 8533 (0.008)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.1533 0.0816 −0.2349∗∗∗
N = 2134 N = 16918 (0.000)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0114 0.0816 −0.0703∗∗∗
N = 8533 N = 16918 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
15, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers international banks between 1999-2013.
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Figure 4.16: Model calculation of the kinking effect of taxation
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The figure shows superimposed histograms of various earnings measures for a randomly selected sample of 30,000
observations with mean of 0.125 and standard deviation of 0.1. The location of zero earnings is marked by the
dashed line.
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Table 4.7: Earnings management statistics - Robustness
tests
Obs. EM1 EM2 EM3
Panel A: OECD
Pre-impairment operating profit 18412 0.70 1.13 1.38
Operating profit 18412 3.07∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 2.01
Pre-tax profit 18412 1.93∗ 3.46∗∗∗ 1.99
Net income 18412 1.72∗ 3.20∗∗∗ 2.42
Panel B: Non-OECD
Pre-impairment operating profit 9183 −1.29 1.15 1.72
Operating profit 9183 4.29∗∗∗ 7.03∗∗∗ 2.68
Pre-tax profit 9183 6.75∗∗∗ 7.31∗∗∗ 3.92
Net income 9183 5.99∗∗∗ 6.99∗∗∗ 5.71
Panel C: US
Pre-impairment operating profit 11069 0.07 1.54 1.49
Operating profit 11069 2.55∗∗ 4.89∗∗∗ 1.99
Pre-tax profit 11069 1.71∗ 3.46∗∗∗ 1.74
Net income 11069 1.50 3.06∗∗∗ 2.11
Panel D: Non-US
Pre-impairment operating profit 16526 0.00 0.85 1.31
Operating profit 16526 3.91∗∗∗ 5.14∗∗∗ 2.23
Pre-tax profit 16526 4.50∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 3.32
Net income 16526 4.32∗∗∗ 6.93∗∗∗ 4.58
Panel E: Scaled by total assets
Pre-impairment operating profit 27585 −0.42 0.83 1.53
Operating profit 27585 0.47 3.36∗∗∗ 2.10
Pre-tax profit 27585 1.72∗ 3.90∗∗∗ 2.61
Net income 27585 2.81∗∗∗ 5.02∗∗∗ 3.80
Panel F: Diversified assets
Pre-impairment operating profit 23451 0.44 1.00 1.35
Operating profit 23451 3.81∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ 2.24
Pre-tax profit 23451 2.86∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 2.33
Net income 23451 3.59∗∗∗ 4.63∗∗∗ 3.10
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Table 4.7: Earnings management statistics - Robustness
tests (continued)
Obs. EM1 EM2 EM3
Panel G: Diversified income
Pre-impairment operating profit 21932 −1.61 0.31 1.17
Operating profit 21932 3.52∗∗∗ 3.27∗∗∗ 2.43
Pre-tax profit 21932 3.37∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 2.55
Net income 21932 3.41∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗ 3.29
Panel H: Alternative measures
Pre-impairment operating profit 27585 −1.31 1.17 1.58
Operating profit 27585 4.15∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 2.27
Pre-tax profit 27585 4.92∗∗∗ 5.42∗∗∗ 2.64
Net income 27585 5.51∗∗∗ 6.53∗∗∗ 3.64
The table shows results of the statistical tests to assess the presence of an irregular-
ity around zero earnings. The samples analysed in Panels A to D cover, respectively,
banks in OECD countries, banks in non-OECD countries, U.S. banks, and non-U.S.
banks. The sample analysed in Panels E to H cover international banks between
1999-2013. Variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the im-
pact of outliers. The null hypothesis is that there is no discontinuity around zero
earnings. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; EM3 is not a statistic but a simple
ratio (no significance test computed).
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Table 4.8: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - OECD sample
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −1.0177 0.0651 −1.0827∗
N = 1558 N = 6562 (0.056)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −1.0177 0.1838 −1.2015∗∗
N = 1558 N = 10292 (0.034)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0651 0.1838 −0.1187∗∗∗
N = 6562 N = 10292 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.4003 0.0527 −0.4529
N = 1558 N = 6562 (0.119)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.4003 0.1152 −0.5155∗
N = 1558 N = 10292 (0.076)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0527 0.1152 −0.0626∗∗∗
N = 6562 N = 10292 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.4242 0.0009 −0.4251
N = 1558 N = 6562 (0.198)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.4242 0.0036 −0.4278
N = 1558 N = 10292 (0.195)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0009 0.0036 −0.0027
N = 6562 N = 10292 (0.673)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.1932 0.0115 −0.2047∗∗
N = 1558 N = 6562 (0.016)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.1932 0.0650 −0.2582∗∗∗
N = 1558 N = 10292 (0.003)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0115 0.0650 −0.0534∗∗∗
N = 6562 N = 10292 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
15, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers banks in OECD countries between 1999-2013.
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Table 4.9: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - Non-OECD sample
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) 0.0986 0.0568 0.0418
N = 576 N = 1975 (0.604)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0986 0.2855 −0.1869∗∗
N = 576 N = 6632 (0.040)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0568 0.2855 −0.2288∗∗∗
N = 1975 N = 6632 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) 0.1787 0.0556 0.1231
N = 576 N = 1975 (0.201)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.1787 0.1810 −0.0023
N = 576 N = 6632 (0.981)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0556 0.1810 −0.1254∗∗∗
N = 1975 N = 6632 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.0348 −0.0097 −0.0252∗∗∗
N = 576 N = 1975 (0.005)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0348 −0.0029 −0.0319∗∗
N = 576 N = 6632 (0.015)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0097 −0.0029 −0.0067
N = 1975 N = 6632 (0.521)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.0453 0.0108 −0.0561∗∗
N = 576 N = 1975 (0.030)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0453 0.1075 −0.1527∗∗∗
N = 576 N = 6632 (0.000)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0108 0.1075 −0.0966∗∗∗
N = 1975 N = 6632 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
15, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers banks in non-OECD countries between
1999-2013.
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Table 4.10: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - U.S. sample
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.3053 0.0637 −0.3690
N = 962 N = 3943 (0.352)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.3053 0.1366 −0.4419
N = 962 N = 6164 (0.266)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0637 0.1366 −0.0730∗∗∗
N = 3943 N = 6164 (0.002)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.1894 0.0523 −0.2417
N = 962 N = 3943 (0.528)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.1894 0.0840 −0.2734
N = 962 N = 6164 (0.477)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0523 0.0840 −0.0317
N = 3943 N = 6164 (0.164)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.0083 0.0006 −0.0089∗∗
N = 962 N = 3943 (0.041)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0083 0.0035 −0.0117∗∗
N = 962 N = 6164 (0.017)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0006 0.0035 −0.0028
N = 3943 N = 6164 (0.225)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.1077 0.0107 −0.1184
N = 962 N = 3943 (0.160)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.1077 0.0492 −0.1568∗
N = 962 N = 6164 (0.064)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0107 0.0492 −0.0385∗∗∗
N = 3943 N = 6164 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
15, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers U.S. banks between 1999-2013.
179
Earnings Management in Banking: Dissecting the Kink
Table 4.11: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - Non-U.S. sample
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −1.0538 0.0627 −1.1165
N = 1172 N = 4594 (0.100)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −1.0538 0.2736 −1.3273∗
N = 1172 N = 10760 (0.051)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0627 0.2736 −0.2108∗∗∗
N = 4594 N = 10760 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.2889 0.0542 −0.3431
N = 1172 N = 4594 (0.134)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.2889 0.1737 −0.4625∗∗
N = 1172 N = 10760 (0.044)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0542 0.1737 −0.1195∗∗∗
N = 4594 N = 10760 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.5742 −0.0034 −0.5708
N = 1172 N = 4594 (0.193)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.5742 −0.0003 −0.5739
N = 1172 N = 10760 (0.191)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0034 −0.0003 −0.0031
N = 4594 N = 10760 (0.725)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.1907 0.0120 −0.2026∗∗
N = 1172 N = 4594 (0.025)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.1907 0.1002 −0.2909∗∗∗
N = 1172 N = 10760 (0.002)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0120 0.1002 −0.0883∗∗∗
N = 4594 N = 10760 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
15, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers non-U.S. banks between 1999-2013.
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Table 4.12: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - Earnings measures scaled by total assets
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) 0.0072 0.0106 −0.0034∗
N = 2071 N = 24972 (0.086)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0072 0.0835 −0.0763∗∗∗
N = 2071 N = 542 (0.000)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0106 0.0835 −0.0729∗∗∗
N = 24972 N = 542 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) 0.0125 0.0069 0.0056∗∗∗
N = 2071 N = 24972 (0.000)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0125 0.0391 −0.0265∗∗∗
N = 2071 N = 542 (0.003)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0069 0.0391 −0.0321∗∗∗
N = 24972 N = 542 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.0031 −0.0002 −0.0029∗
N = 2071 N = 24972 (0.095)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0031 −0.0040 0.0009
N = 2071 N = 542 (0.842)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0002 −0.0040 0.0038
N = 24972 N = 542 (0.366)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.0022 0.0040 −0.0062∗∗∗
N = 2071 N = 24972 (0.000)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0022 0.0485 −0.0507∗∗∗
N = 2071 N = 542 (0.000)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0040 0.0485 −0.0445∗∗∗
N = 24972 N = 542 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
15, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers international banks between 1999-2013.
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Table 4.13: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - Diversified banks (assets) sample
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.7364 0.0673 −0.8037
N = 1553 N = 7224 (0.126)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.7364 0.2186 −0.9550∗
N = 1553 N = 14674 (0.069)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0673 0.2186 −0.1512∗∗∗
N = 7224 N = 14674 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.3158 0.0557 −0.3715
N = 1553 N = 7224 (0.201)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.3158 0.1429 −0.4587
N = 1553 N = 14674 (0.115)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0557 0.1429 −0.0872∗∗∗
N = 7224 N = 14674 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.2985 −0.0011 −0.2974
N = 1553 N = 7224 (0.325)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.2985 −0.0015 −0.2970
N = 1553 N = 14674 (0.326)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0011 −0.0015 0.0004
N = 7224 N = 14674 (0.947)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.1221 0.0127 −0.1348∗∗
N = 1553 N = 7224 (0.021)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.1221 0.0772 −0.1993∗∗∗
N = 1553 N = 14674 (0.001)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0127 0.0772 −0.0645∗∗∗
N = 7224 N = 14674 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
15, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers international banks between 1999-2013.
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Table 4.14: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - Diversified banks (income) sample
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −1.5768 0.0652 −1.6420∗
N = 1044 N = 6415 (0.052)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −1.5768 0.2341 −1.8109∗∗
N = 1044 N = 14473 (0.032)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0652 0.2341 −0.1689∗∗∗
N = 6415 N = 14473 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.6470 0.0536 −0.7006
N = 1044 N = 6415 (0.108)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.6470 0.1521 −0.7991∗
N = 1044 N = 14473 (0.067)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0536 0.1521 −0.0985∗∗∗
N = 6415 N = 14473 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.6337 −0.0014 −0.6323
N = 1044 N = 6415 (0.199)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.6337 0.0038 −0.6376
N = 1044 N = 14473 (0.196)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0014 0.0038 −0.0052
N = 6415 N = 14473 (0.317)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.2961 0.0131 −0.3091∗∗
N = 1044 N = 6415 (0.015)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.2961 0.0781 −0.3742∗∗∗
N = 1044 N = 14473 (0.004)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0131 0.0781 −0.0651∗∗∗
N = 6415 N = 14473 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
15, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers international banks between 1999-2013.
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Table 4.15: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - First alternative definition of earnings groups
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.7164 0.0712 −0.7876∗
N = 2134 N = 12953 (0.057)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.7164 0.2722 −0.9885∗∗
N = 2134 N = 12498 (0.017)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0712 0.2722 −0.2009∗∗∗
N = 12953 N = 12498 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.2440 0.0544 −0.2984
N = 2134 N = 12953 (0.162)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.2440 0.1710 −0.4150∗
N = 2134 N = 12498 (0.053)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0544 0.1710 −0.1167∗∗∗
N = 12953 N = 12498 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.3191 −0.0007 −0.3184
N = 2134 N = 12953 (0.186)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.3191 0.0011 −0.3201
N = 2134 N = 12498 (0.184)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0007 0.0011 −0.0017
N = 12953 N = 12498 (0.818)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.1533 0.0176 −0.1708∗∗∗
N = 2134 N = 12953 (0.006)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.1533 0.1001 −0.2533∗∗∗
N = 2134 N = 12498 (0.000)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0176 0.1001 −0.0825∗∗∗
N = 12953 N = 12498 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
20, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers international banks between 1999-2013.
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Table 4.16: Mean difference tests of earnings streams among different earnings
groups - Second alternative definition of earnings groups
Mean x Mean y Diff.
Panel A: PIOP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.7164 0.0584 −0.7747∗
N = 2134 N = 4303 (0.061)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.7164 0.1926 −0.9090∗∗
N = 2134 N = 21148 (0.028)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0584 0.1926 −0.1342∗∗∗
N = 4303 N = 21148 (0.000)
Panel B: PIOP−OP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.2440 0.0563 −0.3003
N = 2134 N = 4303 (0.160)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.2440 0.1229 −0.3669∗
N = 2134 N = 21148 (0.086)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0563 0.1229 −0.0666∗∗∗
N = 4303 N = 21148 (0.000)
Panel C: OP−PTP
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.3191 −0.0028 −0.3163
N = 2134 N = 4303 (0.189)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.3191 0.0008 −0.3199
N = 2134 N = 21148 (0.184)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.0028 0.0008 −0.0036
N = 4303 N = 21148 (0.453)
Panel D: PTP−NI
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Small earnings banks (y) −0.1533 0.0049 −0.1582∗∗
N = 2134 N = 4303 (0.011)
Neg. earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) −0.1533 0.0689 −0.2222∗∗∗
N = 2134 N = 21148 (0.000)
Small earnings banks (x) − Higher earnings banks (y) 0.0049 0.0689 −0.0640∗∗∗
N = 4303 N = 21148 (0.000)
The table shows the mean of the various earnings streams among Negative earnings banks, Small earnings banks,
and Higher earnings banks, differences in means across earnings groups, and the number of observations N in
each earnings group. For each mean difference, a test statistic (t-test) is computed with p-values reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. Negative earnings banks are banks with negative Pre-impairment
operating profit, Small earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit within the first 15 intervals
right to zero, and Higher earnings banks are banks with Pre-impairment operating profit located beyond interval
10, with earnings intervals set at 0.01. The sample analysed covers international banks between 1999-2013.
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In this thesis, we investigated three different aspects of banking. The three independent but
related papers that form this thesis are organised in such a way that they can be read independently.
We start this concluding chapter with a general overview of the banking industry. We then discuss
each paper in more detail in the form of three extended abstracts. We close this thesis with some
thoughts on shadow banking.
Brief overview of the banking industry
The banking industry is particularly important for overall economic activity since it channels funds
from individuals who save to individuals with productive investment opportunities. However, this
central role performed by the banking industry can be double-hedged. While a well-functioning
banking system can efficiently promote economic growth, dysfunctions in this industry can severely
impact on economic activity. The Great Depression of the 1930s, and more recently the Great
Recession, are two dramatic examples.
The banking sector has long been considered as rather boring and unattractive, notably be-
cause of tight regulations that strictly limited the range of business activities conducted by banks.
However, a worldwide wave of deregulation that started in the 1980s, coupled with technological
developments, has dramatically changed the visage of the banking industry. These changes have
resulted in the banking industry being populated by a wide variety of banks all around the world.
Banks are different from firms in other industries in several ways. The banking industry is
notably characterised by a high degree of regulation, a high degree of leverage, and key accounting
positions differing from the nonfinancial industry. These differences reduce the comparability
between banks and nonfinancial firms. As a result, banks are often excluded from empirical studies
in accounting and finance (e.g. asset pricing, earnings management). Therefore, several areas of
research remain largely unexplored for the banking industry. The exclusion of banks from major
studies, combined with the particular character of this industry, has given rise to a banking-specific
literature.
This thesis has taken advantage of the particular characteristics of the banking industry as
well as the exclusion of banks from major studies in the accounting and finance literature. The
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first two studies take a market approach to analyse the impact of various bank-level characteristics
on, respectively, market valuation and stock market returns. The third study, by investigating
earnings management, addresses a potential source of distortion affecting information available to
and analysed by various market participants and other stakeholders.
The valuation of diversified banks: New evidence
In this study, we analyse the association between a bank and its valuation using a comprehensive
sample of international banks including 19,677 bank-year observations between 1998-2013. This
association is important for the governance of banks and for banking regulation. While diversifi-
cation may allow economies of scope and synergies between the different business units of a bank,
it may also result in conflicts of interest and agency costs.
Two closely related measures, based on the share of interest income in total operating income,
are particularly important to assess the association between diversification and valuation: a di-
versification proxy that reaches a maximum at an interest-income share of 50% and a type proxy
that increases monotonically with interest-income share.1 The first measure distinguishes between
specialised institutions (commercial or investment banks) and diversified institutions (mix of com-
mercial and investment activities). Diversification, however, does not distinguish between full
specialisation in commercial activities or full specialisation in investment activities, but considers
both types of banks as specialised institutions. The second measure, type, focuses on this distinc-
tion. If the type variable is not included, a triangular structure of the diversification variable is
imposed on the data since both types of specialised banks are given the same diversification value.2
In this case, it is not possible to analyse whether banks focusing mainly on investment activities
are valued differently compared to banks focusing on commercial activities. The two measures
should be jointly considered and their combined effect analysed in empirical studies.
Our study is motivated by the fact that three studies in the recent literature have reported
1Alternatively, the share of interest income in total operating income can be replaced by the share of loan assets
in total assets.
2The diversification effect, by construction, has a symmetrical triangular structure (V-shape or inverted V-shape)
because the effect is strongest for interest income share of 0.5, and falls off towards investment banks (share of 0)
and commercial banks (share of 1). When bank type is also relevant for valuation, there is a second effect running
monotonically from an interest-income share of 0 (pure investment banks) to a level of 1 (pure commercial banks).
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strongly different results: Laeven and Levine (2007) found a significant diversification discount for
a sample of U.S. banks between 1998-2002, Baele et al. (2007) reported a significant diversification
premium for a sample of European banks between 1989-2004, and Elsas et al. (2010) found no
direct effect, but an indirect effect from a positive association of diversification with profitability for
a sample of banks from nine developed countries. Of course, the difference in results between these
studies could be explained by the geographical composition of the samples or by the time periods
analysed. For instance, Baele et al. (2007) advanced that regulatory or institutional differences
were responsible for the different results found in their study compared to the study of Laeven
and Levine (2007). However, a more careful analysis of the three studies reveals fundamental
methodological differences that may be responsible for the different results found.
First, there are two major issues regarding the use of type and diversification: Only Laeven and
Levine (2007) systematically include these two variables in regression. In the two other studies,
either type and diversification are not jointly included, or when they are, type does not capture
the common understanding of bank type as in Laeven and Levine (2007), i.e. a monotonically and
regular increase of the type value when interest income share increases.3 The various diversification
proxies used in the three studies are, however, fairly similar to each other. Second, Elsas et al.
(2010) used an estimation approach with bank fixed effect, thus focusing on the variation of
individual bank value over time, while Laeven and Levine (2007) and Baele et al. (2007) used
country fixed effects and are primarily interested in cross-sectional valuation differences. And
third, the control variables used are not identical. For instance, Elsas et al. (2010) argued that
including a profitability variable absorbed the valuation effect of diversification.4
In this study, we aim to reconcile the different results from previous studies by using a compre-
hensive framework with unified time periods, estimation approach, proxies for diversification and
type, and control variables. With this unified framework, we aim to shed new light on the differ-
ent results found in these three studies, i.e. whether these results are driven by institutional and
regulatory determinants of diversification, or whether they are caused by differences in method-
3For example, one measure of type used has a peculiar form going to infinity when interest-income share ap-
proaches one, which implies that tiny changes of interest-income share yield large changes in type.
4“When controlling for profitability, bank market value is not directly affected by diversification” (Elsas et al.,
2010, p. 1286).
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ology. To do so, we build three subsets of banks corresponding to the samples used in the three
prior studies of interest. In addition, we divide the total period into four subperiods to detect a
possible evolution over time. We summarise the estimation results in tabular and graphical form
to highlight the combined effect of type and diversification (predicted partial response of valuation
to type and diversification).
We employ Tobin’s Q as our valuation proxy. We use the same income-based and asset-based
measures of bank type and diversification as in Laeven and Levine (2007). The type variable is
defined as the ratio of net interest income to total operating income (or loans relative to total
earning assets). Diversification is defined as one minus the absolute value of the ratio of net
interest income minus other operating income divided by total operating income (or one minus
the absolute value of the ratio of net loans minus other earning assets divided by total earnings
assets). We further include bank-level control variables that account for a banks’ funding structure,
its operating profitability, bank-efficiency, loan losses provisions, risk, growth opportunities, size,
and equity. Finally, we include macroeconomic and regulatory control variables and use country
and year fixed effects.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. In each subperiod, the effects of type and
diversification are fairly similar for the three subsamples of the main prior studies. Thus, the
diversification effect does not seem to be influenced by regulatory or institutional factors. In the
first subperiod (1998-2002), we find a significant valuation premium for investment banks and a
significant diversification discount that both confirm the findings of Laeven and Levine (2007). The
graphical representation of the joint effect of type and diversification shows that the diversification
discount is mainly driven by a small number of rather extreme observations for banks with an
investment profile. The effect is considerably smaller in a robust regression. Among commercial
banks, valuation is not systematically related to the share of investment banking activities. Thus,
as long as the investment activities are not predominant, they are not rewarded by a valuation
premium. After the first period, the diversification discount and the type effect drop substantially.
Both effects practically vanish in the last subperiod (2010-2013).
Beyond the thematic of diversification, our paper shows the importance of using similar method-
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ological frameworks when similar topics are investigated. This is necessary to guarantee the compa-
rability of the results. Otherwise, it is fairly difficult to assess whether differences between studies
are genuine and can be attributed to e.g. institutional or regulatory factors, or whether they come
from methodological choices. If results from studies treating the same thematic are not directly
comparable, one risks drawing the wrong conclusion. Finally, our study underlines the importance
of replicating existing studies, e.g. when these existing studies come to strongly different results.
Profitability and other industry-specific determinants of banks’ cross-sectional returns
This study investigates the predicting power of profitability, industry-specific variables, and tra-
ditional market anomalies on the cross-section of bank stock returns. Our final sample includes
190,592 monthly returns for U.S. banks between 1980-2014. The profitability premium that re-
lates more profitable firms to higher stock returns has long been one of the least explored market
anomaly. In the past few years, however, it has attracted particular attention from the academic
literature. Several studies (e.g. Hou et al. (in press); Novy-Marx (2013)) have highlighted the
strong predicting power of profitability. Moreover, Fama and French (2014) have extended their
three-factor model to a five-factor model including a profitability-based factor.
Banks are typically excluded from asset pricing studies because they are different from firms
in other industries. Thus, the existence of the profitability premium, as well as other market
anomalies, remains largely unknown for a sizeable portion of listed companies. Furthermore,
because of the different nature of banks compared to firms in other industries, there may exist
important links between industry-specific variables and the cross-section of stock returns (Cooper
et al., 2003). Finally, since we include control variables accounting for well-known market anomalies
such as size, book-to-market, or past performance at different horizons, this study also provides
evidence about the predicting power of these anomalies in the banking industry.
Only few studies have investigated the predicting power of market anomalies in the banking
industry. These studies are limited to book-to-market and size. Some of them have documented
the existence of size and book-to-market premiums (e.g. Baek and Bilson (2014); Barber and Lyon
(1997)) similar to the nonfinancial industry, others (e.g. Cooper et al. (2003); Viale et al. (2009))
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found no effect. While they all used U.S. data, they did not cover the same time periods, which
may be the reason why they have come to different results. To our knowledge, the predicting power
of profitability and momentum have never been explored within the banking industry. As for the
predicting power of banking industry-specific variables on the cross-section of expected returns,
no study has, to our knowledge, been conducted so far. Only Cooper et al. (2003) have covered
a related topic by trying to relate quarterly changes in industry-specific variables to stock returns
in order to analyse the impact of good/bad news shocks.
In the empirical analysis, there is no consensus regarding the best measure of economic prof-
itability. While Novy-Marx (2013) used gross profit divided by total assets, Fama and French
(2006, 2008) used income before extraordinary items divided by book value of equity. We use
several profitability proxies covering several earnings positions and profitability aspects down the
income statement, namely Pre-impairment income scaled by total assets, Operating income scaled
by total assets, Pre-tax income scaled by total assets, and Net income scaled by book equity. We
consider several industry-specific variables, namely loan loss provisions scaled by total assets, the
ratio of loans to total earnings assets, the degree of asset diversification, the ratio of customers’
deposits to total liabilities, and common equity scaled by total assets. Finally, we include control
variables accounting for well-known market anomalies such as book-to-market, size, past perfor-
mance at a horizon of one month (short-term return reversal), and past performance at a horizon
of twelve to two months (momentum).
In order to assess the predicting power of the various explanatory variables on the cross-section
of monthly returns, we use three main methods. First, we look at average monthly returns for
portfolios formed on one-way sorts, and then at the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) monthly
cross-sectional regression. We further analyse intercepts from the four-factor model of Carhart
(1997) to investigate the presence of excess returns above and beyond those suggested by the
four-factor model. We also employ portfolios’ Sharpe ratios to examine whether cross-sectional
profitability is due to increasing risk. In addition, we conduct several robustness tests of our
results. Namely, we increase the number of control variables per specification, we use an alternative
approach to address extreme values, we consider the possibility that our results may be driven by
192
Conclusion
small caps, and we look at the evolution of the coefficient estimates over time.
Our main results are as follows. First, we find mixed evidence regarding the predicting power
of profitability. Evidence from Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression suggests a
positive relationship between profitability and expected stock returns. However, further analy-
sis shows that small market capitalisations are very influential in explaining this result; once the
smallest market capitalisations are excluded from the analysis, the statistical significance of the
relationship disappears. In addition, results from one-way sorts of returns on profitability are
largely inconclusive and do not point to the existence of a profitability premium. Similarly, evi-
dence indicating the presence of abnormal returns suggested by significant intercepts of long−short
portfolios regressed on the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) are very limited. These findings
contrast with recent, clear-cut evidence from Novy-Marx (2013) suggesting that profitability is a
strong predictor of expected cross-sectional returns. Thus, the profitability premium seems to be
much more pronounced among nonfinancial firms than it is in the banking industry.
Second, among traditional market anomalies, we find evidence suggesting that book-to-market,
size, and past performance at a horizon of one month can predict the cross-section of expected
returns. Results regarding past performance at a horizon of one month, suggesting short-term
return reversal, stand out from the other variables considered in terms of economic and statistical
significance. In the one-way sort portfolios, we find an average monthly return of 2.079% for
the long−short portfolio as well as a statistically significant intercept suggesting excess returns of
2.12% in the time series regression. In Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression, the
statistical significance of this variable stands out as well. Finally, the effect is particularly stable
over time and persistent in all portfolios sorted on size, meaning that this short-term return reversal
does not result from high volume transactions among small, illiquid stocks. We also find convincing
evidence regarding the predicting power of book-to-market. As for the predicting power of size, it
appears to be, similar to profitability, largely driven by the smallest market capitalisations. Finally,
our results do not suggest that past performance at a horizon of two to 12 months (momentum)
can effectively predict expected stock returns.
And third, for industry-specific variables, our results show that loan loss provisions, loan share,
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and activity diversification can all predict the cross-section of expected stock returns. Banks
with a lower ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets, a lower share of loans to total earnings
assets, and a higher degree of assets diversification are associated with higher returns. We find
convincing evidence in most of our tests (Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, one-way sort
portfolios, intercepts from time series regression). Finally, we find only limited evidence regarding
the predicting power of deposit share, and none regarding the predicting power of equity.
Earnings management in banking: Dissecting the kink
This paper uses a distributional approach to explore earnings management for a sample of in-
ternational banks including 27,585 bank-years observations between 1999-2013. Banks are often
excluded from earnings management studies since several characteristics of this industry require
a separate approach. Thus, various aspects of banks’ earnings management remain largely unex-
plored. We start by investigating the existence of a smooth pre-managed earnings distribution and
the presence of a kink in the distribution of various earnings measures down the income statement.
We then analyse earnings streams happening between these two earnings measures in order to in-
vestigate what components of earnings contribute to the kink, and whether earnings management
is behind the kink.
To our knowledge, the only study using a distributional approach to investigate earnings man-
agement in banking was conducted by Shen and Chih (2005). The authors used various statistical
tests to analyse the presence of a kink around zero earnings. This irregularity was reported in
previous studies of the nonfinancial industry. Shen and Chih (2005) confirmed the presence of
a kink, and interpreted this kink as evidence of earnings management without conducting any
further analysis. In addition, they did not explore the presence of a smooth pre-managed earn-
ings distribution, nor did they analyse earnings streams in order to investigate whether earnings
management was behind the kink. To our knowledge, only Dechow et al. (2003) investigated these
topics, but for the nonfinancial industry.
In order to assess the presence of an irregularity around zero earnings as well as the magnitude of
this irregularity, we rely on graphical evidence by plotting histogram of various earnings measures
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of the income statement. To formally assess the results, we use three statistical tests used in
studies of the empirical literature. To assess whether earnings management is responsible for the
kink, we compare earnings streams from banks in different earnings groups (negative earnings,
small earnings, higher earnings). Again, we rely on graphical evidence and on a formal test to
assess the significance of the results.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we show the existence of a smooth, pre-managed earn-
ings distribution (Pre-impairment operating profit) in the banking industry, thus echoing findings
from Dechow et al. (2003) for the nonfinancial industry. We further show that the distribution
of Net income is characterised by a kink around zero earnings. In order to examine which com-
ponents contribute to the kink, we examine different earnings streams that occur between these
two earnings measures. We show that the distribution of Net income is asymmetrically shifted
to the left relative to the distribution of Pre-impairment operating profit, and this shift causes
the kink. This shift affects mostly banks with positive earnings. More specifically, banks with
relatively high pre-managed earnings are disproportionally shifted to the left compared to banks
with smaller positive earnings. This partial shift reflects higher earnings streams among banks
with higher pre-managed earnings, i.e. earnings streams reducing more heavily reported earnings.
This finding is compatible with a loss avoidance story predicting that firms manage earnings in
order to report profits, even small ones. Compared to banks with higher pre-managed earnings
that can afford stronger hits, banks with modest earnings are more likely to understate subsequent
earnings streams to avoid reporting losses. This difference in earnings streams among these two
earnings categories gives rise to an accumulation of observations in the small earnings area causing
the kink.
The decomposition of total earnings stream shows that banks with higher pre-managed earnings
have on average (1) higher impairment charges on loans, securities, and other credits as well as
(2) higher tax expenses relative to smaller earnings banks. We show that both earnings streams
are responsible for the apparition of the kink and its subsequent reinforcement. In the light of
these results, earnings management appears to be an explanation for the kink, but only a partial
one. The use of impairment charges for earnings management purposes is well-known and has
195
Conclusion
been largely documented in the banking literature. Thus, the difference in terms of impairment
charges among earnings groups is likely to reflect at least some degree of earnings management. It
is, however, less likely that earnings management is the main driver behind the kinking effect of
taxation. Given that tax expenses are largely a positive function of earnings, the fact that banks
with higher earnings have higher tax expenses can rationally be expected without an earnings
management explanation. Thus, our results tend to indicate that earnings management is only
a partial explanation for the kink. We conduct several robustness tests of our results, both for
the different earnings management statistics and for the mean difference tests of earnings streams
among different earnings groups. In these robustness tests, we consider sample splits according to
geographical criteria, a different scaling of earnings, and the possibility that a banks’ main activity
can have an influence on the results. We also consider alternative measures for our statistical tests.
Overall, these robustness tests largely confirm our main findings.
The existence of a kink in the distribution of reported earnings is often interpreted as evidence
of earnings management without further investigation. Similarly, the magnitude of the kink is often
used to gauge the degree of earnings management. Given our findings, this is not unproblematic.
Our study suggests that tax expenses have a kinking effect without being an obvious target of
earnings management practices. Thus, at least part of the kink is not caused by earnings manage-
ment since other factors, tax expenses in our case, also contribute to this irregularity. Interpreting
the presence of a kink around zero earnings as evidence of earnings management without further
investigation therefore bears the risk of drawing wrong conclusions.
Shadow banking
Finally, I would like to conclude this thesis with some thoughts on shadow banking. While this
thesis was dedicated to the traditional banking system, several activities traditionally carried out
by banks tend to be increasingly fulfilled within the shadow banking system.
The International Monetary Fund (2014, p. 65) defines shadow banking as “... financial in-
termediaries or activities involved in credit intermediation outside the regular banking system, and
therefore lacking a formal safety net”, while Shiller (2012, p. 43) defines shadow banks as “...merely
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financial institutions that manage to escape banking regulation by designing themselves so that they
do not fit the definition of commercial banks. They do not literally accept deposits, but instead get
the money they lend in slightly different ways.” Examples of shadow banks include the now-failed
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Shadow banks typically obtain commercial securitised loans
or mortgages and enter into repurchase agreements with institutional investors, using the securities
as collateral. That business creates liquid investments for institutional investors, which resemble
deposits, and so the shadow bankers are in effect creating money as well. Thus, their activities may
involve a risk of collapse of the entire economic system, just as with commercial banks (Shiller,
2012).5
In the past few decades, an upward trend in the size of shadow banking has been observed. As
a result, shadow banking now constitutes a non-negligible fraction of total financial intermediation
in many developing as well as emerging countries (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 as illustrations of
the importance of shadow banking in the U.S.).
Figure 5.1: Bank lending to the private non-financial sector, U.S. 1952-2013
Source of the data: Banks for International Settlements
5Another example is the structured investment vehicle (SIV), which was created by commercial banks before
the financial crisis of 2007; they hoped to escape regulation by putting some of their business into the SIV’s, which
were considered separate (and unregulated) entities.
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Table 5.1: Assets of financial institutions, U.S. 2002-2013
Year Financial Central Banks Insurance Pension Public Other
institutions bank companies funds institutions intermediaries
USD % FI USD % FI USD % FI USD % FI USD % FI USD % FI USD % FI
2002 42,173 100.00 754 1.79 9,767 23.16 4,270 10.12 8,503 20.16 5,711 13.54 13,169 31.23
2003 46,546 100.00 797 1.71 10,570 22.71 4,832 10.38 9,337 20.06 6,141 13.19 14,869 31.94
2004 51,320 100.00 841 1.64 11,787 22.97 5,289 10.31 10,241 19.96 6,270 12.22 16,892 32.91
2005 55,655 100.00 879 1.58 12,806 23.01 5,597 10.06 10,942 19.66 6,370 11.45 19,061 34.25
2006 61,385 100.00 908 1.48 14,014 22.83 6,021 9.81 11,697 19.06 6,716 10.94 22,028 35.89
2007 67,526 100.00 951 1.41 15,362 22.75 6,336 9.38 12,292 18.20 7,640 11.31 24,945 36.94
2008 67,403 100.00 2,271 3.37 16,944 25.14 5,820 8.63 11,723 17.39 8,371 12.42 22,274 33.05
2009 68,451 100.00 2,267 3.31 16,936 24.74 6,204 9.06 12,717 18.58 8,425 12.31 21,902 32.00
2010 69,528 100.00 2,453 3.53 17,040 24.51 6,528 9.39 14,036 20.19 7,862 11.31 21,609 31.08
2011 71,143 100.00 2,947 4.14 17,948 25.23 6,717 9.44 14,377 20.21 7,785 10.94 21,369 30.04
2012 75,378 100.00 2,955 3.92 19,314 25.62 7,054 9.36 15,148 20.10 7,712 10.23 23,195 30.77
2013 81,269 100.00 4,074 5.01 20,204 24.86 7,508 9.24 16,350 20.12 7,931 9.76 25,203 31.01
Banks refer to the broader category of deposit-taking institutions and also include U.S. holding companies. Insurance companies include property-casualty
insurers and life insurers. Pension funds’ assets include the unfunded claims on the sponsor for private pension funds, state and local retirement funds, and
federal retirement funds. Numbers are in USD billion. Source of the data: Financial Stability Board.
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Traditional banks are adversely affected by these new competitors from shadow banking that
do not face the same barriers of entry into banking and are not subject to the same regulatory
constraints.6 Thus, traditional banks may have felt the need to behave like shadow banks and
to enter unconventional new lines or activities (e.g. originating subprime mortgage securities),
ultimately creating risk for the entire economic system. While shadow banking has the potential
to play a beneficial role for the economy by complementing traditional banking (e.g. by expanding
access to credit or support market liquidity), the financial crisis of 2007-2008 has also revealed the
threat that it can pose to overall economic activity (International Monetary Fund, 2014). It is
therefore important for the sake of financial stability to understand and properly monitor shadow
banking.
The academic literature about shadow banking, and particularly the empirical literature on
this topic, is still in its nascent stage. Given the important size of shadow banking, this area
could turn out to be one of the next promising field of research in finance. As noted by the
International Monetary Fund (2014), the scarcity of data has so far substantially limited the scope
of empirical studies. Given the need to better understand and monitor shadow banking because of
its systematic riskiness (e.g. assessment of maturity mismatches, liquidity risks, interconnectedness
with traditional banking), one can rationally expect that the necessary data will be collected. A
first example is the recent release by the Bank for International Settlements of a database on
credit to the private sector. In addition to the provision of credit by domestic banks covered by
traditional domestic bank credit series, this database also includes debt held by the nonfinancial
sector as well as cross-border lending (see Dembiermont, Drehmann, and Muksakunratana (2013)
for more information on this database).
6New regulations, notably the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, are designed to put many of these shadow
banking activities under stronger regulation to help prevent a repeat of the crisis.
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Table 5.1: Regression results - Trimmed dependent variable
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −0.104∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.017 −0.143∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.025
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.37) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.25)
Diversity −0.050∗∗ 0.006 0.021 −0.020∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗
(0.01) (0.67) (0.18) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Deposit share 0.036 0.045∗∗ 0.043∗∗ −0.021 0.048∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ −0.019
(0.21) (0.01) (0.05) (0.29) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.31)
Wholesale share 0.030 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ −0.020 −0.002 0.034∗∗ 0.032 −0.020
(0.22) (0.00) (0.03) (0.20) (0.94) (0.04) (0.15) (0.18)
Operating profit −0.034 0.009 0.059 0.056 −0.013 0.014 0.031 0.043
(0.67) (0.90) (0.52) (0.42) (0.87) (0.85) (0.72) (0.53)
Cost-to-income 0.004 −0.001 0.002 −0.070∗ 0.006 −0.003 0.002 −0.068∗
(0.52) (0.92) (0.52) (0.09) (0.29) (0.76) (0.49) (0.09)
Loan loss provisions 0.622 2.719∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗ 0.474∗∗ 0.631 2.549∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 0.469∗∗
(0.29) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.25) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03)
Z-Score 0.007∗∗ −0.002 −0.003 0.002 0.007∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 0.002
(0.02) (0.32) (0.10) (0.19) (0.01) (0.73) (0.50) (0.13)
Growth in assets −0.012∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001 0.000 −0.010∗∗ −0.002∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.33) (1.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.82) (0.92)
Log assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.84) (0.87) (0.92) (0.80) (0.32) (0.88) (0.77) (0.72)
Equity 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗
(0.11) (0.03) (0.43) (0.05) (0.20) (0.06) (0.52) (0.05)
Observations 3404 5144 4471 6571 3404 5144 4471 6571
R-squared 0.167 0.402 0.292 0.273 0.188 0.403 0.293 0.274
Macroeconomic
control variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulatory control
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Table 5.2: Regression results - Market-to-book value
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −1.291∗∗∗ −0.508∗∗∗ −0.666∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −1.547∗∗∗ −0.806∗∗∗ −0.634∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Diversity −0.355∗ 0.104 0.278∗∗ −0.201∗ −0.690∗∗∗ −0.423∗∗∗ −0.191∗ −0.045
(0.08) (0.42) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.62)
Deposit share 0.162 0.163 0.395∗∗ 0.099 0.302 0.249 0.423∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.51) (0.45) (0.02) (0.49) (0.19) (0.24) (0.01) (0.62)
Wholesale share 0.558∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.194 −0.131 0.182 0.388∗∗ 0.045 −0.134
(0.02) (0.00) (0.11) (0.19) (0.44) (0.02) (0.73) (0.21)
Operating profit 7.756∗∗∗ 16.918∗∗∗ 5.738∗∗ 1.959 7.536∗∗∗ 14.559∗∗∗ 5.584∗∗ 1.870
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.12)
Cost-to-income 2.716∗ −0.115 0.295 1.052 1.353 −0.758 0.436 1.143
(0.08) (0.95) (0.70) (0.48) (0.36) (0.69) (0.58) (0.44)
Loan loss provisions 0.072 −0.242∗∗∗ 0.047∗ −0.260 0.090∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗ −0.240
(0.12) (0.00) (0.06) (0.26) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.28)
Z-Score −0.201∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗ −0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.38)
Growth in assets 1.260 1.710∗ 0.228 2.472∗∗ 0.868 1.227 0.237 2.578∗∗
(0.24) (0.07) (0.78) (0.04) (0.42) (0.17) (0.79) (0.03)
Log assets 0.158∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.007 0.039∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.009 0.035∗∗
(0.00) (0.16) (0.68) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.58) (0.02)
Equity −1.044 −3.977∗∗∗ −1.608∗∗∗ −0.045 −0.778 −3.924∗∗∗ −1.687∗∗∗ −0.061
(0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.85)
Observations 3421 5171 4490 6595 3421 5171 4490 6595
R-squared 0.279 0.269 0.297 0.217 0.296 0.273 0.289 0.216
Macroeconomic
control variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulatory control
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Table 5.3: Regression results - Reduced form regression
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −0.165∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.018 −0.193∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.016
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.42) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.49)
Diversity −0.075∗∗ 0.007 0.013 −0.023∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.022
(0.03) (0.71) (0.47) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13)
Operating profit 1.269 3.375∗∗∗ 0.415 0.367 1.337∗ 3.177∗∗∗ 0.384 0.368
(0.11) (0.00) (0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.00) (0.22) (0.21)
Log assets 0.003 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.004 −0.004∗∗ −0.005∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.16) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Observations 3421 5171 4490 6595 3421 5171 4490 6595
R-squared 0.161 0.351 0.233 0.285 0.189 0.353 0.234 0.285
Macroeconomic
control variables
No No No No No No No No
Regulatory control
variables
No No No No No No No No
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Table 5.4: Regression results - IV: Activity restrictions
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −0.093∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.134∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.029∗
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
Diversity 0.808∗ 9.203∗∗∗ −0.037 −0.165 −0.246∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ −0.001 0.046
(0.08) (0.00) (0.97) (0.43) (0.02) (0.00) (1.00) (0.63)
Observations 3421 5171 4490 6595 3421 5171 4490 6595
R-squared 0.020 0.028 0.060 0.008 0.040 0.043 0.059 0.009
Macroeconomic
control variables
No No No No No No No No
Regulatory control
variables
No No No No No No No No
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Table 5.5: Regression results - IV: Diversification others
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −0.098∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.139∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.71)
Diversity −0.096 0.092 0.149∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 3421 5170 4478 6575 3421 5170 4478 6575
R-squared 0.019 0.018 0.067 0.015 0.039 0.042 0.079 0.026
Macroeconomic
control variables
No No No No No No No No
Regulatory control
variables
No No No No No No No No
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Table 5.6: Regression results - IV: Lagged diversification
1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 1998-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
Asset-based measures Income-based measures
Type −0.085∗ −0.060∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.019 −0.092∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.05) (0.00) (0.66) (0.20) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24)
Diversity −0.181∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.014 −0.202∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.017
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44)
Observations 3238 5129 4474 6555 3238 5129 4474 6555
R-squared 0.117 0.253 0.219 0.278 0.141 0.273 0.225 0.278
Macroeconomic
control variables
No No No No No No No No
Regulatory control
variables
No No No No No No No No
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
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